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Abstract 
The Gulf Cooperation Council, Law and Institution: Implications for the 
Member States 
Ali M. Al-Mehaimeed 
Subsequent to numerous bilateral and multilateral cooperation attempts 
during the 1970's, the States of the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and 
Kuwait established a regional organisation, the GCC, on 25 May 1981 with the 
underlying objectives of promoting cooperation and development in all fields, with 
special emphasis on the economic sphere. 
The aim of this study is to elucidate and analyse the constitutional formation 
of the GCC as well as its international and national legal status and to gauge the 
implication of the analysis for the Member States. 
The study is introduced by the background chapter which traces the political 
history of the Member States and their pre-GCC cooperation efforts. It further 
delineates how and when the idea of embarking upon such an institutionalised 
cooperation was born and eventually materialised. 
Chapter two dissects the constitutional framework of the GCC. Besides an 
identification of GCC stated and imphed objectives and principles, it treats the issues 
on membership, unilateral withdrawal, reservation to provisions of the Charter and 
amendment thereof. It also portrays the GCC organs and classifies them into principle 
ones, ancillary and specialised ministerial committees. Having identified the 
decision-making organ, it concludes with an attempt to investigate the way GCC 
decisions are initiated and finally made; their nature as well as legal force is also 
determined. 
Abstract 
The legal personality of the GCC both under international law and under 
municipal law of Member States is examined in chapter three. Chapter four ventures 
into determination of the characteristics of the GCC along the spectrum of 
international associations. 
As an organisation aiming in the long run at integration amongst its Member 
States, consideration of the status of its legal acts within municipal law of each 
Member is of import for such undertaking purports to unfold and classify the type of 
relationship between GCC law and domestic law of Member States, and its 
effectiveness in pursuing the sought objective. 
Accordingly, the study embodies chapters five and six which give an account 
of GCC substantiative economic law, and, at the same time, show in practical terms 
how GCC programmes are being elaborated, sanctioned and received by the legal 
systems of Member States. Questions raised by these chapter regarding the character 
of GCC law and its relationship with municipal law of Member States are answered 
in chapter seven. 
The concluding chapter highlights the findings of the study. In addition, it 
points out to the institutional shortcomings, and in light of the overall findings of the 
study it recommends the establishment of a GCC court of justice and a specialised 
supervisory organ. Thoughts on the future outlook of the GCC concludes the whole 
study. 
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Preface 
Founded on 25 May 1981, the GCC marked the first comprehensive attempt 
amongst its Members, the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait, to 
furnish legal rules for co-operation as well as institutional structure and procedures 
whereby these will be administered. Invariably, its creations brought legal problems 
of internal as well as external character which need be tackled under various branches 
of international law. 
Treatment of such legal issues of the GCC in a simple coherent whole is the ^ 
purpose of this study. It aims at describing and analysing the constitutional structure 
and status of the GCC and considering the implications of the analysis for the legal 
systems of the Member States of the GCC. These implications caimot be understood 
entirely in terms of the institutions of the GCC but must take into account its 
objectives and programmes. The enquiry will concentrate on the GCC's economic 
aims. Because economic co-operation is a major objective of the GCC, it is inevitable 
that attention be given to the process of economic integration of the European 
Communities. This shows what can be achieved and what must be achieved for 
effective economic co-operation. However, as will be shown, the GCC is not a 
supranational institution like the EC and the legal systems of the Member States are 
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not integrated with the legal order of the GCC. It will not be possible, therefore, for 
the GCC to replicate exactly the mechanisms of the EC. On the other hand, the 
objectives of the GCC are similar to those of the EC. The importance of the EC 
experience to the GCC is to demonstrate that where certain choices may be made 
about the elaboration of progranmies, about the legal status of the norms of GCC 
system and about the relationship between GCC law and national, those choices 
should be exercised in particular ways if the objectives of the GCC are to be pursued 
in the most effective way. 
As far as the organisation of the thesis is concerned, it proceeds in the 
following way. It begins with a description of the political history of the GCC States 
and their previous attempts at unity, integration and co-operation. This is a necessary 
preHminary to understanding the constitutional structure of the GCC and its general 
relationship wi th its Members. This background chapter concludes with a 
presentation of what the States have done, which is that they have entered into a treaty 
relationship with the enumerated content. 
The next chapter analyses this achievement f rom constitutional and 
institutional points of view. I t identifies the expHcit and impHcit objectives of the GCC, 
principles and the question of membership. I t includes discussion on the functional 
organs and their classifications into principal, ancillary and otherwise specialised 
ministerial ones. Examination of the decision making process, voting procedures and 
the legal status of GCC decisions concludes this chapter. 
The question of whether a separate legal person, the GCC, has been created 
by the founding treaties is treated in chapter three: The conclusion is that there has. 
The character of that legal person is determined by chapter four. Federalism, 
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supranationalism and confederalism are defined and their indicia elements are 
enumerated: The finding is that the GCC is an international organisation with 
confederal, but neither supranational nor federal, characteristics. 
As an international legal person, the authority of its legal acts within Member 
States is to be determined by the constitutional relationship between international 
law and domestic law in each particular State. In order to assess the ways in which 
these interrelations will arise, it is necessary to understand the range of the economic 
programmes undertaken by the GCC, their implementation and reception by national 
legal systems. 
This is furnished in chapters five and six. Substantive rules on the free 
movement of goods are the subject of the first. The second is concerned with those 
on the free mobility of persons. In both chapters, each GCC rule in followed by the 
implementing national measures. 
The study then turns again to the matter of the implementation of 
international legal rules in domestic legal orders. Chapter seven examines the issue 
and shows that it is seldom clearly or finally resolved. 
One further matter remains. However well disposed the officials of a legal 
system are towards international obligations, there remains the problem of identifying 
and applying those obligations, particularly when they are a matter of dispute. In the 
EC legal order, it is possible to obtain an authoritative judgement of any dispute from 
the European Court of Justice. Dispute settlement in the GCC is much more diffuse. 
The concluding chapter, therefore, recommends that a progress toward an organ with 
jurisdiction and authority similar to those of the ECJ would play a substantial part in 
Preface Xll 
eliminating the obstacles to uniform implementation of GCC law which exist at 
present. 
In addition, the final chapter summarises the findings of the entire study 
enumerates several recommendations and assesses the future prospect of the GCC. 
During the course of writing this thesis, a number of GCC documents have 
been obtained from various sources. They constituted an important basis for the study. 
Because they are used as a major reference throughout, it seemed the value of this 
study would be greatly increased if it included those referred to, as well as others which 
are more up to date. Volume Two was therefore prepared, edited and produced along 
with the thesis. 
As far as GCC sources are concerned, I have drawn so much on, as just 
pointed out, official records and GCC documents. Meetings and discussions with 
some key GCC officials shed light on some issues which could not be found in the 
documentary evidence. In particular I learned a great deal from my personal 
conversation with Mr AbduUa Bishara, the Secretary General, and the same from my 
personal interview with Dr. Mohammed As-Syari the Director of the Legal 
Department, 
Mention must be made of the fact that the GCC, as an international actor is 
only ten-years old, and, as wil l be noted, is undergoing a process of evolution. As such, 
conclusions reached in this study can be neither conclusive nor exhaustive. Within its 
framework, the six Members are practising regionalism, and in pursuance of 
integration. The process itself is neither blameworthy nor exceptionally praiseworthy: 
it represents the pragmatic approach of neighbouring States with much in common 
to achieve integration. 
Chapter One 
Political Background of the Members and 
Foundations of the GCC 
Introduction 
The endeavour embarked upon by the GCC is likely to involve issues and 
conceptions inherited from or influenced by past experiences of the Member States, 
in particular their political history before the creation of the GCC. What follows will 
be a brief account of their emergence as sovereign States. 
This is followed by an examination of the various antecedent efforts made at 
unity, cooperation and integration. For the purposes of simplification of these 
processes, they will be organised in accord with their date as well as their classification. 
Such an exercise should provide the basic grounding of the present cooperative 
experience of the GCC. 
Before attempts are made to analyse the GCC in light of its treaties and 
practice, the subject of the subsequent chapters, it is thought appropriate to explore 
how the idea of cooperation amongst the six States, in such a comprehensive manner, 
was born and how the GCC was subsequently established. 
lA: Birth of Modern States 
The political history of Members of the GCC in their current forms is 
relatively short, especially the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar which joined the international 
Political Background of the Members and Foundations of the GCC 
commmunity in 1971, and Kuwait ten years earlier. Prior to that, all Members had 
experienced more or less the same political history: They had constituted, in one form 
or another, parts of considerably large political communities. First they were parts of 
the various Islamic States from about the 620s-1250s, i.e. the periods of the Prophet 
and the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs, the Ummayyael Caliphate and the Abbasid 
Caliphate.^^^ 
Between the decline of the Abbasid Caliphate and the presence of the 
Ottoman influence in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, politically discrete entities 
such as Bahrain, Oman and Al-Ahsa, assumed, at times, their independence and hence 
administered their own internal and external affairs. Other times, however, these units 
acknowledged foreign authorities over them and thus only local matters were left for 
their discretion. 
The Ottoman Empire came to the region in the sixteenth century. Since then 
and until the first decades of the twentieth century several parts of Arabia and the 
Gulf were influenced to a variety of degrees by the Ottoman authority.^ "^^ 
Besides the Ottomans, European powers had developed interest in the Gulf 
region as early as the first decade of the sixteenth century, in particular the Portuguese, 
Dutch, French and B r i t i s h . B y far, it is the British presence in the Gulf that lasted 
longer, and, as wil l be noted, immediately pre-dated the independence of four GCC 
Member States. The British presence was consolidated by the end of the nineteenth 
and beginning of the twentieth centuries, as the Ottoman influence in the area was 
declining. During that period, Britain concluded treaties with the Rulers of Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar and the Emirates now constituting the U A E whereby Britain became 
the custodian of their defence and foreign affairs.^ "^^ 
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Britain as well as France maintained various treaty relations with Muscat 
during the ninteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Notwithstanding the advance of the Europeans, different parts in the 
mainland of Arabia continued acknowledging the authority of the Ottoman Empire 
until its collapse early in the twentieth century and the establishment of the third Saudi 
State.^ ^^ Hereunder follows how and when each Member of the GCC was established. 
lAA: The United Arab Emirates 
On 1 December 1971, the United Kingdom terminated the special treaties 
and all other agreements with the Trucial States, i.e. Abu Dhabi, Dhubai, Ajman, 
Fujairah, Umm-Al-Qaiwain, Sharjah and Ras A l - Khaimah On the following day, 
six emirates formed the State of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and signed a treaty 
of friendship with the United Kingdom The emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah joined 
the Union and thus became the seventh member in the Federation in February 1972 
The U A E was recognised by Britain and other countries as an independent 
sovereign State. By the end of December, 1971, the U A E had been accepted as a 
member of both the United Nations and the Arab League 
1A.II: Bahrain 
Bahrain gained its independence from Britain on 14 August 1971 ^^^\ In 
transferring sovereignty, Britain exchanged memoranda with Bahrain, explicitly 
abrogating the exclusive treaty and all other agreements between the United Kingdom 
and the State of Bahrain ^^^\ Shortly after the proclamation of its independence, most 
countries expressed their recognition of the new State. At the international 
organisations level, Bahrain was admitted to the United Nations and to the Arab 
Political Background of the Members and Foundations of the GCC 
League in September 1971 ^^^\ Since its independence, Bahrain has established 
relationships with most nations in the world. 
1A-III: Saudi Arabia 
The process of creating Saudi Arabia began in 1902 when Riyadh was 
recaptured, and ended with the proclamation that the United territories in the 
Arabian Peninsula were to be called the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Between the appearance of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in Najed in 1902, and the 
outbreak of the First World War in 1914, towns, villages and tribes of Najed and the 
Arabian shore of the Gulf submitted to his authority. As a result, he was the master 
of central Najed as well as the coast of Al-Ahsa in the Gulf. 
In the south-west of the peninsula, Asir was aimexed to the Abdul Aziz 
dominion in 1920. After a brief war, the dispute over boundaries with Yemen was 
settled in 1934. 
In 1921, Abdul Aziz shifted to the north where he seized Hail and other oases 
such as Jauf and Turayf. The Saudi force went further to the north extending Saudi 
territory. Therefore the northern frontiers between Najed, Kuwait and Iraq had to be 
negotiated and settled. 
Afterwards, Abdul Aziz turned to the western part of Arabia, Hijaz, where 
its ruler's position had weakened. Thus in September and October of 1924, Tife and 
Makkah respectively were in Abdul Aziz's hands. In 1925, he succeeded in eUminating 
the Hashimites, when they were driven out of Madinah and Jeddah. As a result, in 
1927, Abdul Aziz was proclaimed King of Hijaz and Najed and its Dependencies. 
Britain recognised Ibn Saud's Kingdom by the treaty of Jeddah in 1927, which freed 
Political Background of the Members and Foundations of the GCC 
the country from restrictions imposed by a previous treaty ^^^\ On 23 September 1932, 
the vast territories, 2,240,000 km^, united by King Abdul Aziz and his men, was 
renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ^ '^^ \ 
Since its formation, the Unitary State of Saudi Arabia has established 
diplomatic relationships wi th the international community, both States and 
international organisations. It is an original member of the Arab League, established 
in 1945 ^^^\ I t is also a founding member of the United Nations, also formed in 1945 
(16) 
1A.IV: Oman 
The legal status of Oman was not affected by the British protectorate policy 
in the Gulf. The formal relationships between the United Kingdom and Oman have 
been a series of treaties of commercial, friendship and non-alienation characters only, 
some of which were signed in 1798, 1891, 1902, 1923 and 1951 ^ ^ ^ l Nonetheless, it 
was not until 1970 that Oman's image on the international scene was enhanced ^^^\ 
Subsequent to 1970, Oman witnessed progressive changes at the national, regional 
and global levels. Nationally, apart from the economic and social achievements, the 
internal problem with the rebels was gradually resolved. Regionally, Oman has 
established relations with its neighbouring States as well as with other Arab countries. 
On the international level, it maintains relations with most countries of the world. In 
1971, Oman was accepted as a member of the United Nations and the Arab League 
(19) 
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1A.V: Qatar 
Qatar declared its fu l l independence from Britain on 1 September 1971 after 
the failure of attempts to agree terms for Union with Bahrain and the Trucial States 
The special treaty relationship between Qatar and the U K estabhshed in 1916 
was terminated through exchanged memoranda between the countries in September 
1971 In the same month, the new State's international identity was fully 
established when it was accepted into the United Nations and the Arab League ^ ^^\ 
Since then, the State of Qatar has undertaken the establishment of diplomatic 
relationships with neighbouring States as well as other countries of the world. 
1.A.VI: Kuwait 
The State of Kuwait was the first to be freed from the British protectorate 
system in the Gulf. It was declared independent ten years before its counterparts in 
the Gulf under that system. In June 1961, its sovereignty was transferred from Britain 
to the ruler of Kuwait through notes exchanged between the two countries, which 
terminated the special treaty of 1899 '^^ ^\ The exchanged notes, moreover, stipulated 
that: 
nothing... shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's Government to assist the 
Government of Kuwait if the latter request such assistance. 
Noticeably, this "assistance clause" was annulled by mutual consent in May 
1968 through another exchange of notes between United Kingdom and Kuwait ^^ '^ ^ 
I t should be noted that the "assistance clause" of 1961 has not been repeated in 
subsequent agreements between Britain and the rest of the protected States when the 
exclusive agreements with them were abrogated ^^^\ 
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In July 1961, Kuwait was accepted as a member of the Arab League. Likewise 
its application for membership of the United Nations was accepted in May 1963 '^^ \^ 
Since then, Kuwait has been an active participant in global politics. 
l .B: Paths to Gulf Unity 
Unity amongst the GCC Member States is an old phenomenon; apart from 
their unification during the Muslem empires, the Reformative Movement (1755 -
1818) had once unified them into one state. However when the Movement was 
stripped of its territories in the Gulf, intergrative efforts of any kind were undermined. 
Thus, i t was not until the mid-1950s that attempts at integration were re-activated. 
Although they were of limited success, they erected the foundation for subsequent 
attempts. When the British withdrew from the Gulf, the true desire of the people for 
integration appeared clear and soon resulted in the establishment of the United Arab 
Emirates. Yet, for more common actions, a new approach was needed to overcome 
barriers and unite the whole region. Therefore, in the 1970s the ultimate aim of unity 
was pursued through a gradual integrative process. This can be seen in the bilateral 
and multilateral agreements concluded after the independence of the States, the joint 
ventures and common institutions established throughout the 1970s, and finally the 
comprehensive and far-reaching terms of the GCC Charter. The following is an 
enumeration of the unification and co- operation processes up to the formation of the 
GCC. 
I.B.I: The Early Unification Process 
By the 18th century, Arabia, including the Gulf, had been divided into 
numerous tiny entities sharing common societal features, e.g ignorance, hunger, fears 
and polytheism. It was apparent that since this society had already experienced the 
Political Background of the Members and Foundations of the GCC 
same illness and had been successfully treated, the same treatment was to be reapplied 
if the society wished to recover. Islam had brought unity in the 7th century, and 
therefore, in the 18th century, Islam was seen as the only way to Uberation and 
unification. 
Therefore, in the mid-18th century. Shaikh Mohammad Ibn Abdul- Wahab 
^^ ^^  launched his Reformative Movement from Hurimla, in Najed. He aimed to preach 
that Muslems should return to the teaching of the Quran and tradition of the Prophet. 
The ultimate goal, though, was stipulated to be Arab unity under the banner of Islam. 
In Hurimla he preached the oneness of God and condemned acts prohibited in the 
Quran such as adultery, murder, theft, usury and drinking alcohol. However, he had 
to leave Hurimla after surviving an assassination attempt engineered by slaves of his 
town. His destination was Uyaina. 
In Uyaina, he gained a number of followers, including the ruler who promised 
the Shaikh fu l l protection and support They both undertook the destruction of 
trees and domes which were held sacred and invoked in the daily prayers ^^^\ They 
further applied Islamic law to several criminal acts. Those acts of the Shaikh and the 
ruler, nontheless, did not go unnnoticed. On the contrary: chiefs of tribes and rulers 
of some towns, especially the non-Sunny sects, forced the ruler of Uyaina to expel the 
Shaikh, which he did. 
Shaikh Mohammad left Uyaina for Dariyah where he had followers. The 
ruler of Dariyah, Mohammad b. Saud, advised by his wife, met with the Shaikh and 
promised to offer to his Movement every protection and support ^^^\ Most 
importantly, the historical Dariyah agreement of 1745 was signed by the two men. 
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which marked the beginning of the practical pursuance of the goals sought, i.e. 
hberation and unification of Arabia under the banner of Islam. 
The unification process started with the propagation in the neighbouring 
tribes of a peaceful return to the basic precepts of Islam. To this end, the Shaikh and 
the ruler sent followers to those tribes and to some Arab countries in an effort to invite 
them to join the Movement. Few positive responses were offered. Moreover, the rest 
announced their opposition to the Movement and finally they coalesced against it. 
A t this stage, a new approach was needed, especially when some followers, 
under the rule of some opponents, were unlawfully treated. It was presumed that 
preserving people's automony could only be achieved by means of establishing an 
Islamic State. To this end, Riyadh and nearby towns were annexed to Dariyah by 
1790, the vast land of Najed was under the Movement's authority 
The Muwahedun ^^^\ uniting force, then moved to the eastern part of Arabia. 
In 1796, Al-Ahsa was conquered and judges, preachers and Islamic scholars were 
appointed About 1800, Bahrain submitted to the authority of Dariyah. Attempts 
to annex Kuwait in the last decade of the 18th century were unsuccessful Groups 
and tribes at different points along the Gulf welcomed the Movement and accepted 
the idea of reversion to the early teaching of Islam; they were also impressed by the 
concept of liberating their lands from foreign powers of any kind and unifying it under 
one Islamic State. However, Muwahedun attention was directed towards the three 
local powers along the Arabian shore of the Gulf. Those powers were Muscat, the 
al-Qawasim confederation and the Bani Yas Union The question that occupied 
the minds of the Muwahedun was how to convince these powers to adopt the 
Movement. 
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The Qawasim pact consisted of a number of tribes situated in an area 
extending from Musaundom to Sharjah along the Arabian coast of the Gulf. 
Ras-al-Khaimah, an important sea port, was their main city. Others such as Sharjah, 
umm Al-Quwain and Ajman were either under the dominance of Ras Al-Khaimah or 
in alliance with it 
The Qawasim enrolled in the Movement at the beginning of the 19th century 
As well known seafarers and brave men, the Qawasim played a considerable role 
in fighting coloniahsm and spreading the movement throughout the Gulf region. As 
in most conquered territories, the Qawasim were allowed to be ruled by their own 
people; however they were provided with judges and Islamic scholars from Najed, to 
ensure justice and knowledge of Islam. 
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Oman submitted to Duriyah and 
paid an annual tribute of 50,000 Riyals, but it was administered locally. ^ ^^ ^ 
By 1805, most of the Arabian Coast of the Gulf was under the control of only 
one State, from Bussora to Dubba 
In the western part of Arabia, the Muwahedin captured Tif, Macca, Medina 
and Jaddah '^^ ^\ Asir, Najran and Hudiduh were also included in the new state '^^ ^\ 
In the north, the Movement reached the outskirts of Bagdad and Horan, now 
in Syria 
By 1810, those tiny entities in the Gulf and in Arabia in general had been 
unified into one State, for the first time after the death of the Prophet Mohammad. 
It came to include Najed, Ahsa, Bahrain, Arabian Gulf emirates, Hejaz, Asir, and 
portions of Yemen, a part of Iraq and a part of Syria. Those territories witnessed the 
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replacement of diversity and conflict by unity and holy war. Their political, economic, 
cultural and social aspects of life were improved noticeably by the Islamic system 
introduced by the new State ^'^\ Those achievements and developments were highly 
appreciated by people of Arabia as security, justice and unity were the predominant 
and distinctive features of the society; but since the region was interesting to external 
powers of the time as well, their views, regardless of their legitimacy, of the union 
were of considerable import. They either decided to side with it, against it or leave it 
alone. Thus, the questions are what were their views and what decision did they take? 
The views of the foreign powers were that this large Arab-Moslem State was 
a major threat to their interests in the region. Accordingly, they decided to work 
towards its total destruction if possible. If not, dividing it into small entities was the 
least goal. Two means were employed to achieve that end. One was conceptual, the 
other physical. 
In an attempt to separate conceptually this state from the rest of the Islamic 
world, they labelled its foundation, i.e. the Movement, Wahhabism '^^ \^ The message 
to Moslems was that this Movement founded by b. Abdul-Wahhab is different from 
the four Islamic schools of thought; and as such is an innovative sect which should be 
rejected. They hoped that through this propaganda the new state would lose Moslem 
sympathy when the physical means were used. 
On the battlefield, the Turks were demolishing the State from the West of 
the region, while the British force in the East watched the progress, waiting to take 
over the mission where the Turks left off. 
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Mohammad Ali, the Turks' Viceroy of Egypt, as well as his sons, stripped the 
State from its western, southern, northern and central territories, including the capital 
during the second decade of the 19th century In 1818, defenders of the State's 
capital, Dariya, after several months of fighting were unable to withstand the French 
heavy weapons used by the intruders. As a result, the city surrendered ^^''\ The eastern 
part of the State, i.e. the Arabian shore of the Gulf, was not targeted by the Egyptians, 
but foreign forces were there ready to demolish what was left of the State. Hence, in 
1819, Ras-Alkaima, the major city in the east, was totally destroyed; other emirates 
preferred to surrender before they too were wiped out 
Generally, although Britain is partly responsible for the frustration of the 
State, Mohammad Ali is by far more to blame not only because he aborted the State 
but also because he rendered the east powerless when Dariya was captured, and in so 
doing he provided the British with an opportunity to impose their colonial protection 
on the Arabian Gulf emirates. That system lasted for about 150 years taking the 
emirates away from any integration attempt in the Arabian Peninsula '^^ \^ 
Thus, when this State was reconstructed by Imam Faisal b. Turkey in the 
mid-19th century, only a small portion of the Gulf could be annexed to it ^ ^^\ 
When the third and last attempt at a united Arabia was made, annexation of 
the Gulf was not easily possible, for the British had comfortably established 
themselves. The exclusive agreement, the extra-territorial jurisdiction and boundaries 
between the emirates were novel features and undermined their inclusion with the 
rest of the unified territories. Therefore, the attempt resulted only in the 
establishment of the vast united land called Saudi Arabia ^^^\ 
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l .B.II: Co-operation Efforts 
Between 1820 and 1950, foreign powers' policies in the region fostered 
fragmentation of the emirates and completely separated them from the rest of Arabia 
and its efforts at unification and co-operation. However by 1950, the region had 
v/itnessed numerous changes which induced Britain to assess its policy of neglect in 
the area. Those events include the Arab awakening and, most importantly, discovery 
of oil. The new policy gave way to political, social and economic improvements which 
were the foundation for subsequent co- operative, federalistic and integrative 
achievements. Under the new poHcy bilateral agreement was approved, a unified land 
force was formed and a consultative council for the rulers was set up. 
In 1951, the Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS), a common land based force, was 
established to provide the Gulf emirates with internal peace and security ^^^\ It was 
commanded by a British officer assisted by Jordanians and other Arab officers. In 
addition to its headquarters in Sharjah, it maintained some camps in various places 
within the emirates 
In the late 1950s, the TOS was enlarged, and vested with power to defend the 
emirates against external aggression and to engage in extra-territorial combat, in 
addition to its original task as a peace keeping force. The record of its functional 
activities includes its participation in two external confrontations, i.e. the Buraimi 
Dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, and Southern Oman combats 
When the States gained their independence in 1971, the TOS was handed over to the 
federal government and thus became a nucleus for an advanced federal army. 
Another positive step which resulted from the post-1950s British policy was 
the formation of the Trucial States Council (TSC) in 1952 ^^^\ The Council was 
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composed of rulers of the seven Tmcial States, i.e. Abu Dhabi, Dhobi, Ras Al-Khaima, 
Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah and Umm Al-Qaiwain. Although the TSC was set up under 
the guardianship and presidency of Britain, it offered the rulers a chance to meet once 
again in an atmosphere which differed from that of the war-field; throughout its 
duration, they met and discussed matters of mutual concern in a peaceful and 
co-operative envirormient and reviewed their societies' needs. 
By the late 1950s, the rulers had showed a considerable interest in 
co-operation on social and economic matters, the result of which was a DeHberative 
Council comprising two representatives from each emirate aimexed to the TSC. The 
mission of the new council was to prepare proposals for, and implement 
recommendations of, the TSC. 
During the 1960s more developments along the road to closer co- operation 
occurred. The presidency of the TSC was handed to the rulers themselves, who elected 
the ruler of Ras Al-Khaimah as its chairman More importantly, the Trucial States 
Development Office and the Trucial States Development Fund were formed under 
the TSC supervision. 
The TSC, through the Development Fund, undertook to provide the emirates 
with the basic needs of the 20th century such as roads, education, health facilities, 
housing, electricity, telecommunications and other development programmes ^^^l 
Abu Dhabi alone subsidised 70% or more of the revenues of the Development Fund 
(58)^  The rest came from outside sources. 
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The above were the institutions that made the emirates come closer to each 
other in the economic, military and social fields; hence, the question is what did those 
institutions generate on the political level? 
No significant accomplishment could be attributed to them. However, it is 
obvious that the TSC provided the emirates with an opportunity to consider political 
co-ordination, taking into account the success they gained from their collaboration 
over socio-economic development. 
Yet, prior to 1968 when Britam decided to pull out, no advantage was taken of 
that oppormnity. No definite reason can be identified. The only co-operative effort that 
materiahsed was the agreement reached between Sharja and Fujairah in February 1958 
which stated that "there shall be unity between the parties, in good and bad times,..." ^^ \^ 
l .B.III: Federation Experiments 
In 1968, when Britain announced its intention to withdraw from the Gulf by 
the end of 1971, the rulers had to consider seriously the future of their mini-states. 
Each emirate was faced with deciding between two options: to work towards its own 
independence, or to join the other emirates in a federal government. The latter was 
the choice of all states, although each, during the transitional period 1968-1971, 
showed ability to act independently when each enjoyed self- government and freedom 
of decision regarding its future. 
People of the Gulf were optimistic about the unification of those states even 
though similar attempts had been made under similar circumstances but had not been 
realised 
Political Background of the Members and Foundations of the GCC 17 
a. The 9-nnember Union 
The first step towards unity was the agreement concluded between Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai in February 1968 to establish, under one flag, a federation between 
the two states ^^^\ This agreement called for entrusting the federal authority with 
security matters, social and education services, and citizenship and immigration ^^^\ 
Article 4 invited the other five States, Qatar and Bahrain to join the union and discuss 
the future of the region. The invitation was accepted; accordingly, a conference 
attended by all nine rulers was held in Dubai on 25-27 February 1968. The three days 
of deliberations produced an agreement to establish a federation signed on the last 
day by all nine rulers ^^^\ That union was to be called "the Federation of Arab 
Amirates" (FAA) Ultimate political authority was vested in a Supreme Council 
made up of the nine rulers ^^^\ Executive authority was entrusted to a federal Council 
Furthermore, the agreement provided for the estabhshment of a Supreme 
Federal Court (67) 
However, the accord ran into difficulties in its implementation process due, 
it seems, to its generality, vague terms and the unanimity provision. Negotiations over 
the implementation of the terms agreed upon in the agreement occupied the four 
sessions the Supreme Council held between July 1968 and October 1969 
Agreement in important matters such as the Union's constitution, budget and army 
was not reached. The disagreement, moreover, was intensified after the fourth round 
of negotiation, when the British Political Resident in the Gulf sent forward a message 
to the rulers urging them to overcome their difficulties and erect the basis for the 
projected federation. This note was considered by some members as unjustifiable 
interference in purely local matters which concerned their own future. As a direct 
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result, the meeting broke up when the rulers of Qatar and Ras Al-Khaima walked out 
of the negotiation room ending discussions at the rulers' level Attempts at the 
level of deputy rulers had also failed as their two meetings in 1970 broke down 
At this stage, a federation of nine members was inconceivable; first, because 
differences on some subjects of the accord remained umesolved, and second, Bahrain 
reactivated its old demands that the number of representatives in the Federal Council 
be proportional to population whilst other emirates suggested equal representation. 
This latter demand was insisted upon by Bahrain only after the Iranian claim to 
Bahrain was settled. Those two local reasons, as well as others such as Qatar and 
Bahrain's opposition to each other during the negotiations, with or without legitimate 
justifications, led to the failure of the nine member federation. On the other hand, it 
has been suggested that external powers did not encourage a union involving Qatar 
and Bahrain ^^ ^^ ; if so, the contention that internal and external forces collaborated 
in shaping the future of the Gulf would be valid. 
b. The 7-Member Union 
When it became clear that Britain would honour its promise to withdraw by 
the end of 1971 and the date came closer, speed in deciding the future of each emirate 
was necessary. Having realised that, the rulers of seven emirates - Qatar and Bahrain 
not included - held a meeting in Dubai on 10 July 1970, during which many nationals 
paid visits to various rulers urging them to launch a seven-member union On 18 
July 1971, the formation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was declared. The 
constitution of the nine member union was adopted with some modifications to suit 
the new federation. On 2 December 1971, its independence was proclaimed. Bahrain 
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and Qatar had already declared themselves independent in the same year, in August 
and September respectively. 
In brief, by the end of 1971, the future of the Gulf had been mapped out. At 
first, the map of the Gulf looked so bad that boundaries, passports and flags slowed 
down their interactions; however the subsequent numerous co-operative efforts in all 
forms, i.e. bilateral, multilateral and joint ventures in various fields, rendered those 
obstacles more of artifical barriers, particularly when the time for a Gulf citizenship 
is drawing closer.^ "^*^  The co-operative and integrative process which are gradually 
bringing the people of the Gulf together are discussed in the following section. 
l .B.VI: Partial Co-operation 
Between 1971, when the States gained independence, and 1981, when they 
established the GCC, many agreements were concluded and more than 30 institutions 
were jointly established in most fields, e.g. economic, information, culture, education 
and communications. They all aimed at self identity, soHdarity and integration. 
Education and cultural co-ordination: 
Deep concern about the educational bases, methods and goals guided the 
Gulf States to the estabUshment of the Arab Educational Office for the Gulf States 
in 1976, with its headquarters in Saudi Arabia The objectives of this Office are 
to co-ordinate the educational process at all levels, enhance the Islamic Arabic 
identity of the region, consolidate unity of the region's society, establish common 
educational institutions and spread Arabic, especially in Muslem countries ^^^\ 
Achievements of the Office include strengthening relations with regional and 
international centres for Arabic and Islamic studies, editing, publication and 
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Islamic source books and participation in a number of regional and international 
educational conferences.^ ^^^ 
In the late 1970s two educational bodies were established and attached to the 
Office; these are the Arab Centre for Educational Research located in Kuwait, and 
the Gulf University based in Bahrain 
Informational collaboration: 
The following are common establishments in the field of information: 
- The Gulf Corporation for the Production of Joint Television 
Programmes, based in Kuwait and established in 1976.('^ 9) 
- The Gulf News Agency (GNA), located in Bahrain and formed in 
1978.(80) 
- The Gulf Television, based in Saudi Arabia and set up in 1977.(^ 1) 
Economic cooperation 
Economic co-operation between the States has covered all economic aspects 
and taken various forms, all of which is an indicafion that the road to economic 
integration had already been marked when the GCC was established. The following 
are some of the joint economic projects and institutions. 
- The Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company, based in Bahrain, 
founded in the late 1970s.(82) 
- The Gulf International Bank, situated in Bahrain and formed in 
1975.(83) 
- The United Arab Shipping Company, located in Kuwait and launched 
in 1976.(84) 
- The Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in the Gulf States, 
based in Saudi Arabia and established in the late 1970s.(85) 
- The Gulf Organisation for Industrial Investment, located in Qatar, and 
founded in 1976.(86) 
- The Gulf Air, formed in 1950 and involving Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and 
the UAE.(87) 
- The Drydock, in Bahrain, was established in 1978.(88) 
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- The Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company, based in Bahrain and set 
up in 1981.(89) 
- The Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consultancy, located in Qatar, 
and launched in 1976.(90) 
- The Regional Fishery Survey and Development Project, based in Qatar 
and established in 1975.(91) 
- The Gulf Ports Union was established in 1976.(^ 2) 
- The Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) 
was established in 1968 and includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE from the GCC besides some other Arab 
countries. (9 )^ 
- The Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yards, based in Bahrain, and 
established in 1974.(94) 
Interaction in other fields 
Joint actions in fields such as health, agriculture, communication and social 
affairs were also undertaken by the States prior to the GCC. 
In 1976, a general secretariat for the Arab Gulf Health Ministers Council was 
set up in Saudi Arabia. ^ ^^ ^ 
In the agricultural field, two bodies have been established: the first is the 
Arab Gulf Agriculture Ministers Conference; the second, the Arab Gulf Ministerial 
Council.^ ^^^ 
In 1978, the Ministerial Council for Arab Gulf Labour and Social Affairs was 
formed. A follow-up committee, based in Bahrain, was annexed to it.^^^^ 
In 1971, the Permanent Committee of the Gulf Telecommunication was 
established, based in Bahrain and involving Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE ^^^\ 
Now all GCC Members are subscribers to it, and it has been converted to a GCC 
institution. 
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The Gulf Postal Association was established in 1977 by Bahrain, Qatar, 
Kuwait, Oman, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It aims to co- ordinate and develop 
the postal services, exchange ex-pertise and unify the postal systems in the Member 
States 
l .C: Emergence and Establishment of the GCC 
The idea of establishing an integrated regional body was born in the 1970s; 
yet, it was not until 1981 that this idea materialised. This was largely due, it is thought, 
to the fact that the States had learned much about different kinds of association and 
about the approaches to be employed in pursuing each, both at the Gulf level and at 
the Arab level. Therefore, during the decade of discussions and preparation stages, 
the States made sure that the best and most well-considered means were employed 
in pursuing the aim of Gulf integration. In this section, the birth of the idea of close 
and institutionalised co-operation will be traced, as well as the formation process of 
the GCC. 
Leaders of the Gulf States, long before the GCC was set up, had expressed 
the view that Gulf integration had become a pressing need for development of the 
region. In 1970 Sultan Qaboos b Saaid of Oman expressed his willingness to maintain 
close co-operation with neighbouring states. He said: 
This will be our long-term policy under which we will maintain consultations for 
the future well being of our region (lOl). 
In 1976, Oman hosted a conference for the Foreign Ministers of the Gulf 
States. Security of the region, development and advancement for the well-being of the 
peoples of the Gulf and the promotion of co- ordination in all spheres were, according 
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to the Sultan of Oman, the prime purposes of the conference This meeting was 
the first practical step towards the estabhshment of the GCC. 
Following the Oman Conference, the conceptual efforts for close co-
operation were intensified. They all called for the finding of ideal and sound bases for 
co-operation. The Crown Prince of Bahrain, Shaikh Hamad b Isa Al-Khalif a, observed 
the need for collective work in all fields as a prerequisite for sound development, when 
he stated: 
Since this is the age of major powers and nations, there is no place for small 
countries to survive on their own and should they try to do so, they will definitely 
experience more backwardness and pressures, while the advanced nations will 
continue to enjoy more progress and advancement. All this prompts us to believe 
in the principle of co- operation based upon good faith and a clear vision (103). 
The President of the UAE, Shaikh Zayed b Sultan, had also expressed the 
need for Gulf integration based on "sound political, cultural, social and economic 
principles", which would enable it: 
to hold out in the face of challenges and will help it to withstand external storms 
and pressures (104). 
The Amir of Kuwait, who was then the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, 
also expressed his view regarding the future of the region, which was that of: 
creating a form of unity or federation that is based upon firm and sound 
foundations for the benefit and stability of the peoples of the region (10 )^. 
The second pracUcal step to establishing the GCC was the tour made in 1978 
by Shaikh Saad A. Al-Sabah, Kuwait's Crown Prince and Prime Minister, to the 
capitals of Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia. Those visits showed 
positively the determinafion of those States to maintain more comprehensive 
co-operation than that which they already had. The Kuwaiti-Omani Communique 
states: 
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The two parties, after reviewing relations between the Gulf States and the 
prevailing circumstances, agreed on the need for the closest possible formula of 
co-operation between its states within the framework of their Islamic concepts, 
historical relations and similarities of affairs, and in response to the aspirations 
of the region's people to realize greater progress and stability (106). 
The Kuwaiti-Bahraini Communique states the two sides' determination: 
to lay down a verified plan for poUtical, economic, social and educational 
performance (1^7), 
The Kuwaiti-Qatari Communique reads, in part, that: 
The two sides held an identical view on the critical situation prevailing in the 
region and the need for collective and speedy action towards unity of its Arab 
States which is determined by the nature of their historical relations and 
similarities and also to cope with the desire to achieve progress and welfare (i^^) 
In Abu Dhabi, the joint Kuwaiti-UAE Communique states: 
reviewing the prevailing situation in the Gulf, the two sides agreed on the need 
for a collective and speedy move to realize unity of the Arab Gulf States 
emanating from their religious and national linkage and to achieve aspirations 
of their people for progress and prosperity (1^9). 
In Riyadh, an excerpt of the Kuwaiti-Saudi joint Communique reads: 
after reviewing the prevailing situation on the Arab peninsula and in the Gulf 
region, the two sides affirm their belief that continuity of positive efforts to 
strengthen all aspects of co-operation is a natural duty. The two sides affirm their 
concern that the region should remain a zone of peace and stability removed 
from international struggles. Relations between its States should be maintained 
on a strong basis of mutual respect, organized co-ordination and effective 
solidarity, with the aim of utilizing their substantial joint potential in serving 
their people (^ ^O). 
In 1980 the sbc leaders of the GCC States discussed the establishment of a 
Co-operation Council, while attending the Arab Summit in Amman, Jordan.^ ^^ ^^  This 
meeting was the third practical step towards the launching of the GCC. 
The fourth practical step was taken in February of 1981, when the Gulf Heads 
of State met on the sidelines of the Islamic Summit Conference in Al-Tife, Saudi 
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Arabia. This meeting resulted in an agreement to set up a co-operation council for 
the six States, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Saudi Arabia. 
Formal declaration of the six States' agreement to establish a regional 
organisation to include the six participants was issued at the end of the meeting held 
on 4 February 1981 by the Foreign Ministers of the six States ^^^^\ They agreed to 
hold another meeting in Muscat on 8 March 1981, with the understanding that it would 
be preceded by two expert meetings, which would be entrusted with drafting the 
agreement reached regarding the establishing of the regional entity called the Gulf 
Co-operation Council. The joint statement issued at the end of the meeting reads: 
Since the United Arab Emirates, State of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar and State of Kuwait realise the very close 
relations amongst them and the common features arising from their own 
religion, similarity of their regions, unity of their heritage, identical pohtical, 
social and demographic structures and their shared cultural background; and 
since these States are desirous of deepening and developing co-operation and 
CO- ordination amongst them in various fields, they have agreed to establish a 
new organisation to be called the Gulf Co- operation Council, to be based in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This Council will serve as the medium for achieving a 
higher degree of co-ordination, integration and cohesion in all fields and for 
forging closer links between its members in various spheres. The GCC will seek 
to establish similar systems in the fields of economy, finance, education, culture, 
social welfare, health services, transportation and communications, 
information, passports and immigrafion, travel, commercial affairs, customs, 
shipping, legal and legislative affairs (ii3). 
The historic day of the formafion of the GCC was followed by official 
meetings at various levels. These meetings were preparatory ones, and were assigned 
for the drawing up of the constitution of the GCC and the internal rules of its various 
organs 
Between the setting up of the GCC on 4 February 1981 and the first Gulf 
Summit on 25 May 1981, ie. the preparafion period, the Foreign Ministers of the six 
States held two Conferences ^^^^\ The first was in Muscat on 9 March 1981, where 
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they put the final touches on the basic laws of the GCC, the internal regulations of the 
Supreme Council and the internal regulations of the Ministerial Council. They also 
discussed the internal regulations of the General Secretariat but agreed to postpone 
ratification of it until a GCC General Secretary was appointed. 
The second Ministerial Meeting was held in Abu Dhabi on May 23-25 1981; 
it was mainly concerned with the preparation for a GCC Summit to be held on 25 May 
1981; it also reviewed the items of the agenda for the GCC Summit and the 
co-operative plans and proposals that would be put before the Summit for its approval. 
The Foreign Ministers also agreed in principle that the GCC Secretary General would 
be from the State of Kuwait ^^^^\ 
On 25-26 May 1981 the UAE witnessed the first Gulf gathering at the highest 
level; the six Heads of State met in Abu Dhabi, where the GCC was launched and 
signing took place of the Charter of the GCC and other documents governing its 
organs. They also appointed Mr AbduUa Yacoub Bishara ^^ ^^ -^  as the first GCC 
Secretary General; Moreover, five specialised committees were set up to accelerate 
the implementation of the GCC programmes. These committees are: the Committee 
for Economic and Social Planning, the Committee for Financial, Economic and Trade 
Co-operation, the Industrial Committee, the Oil Committee and the Committee for 
Social and Cultural Services ^^^^\ More importantly, the first Summit Meeting 
marked the formal starting of the GCC integrative journey. 
Summary 
The geo-strategic import of the Gulf has been recognised for a long time. 
Early significance of the area related to its position as a route for east-west trade, and 
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as a transit centre. Powerful nations at different times in history came to the Gulf as 
traders, travellers or occupiers. The Portuguese, Dutch, French and British all had a 
footing in the Gulf, though to a variety of degrees. Britain, however, is the most 
familiar power in the region as it encompassed nearly 150 years, during which it 
established different types of relationships with the Gulf States, the last being the 
protectorate system whereby the UK administered foreign and defence affairs on 
behalf of the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. During that period, Britain also 
maintained treaty relafionships between Oman and Saudi Arabia. Before the advance 
of the West to the area, the now GCC region, for centuries, had constituted parts of 
the various Islamic States, including the Ottoman empire. 
As a result, the modern political history of GCC Member States is rendered 
considerably short. In the international arena, Saudi Arabia is the oldest, having 
participated in the establishment of the UN and the Arab League in 1945. Although 
never formerly colonised, it was not until 1970 that Oman became an international 
actor. The other four GCC Members, i.e. the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar amd Kuwait, 
acquired their independence from Britain in 1971,1971,1971 and 1961 respectively. 
As regards their pre-GCC interaction, it dates back centuries, and generally 
it could be divided into four phases: the first phase include those three coercive efforts 
at unification which, after two centuries, resulted in the formation of the unitary State, 
Saudi Arabia. The method employed in this phase could have left bad attitudes 
amongst people of the Gulf which must be taken into account when an integrative 
journey is pursued. It shall be seen in the following chapters how the GCC was 
designed to overcome this, along with the long experience with the States being 
sovereignless for colonial reasons. The second phase took the form of limited 
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cooperation under the supervision of Britain during the 1950s and 1960s, e.g. the 
establishment of the TOS and TSC. The third phase covers the two federal attempts, 
the last of which resulted in the creation of the UAE. The fourth phase represents the 
numerous bilateral and multilateral cooperative efforts by the states since their 
independence up to the launching of the GCC. 
The GCC as a concept emerged in the mid 1970s, yet it was not until May 
1981 that it was materiahsed by signing the GCC Charter and other related 
documents. These constituent treaties constitute the backbone of the GCC, the study 
of which is necessary for any investigation of the GCC venture. Accordingly, the 
following chapter will analyse its constitutional aspects. 
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Chapter Two 
Constitutional Analysis of the GCC 
Introduction 
Having sketched the historical and political background of Member States 
as well as their co-operative efforts which culminated in the launching of the GCC, 
the next step is to understand the constitutional structure of this new institution. 
Accordingly, light will be shed to illuminate what the GCC is and how it is working. 
Following a general reading of the constituent treaty and examination of 
some of the common constitutional problems of international organisations, the 
objectives of the GCC and the devices controlling its progress towards their reaUsation 
are indicated. Next the question of membership, in particular the possible ways of its 
coming to an end, is tackled in light of the prevaihng theories in international law. 
Considering the imperative need for dividing the work amongst various 
organs based on speciality and competence, the GCC Charter provided for three 
principle institutions: the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council and the 
Secretariat General. The institutional development of the GCC has given birth to 
three ancillary organs. Additionally, a number of specialised ministerial committees 
have been formed. Accordingly, the institutional setting will be explored, before 
proceeding to the decision-making process, in order, inter alia, to identify the 
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decision-making organ within the framework of the GCC. The last section of this 
chapter is devoted to an examination of the stages through which a GCC decision is 
made: in particular, the sources of proposals and voting procedures. More emphasis, 
however, will be placed on the characteristic of GCC decisions, and an enquiry into 
whether or not they have legal force, and if so, in what way. 
2.A Charter 
2A.I . Overview 
The constituent treaty of an international organisation is usually called the 
"charter", "basic law" or "constitution". Thus, these terms will be used in this section 
interchangeably. 
Charters of international organisations are of special importance: they are 
the fundamental basis for the activities. As well as being a tool which distinguishes 
public from private international organisations, charters contain the mutual rights and 
obligations of their member states. 
On the nature of the constituent instrument of international organisations, 
legal authorities are divided. One view characterises them as a special form of 
international treaty, but still governed by the Law of Treaties. This opinion is 
formulated by an author in the following words: 
"It is natural, therefore, that the conclusion, and especially the operation of an 
international treaty such as the charter of an international organisation, has 
certain peculiarities. However, all the basic provisions of the law of treaties are 
applicable to the charters of international organisations...." (i) 
Another view maintains that these constituent agreements of international 
organisations are of a constitutional nature once they have been concluded 
Accordingly, all issues on charters are dealt with in the light of constitutional norms. 
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A third view holds that the constituent instruments are of a two-fold namre, 
i.e. international agreement and constitution of the organisation According to this 
view, which seems to be gaining ground both in theory and action, treaties estabUshing 
international organisations are agreements in terms of form and in that they contain 
rights and duties of the contracting parties and, at the same time, constitutions 
establishing the institutions and determining their objectives, principles, organs and 
so forth. In essence, this opinion says that, whilst these treaties resemble national 
constitutions in their contents, all legal issues arising under their terms are governed 
by the Law of Treaties unless, as provided for in Article 5 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969, the organisation itself has its own rules regarding a given 
issue. The Charter of the GCC should be regarded as such, i.e. an international 
agreement and a constitution. 
A charter, in general, is usually composed of a preamble and a number of 
articles. Sometimes, annexes are attached to them as in the example of the Pact of the 
Arab League. The preamble usually specifies the reasons and incentives which led to 
the creation of the organisation. The articles, on the other hand, contain the 
institutional and legal structure of the organisation. 
As a typical example, the charter of the GCC consists of a preamble and 22 
numbered articles. The preamble sets out the grounds and incentives for the 
establishment of the GCC. It also designs the ultimate objective of the GCC. The 22 
articles are concerned with the following: 
Article 1 
Article 2 
Article 3 
Article 4 
Establishment of the GCC 
Seat 
Venues of Meetings 
Aims 
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Article 5: Membership 
Article 6: Organs 
Article 7: Supreme Council (SO) 
Article 8: Powers of SO 
Article 9: Voting in the SO 
Article 10: Commission for Settlement of Disputes 
Article 11: Ministerial Council (MC) 
Article 12: Functions of MC 
Article 13: Voting in the MC 
Article 14: General Secretarial (GS) 
Article 15: Functions of GS 
Article 16: Duties of the Secretary-General and his Assistants and Staff 
Article 17: Privileges and Immunities 
Article 18: Budget 
Article 19: Enforcement of the Charter 
Article 20: Amendment of the Charter 
Article 21: Reservations to the Charter 
Article 22: Depository and Registration of the Charter 
Since organisations generally need to adapt themselves in response to 
developments of society, their constitutions usually empower one of the organs, 
normally the one at which all members are represented, to make amendments and 
changes as needed. Conditions, procedures and quorum should also be provided for 
in the charter, though these vary from one to another. The Charter of the GCC confers 
upon any Member the right to request amendment of the GCC Charter '^^ \ 
Procedurally, the requesting State is required to hand its amendment to the Secretary 
General whose task it is to submit the amendment to Member States four months or 
more before it is referred to the Ministerial Council for review The amendment 
comes into force if unanimously approved by the Supreme Council (6) 
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A member state in an international organisation may consider making 
reservations to provisions of the constituent treaty of the organisation. The question, 
in a given circumstance, is whether or not reservations can be made. Reservations may 
be formulated where expressly permitted by the constituent treaty. Reservations 
caimot be made where the constitution expressly prohibits reservations. However, 
problems arise where a constitution remains silent on this question. Legal authors are 
divided. One view would allow reservations provided that the concerned organ of the 
organisation accepts the reservation This view follows the formulation in Article 
20(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. Another opinion 
restricts to the most exceptional cases a State's right to make reservations This 
view takes into account the peculiarity of treaties which establish an international 
organisation. It finds such reservation contrary to the object and purpose of the 
constituent instrument which necessitates that the machinery of the organisation is to 
be the same for all member states.^ ^^  
The Charter of the GCC expressly prohibits making reservations to any of its 
provisions. Article 21 reads: "No reservations may be voiced in respect of this Charter." 
Accordingly, reservations to the GCC Charter cannot be made. 
Members of International organisations are required to register their 
constitutions with the General Secretariat of the U.N. in accordance with Article 102 
of the U.N. Charter. In compliance with that Article, the Charter of the GCC provides 
for registration of a copy of it with the United Nations Another copy was 
registered with the Arab League in compliance with Article 17 of the Pact of the Arab 
League which demands registration of all treaties and international agreements made 
by its members. 
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lAAl. Aims 
Constitutions of international organisations usually specify their objectives. 
For example, Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, Article 2 of the Arab League 
Pact, the preamble of the ECSC treaty, as well as the preamble together with Article 
2 of the EEC, all represent the spirits and objectives underlying their respective 
treaties. An enumeration of the aims of the organisation is important for at least two 
reasons. On the one hand, it underlines the purpose for which the organisation is 
established and limits its competence to those goals articulated in the treaty. On the 
other hand, knowledge of the aims is an essential tool in interpreting the treaty and 
other legislations enacted thereunder. 
Having recognised the imperative need for stating the purpose of the 
organisation, the GCC Charter numbers its objectives in Article 4, though in general 
terms. Herebelow is an examination of these goals. 
One objective of the GCC is to promote co-ordination and integration among 
Member States in all fields, with the ultimate aim of achieving their unity ^^ \^ The 
importance of this goal is evident in restating it more than once in the Charter. Before 
reciting it in Article 4(1), the preamble of the Charter reads, in part: 
"Desiring to effect co-ordination, integration and interconnection between them 
[GCC Member States] in all fields". 
Nonetheless, it does not clarify whether the GCC is seeking to make uniform 
the systems of all fields in Member States, or else seeking to achieve unity among 
Member States themselves. Reading Article 4(1) alone and/or the phrase of the 
preamble cited above,may lead to the conclusion that the long-term objective of the 
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GCC is to make uniform the systems in the various fields. However, reading them 
together with another phrase of the preamble, 
"In an endeavour to complement efforts already begun in all essential areas that 
concern their peoples and realise their [people of the GCC] hopes for a better 
future on the path to unity of the States" 
will enforce the assumption that unity of the GCC States is its ultimate 
objective, and integrating the systems in the various fields is the means employed for 
achieving that end. 
Another expHcit objective of the GCC is to encourage scientific and technical 
progress in the spheres of industry, mining, agriculture, water, animal welfare; to set 
up scientific research centres; and to encourage collective projects by private sector, 
for the good of the people of GCC Member States ^^^\ This goal, to be noted, is a 
traditional one in the practice of international organisations: that is, all organisations 
are formed principally for the good of the peoples of their member states, especially 
since this goal is attained better by means of collective work. 
The third objective of the GCC is spelled out in item (3) of Article 4. 
According to this item, the GCC should work on establishing similar systems in 
different fields including economic, financial, commerce, customs, communications, 
education and culture, social, health, information, tourism, judicial and administrative 
affairs. This goal seems to be a restatement of the first one considering the areas 
mentioned as the prime fields that the GCC is seeking to promote. As was said about 
the first objective, forming similar systems in the various spheres is another means to 
approach the end of unity amongst Member States. 
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The last objective expressly stated in the Charter is to enhance and strengthen 
relationships, bonds and existing co-operation between peoples of the Member States 
in various fields ^^^\ It is clear that this item has been worded in general terms. The 
reason behind such generalities might well be the desire of the founders not to limit 
their co-operative actions to specific events and leave the door open for any other 
activities which are considered beneficial to Member States. Mr. Abdulla Y Bishara, 
the GCC Secretary General confirms this justification when he says: 
"You may observe that these objectives are 'generalities' and that no definitions 
are given, except the injunction to set up similar systems in 'all fields'. The thing 
about this which draws one's attention is the fact that this proposed mode of 
joint Gulf action is not burdened with any restrictions. There is no ceiling and 
there are no confining fences. The field is wide open, flexible and untrammelled 
as regards future activities." (^ '^ ) 
The above objectives of the GCC make no reference to political co-operation 
or to co-operation on internal and external security, yet the GCC, since its inception, 
has made considerable achievements in these fields. This is a manifestation of the fact 
that the GCC has been able to promote co-operation in these fields (and in others) 
although it is neither expressly stated nor even provided for under the general terms 
of Article 4 concerning the GCC objectives. Consideration of the achievements made 
by the GCC in the areas which were mentioned in Article 4 as well as those 
achievements made in the fields not expressly articulated in the Article strengthens 
the contention that the GCC is seeking co-operation amongst its Members in every 
field and that the areas mentioned in Article 4 are but examples. 
Furthermore, one may observe that the GCC makes no reference to the 
maintenance of international and regional peace and security as an objective. 
Nevertheless, since it was set up in May 1981, the GCC has made every possible effort 
to bring peace and security to the Gulf. It established the Committee for the 
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Settlement of Disputes to solve disagreements between its Members. In addition, its 
presence was felt in the dispute between Bahrain and Oatar.^ ^^ ^ In the regional events, 
the GCC has played an important role. As well as restoring the relationship between 
Oman and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen,^ ^^^ it contributed 
considerably to putting an end to the war between Iraq and Iran.^ '^ ^^ 
The above shows that the GCC has not only economic interests but also 
social, political and security objectives. ^ ^^ ^ The economic sphere has been stressed 
only because it is thought to be the backbone of any kind of integration. 
2.A.III Principles 
The principles of an international organisation are different from its 
objectives. Its objectives are the goals that the organisation is seeking to achieve. Its 
principles are those controlling devices to which member states adhere for the sake 
of realising the objectives of the organisation 
Some international organisations expressly articulate their principles in their 
constituent treaties. The U.N. is an example of these organisations: its charter 
enumerates the U.N. principle in Article 2. Another example is the Arab League; the 
Pact in its preamble, as well as in Articles 2, 5, 6 and 8, states the principles to be 
adhered to by member states in pursuing the League's goals. 
The GCC, on the other hand, is an example of an organisation, the Charter 
of which does not expressly articulate its principles. In the case of the GCC, however, 
the Charter includes provisions that amount to the effect of expHcit principles. The 
principles impUed in these provisions are similar to those articulated by the charters 
of the U.N. and the Arab League. The principle of equality between Members, 
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adopted by the U.N. and the Arab League, is provided for in the Charter of the GCC. 
In the GCC, each Member State has one vote in both the Supreme Council and the 
Ministerial Council The "One State, One Vote" principle is a clear indication that 
the GCC has adopted the principle of equality between States. 
Another principle of the GCC is the resort to peaceful settlement of disputes. 
In this respect, the estabUshment of the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes 
under the terms of Article 10 of the Charter is a manifestation that the GCC prohibits 
the use of force in solving disagreements and that it calls for the employment of any 
of the peaceful means including judicial channels. In practice, the peaceful means 
were utilised when the territorial disputes arose between Qatar and Bahrain. ^ ^^ ^ 
2 A.IV. Membership 
Membership of the GCC is limited to its sk founders '^^ '^ \ therefore, its 
constitution makes no provisions regarding admission of new members. Were the 
GCC ever to decide to enlarge its membership, it would do so by a constitutional 
amendment. 
Membership may come to an end for reasons including: expulsion of the 
member, disappearance of the member, dissolution of the organisation or withdrawal 
by the member. Membership is terminated for all when the organisation is dissolved. 
Some constitutions of international organisations such as those of the U.N. and the 
Arab League, make provisions for expulsion and describe their reasons and 
procedures The lack of such provision, as in the case of the GCC, may stop the 
organisation short from expelling an undesired member. However, in addition to 
applying political pressure on that member to withdraw voluntarily, the organisation 
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has the right to expel the unwanted member by duly amending its constitution before 
such a case arises. Examples of the extinction of member states include the Baltic 
States which lost their membership of a number of international organisations when 
they were incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 Withdrawal is another way 
of putting an end to the membership of a member. Most constitutions of international 
organisations permit unilateral withdrawal of a State once that State has decided that 
it is no longer interested in the organisation. Some constitutions, on the other hand, 
make no provision for unilateral withdrawal. 
The constitution of the GCC is silent on this matter. In the absence of 
constitutional provision on this issue, the question of whether or not withdrawal from 
the GCC is permissible remains unanswered. 
The legal literature contains conflicting opinions resulting partly from 
discussions on the withdrawal announcements made by members of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) and the United Nations itself. In the three cases, no 
re-admission procedure was applied to the States making the withdrawal notifications 
when they decided to rejoin the organisations. Furthermore, they had to pay their 
assessed contributions, though only a small percentage (5-10%), for the time of their 
absence. Hence, they were considered as if they never disposed of their membership. 
In light of this practice, as well as the legal theory, some authors concluded that 
unilateral withdrawal is forbidden and void unless expressly or implicitly provided for 
in the constitution of the organisation Implicit right to withdraw, according to this 
view, may be inferred from the terms of the constituent treaty or from the preparatory 
work of the organisation. Alternatively, since the intention of the parties is decisive 
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in the absence of explicit authority, such intention can be put down in an interpretative 
declaration such as the one adopted at San Francisco at the estabhshment of the 
United Nations. That declaration conceded the right to withdraw "in exceptional 
circumstances" 
Another view permits withdrawal even when explicit authority on the subject 
is lacking. ^ •^ ^^  The conclusion of this opinion is based, inter aha, on arguments of 
sovereignty, equity or expediency However, these arguments have been counted 
as unpersuasive as a legal basis for withdrawal in the absence of express or implied 
right to withdraw. The argument of sovereignty is not accepted because it 
"would permit a State not only to withdraw from international organisations, but 
also to repudiate all of its international obligations at will." (^ 9) 
The arguments of equity and expediency are held sufficient grounds for 
inserting a withdrawal provision in the constituent instrument, not argument for 
permitting withdrawal in the absence of such a clause.^ '^ ^ 
In evaluating the two points of view. Dr. Singh divides international treaties 
into two categories; ^^ ^^  those which set up international organisations and those 
which do not. The former, according to him, is governed by principles which pertain 
to international institutions rather than strict adherence to maxims of international 
law of treaties. Thus, he holds the first stated view, i.e. prohibiting unilateral 
withdrawal, rightly with regard to "those law-making treaties (traites-lois) which are 
not organisational in pattern," while holding correctly the other opinion, i.e. allowing 
withdrawal from international organisations in the absence of express stipulation. His 
reasoning is that depriving a member state from this right could only be achieved by 
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obtaining its express consent in the constituent treaty, and not by keeping the said 
instrument silent on the point. 
In the case of the GCC, an implied right to withdraw could be inferred by 
ascertaining the intentions of the parties of the GCC. As suggested above, intention 
of the parties is inferred from the contents of the constituent treaty or the work 
preparatory to the launching of the institution as well as the circumstances in which 
it was concluded. In addition, their intention to allow unilateral withdrawal may be 
expressed in a separate statement. Concerning the GCC, no interpretative declaration 
or similar on the question of withdrawal has been brought to the public attention. 
Neither has the issue been mentioned in the documents on the preparatory work for 
drafting the Charter of the GCC. The constituent treaty of the GCC is for an indefinite 
period; its contents lead to the finding that the obvious intention of its Members is to 
create a permanent institution. 
Al l these indications suggest that unilateral withdrawal from the GCC may 
be difficult to be found by implication. Nonetheless, an answer to the question of 
whether or not it is legally possible for a GCC Member State to withdraw is probably 
in the affirmative. Notwithstanding the permanent nature of the GCC, its limited 
membership, the objectives sought, etc., the right to withdraw could have been 
extinguished when the GCC treaties were drafted by providing express stipulation. 
This must have been understood by the draftsmen who decided not to include a 
provision on the matter. Because a State may not be obliged by something it did not 
consent to, a constitutional amendment is needed should the GCC consider 
prohibiting unilateral withdrawal. The confusion a withdrawal is bound to have in 
disturbing the organisation's financial as well as other legal obligations and the need 
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for rearranging such matters is a logical rather than legal argument against withdrawal 
in the absence of implicit agreement. Additionally, the nature of the GCC as an 
international organisation liable for changes and development and the dependence 
of the GCC's success on its Members co-operation boosts the contention that a State 
is at liberty to withdraw once it decides that, for instance, the course of changes or 
programmes proposed demands so. 
2.B: Structure 
2.B.I. The Supreme Council (SC) 
The Supreme Council is the highest organ of the GCC. It draws up policies 
and basic guidelines for the organisation. Formal functions of the SC are elaborated 
in Articles 8 and 9 of the Charter as well as in those Rules of Procedure of the Supreme 
Council ^^ ^^  signed concurrently with the Charter, on 25 May 1981. The Articles of 
the Charter and the SC Rules of Procedures will guide the analysis of the SC which 
will include its composition, chairmanship, meetings, office, committees, powers and 
functions. 
a. Composition 
Article 7(1) of the GCC Charter states in part that: 
'The Supreme Council... will be formed of heads of member States". 
In contrast with representation to high organs in most regional organisations, 
which is opened for participants of lower ranking than the Heads of State, or of 
Goverimient, representation to the SC is exclusive to the Heads of Member States. 
For instance, the Arab League Pact makes no specification on the level of 
representation of its member States to the Council of the Arab League ^^^\ Thus, 
although a State could be represented at the Arab League by the Head of State, lower 
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ranking participation satisfies the requirements of the Pact. In practice, however, the 
Council of the Arab League meets at the level of Ambassadors or Foreign Ministers. 
In brief, whilst most regional organisations allow representation to their 
highest organs by participants other than Heads of States or of Goverimient, the GCC 
Charter is very clear on this point and restricts representation to the Heads of its six 
Member States, In this respect, the GCC has chosen the appropriate level of 
representation which suits its case as a regional organisation. The Supreme Council 
meets in ordinary session only once a year, thus adding httle to the national and 
international responsibilities of a Head of State. Meeting at this high level is the best 
means for effective decision-taking, and the most formal device for directing 
implementation of the GCC programme. Meeting at this level also reveals not only 
the seriousness of the joint undertaking, but also the determination of the highest 
authorities of Member States to monitor the developments step by step. 
b. Chairmanship 
According to Article 7(1) of the GCC Charter, as well as Article 2(1) of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Council, chairmanship of the Supreme Council 
(SC) rotates periodically amongst Member States based on the Arabic alphabetical 
order of their names, i.e. the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait. 
However, review of the GCC Sunmiit chairmanship from its inception in 1981 until 
now reveals that neither the English nor the Arabic alphabetical order has been 
followed. 
Non-compliance with the Articles calling for an alphabetical order for 
presiding over the first three SC sessions can be understood in the context of the 
decision by the Foreign Ministers, two months prior to the launching of the GCC, to 
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hold these three meetings in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain respectively 
However, overriding the alphabetical sequence provided for in the constituent treaty 
and stressed by the Foreign Ministers when armouncing their above-mentioned 
decision is justifiable if at all by the fact that between the foundation of the GCC in 
1981 and 1990 have been obstacles beyond their control: lack of sufficient facihties in 
some States, such as Oman, thus rendering them unable to host the GCC Summit, led 
to the interim suspension of the Articles in this respect. Member States have, over the 
past 10 years, adopted an alternative procedure for passing the chairmanship 
periodically from one State to another. The new procedures inferred from the practice 
of the State is that a State, or States, at the end of a Summit, expresses its desire to 
hold the next Summit. Then the SC decides where to convene in the next year. This 
conclusion is based on reading into the GCC documents regarding its Summits 
especially the final communiques of the sessions already held ^^^\ 
Having found that the chairmanship of the SC is assigned by a decision to be 
made by the SC itself in a previous session rather than the alphabetical order, other 
aspects concerning the presidency will be analysed below. 
Generally elaboration of the SC is governed by its Rules of Procedure. These 
rules allow the chairman to participate in discussions and make suggestions in the 
name of the State he represents; he is, however, at liberty to have a member of his 
State's delegation to act on his behalf for deliberations in a session But, if the 
country of the chairman is a party to a dispute which is put before the SC for discussion, 
he may not chair the meeting singled out to discuss and resolve that dispute •^^ ^^ ; 
instead, a temporary chairman will be chosen to preside over the session from amongst 
its other members 
Constitutional Analysis of the GCC 51 
Functions of the president include calling meetings, directing voting 
procedures, making sure that the Charter of the GCC and the Rules of Procedure of 
the various organs are compUed with and ensuring the smooth running of the 
organisation as a whole ^^^\ 
The chairmanship of a GCC session remains with the President until a 
subsequent Summit when it is handed over to his successor ^ '^\ It is worth mentioning 
that each State presiding over the Supreme Council, which is the policy-making organ 
of the GCC, tries to achieve maximum progress during its presidency. 
c. Meetings 
The Supreme Council (SC) meets in ordinary session once a year and in 
extraordinary session whenever a request is made by a Member State and agreed upon 
by another '^^ \^ Deciding the opening date is a responsibility of the Secretary General 
who also makes a suggestion regarding the closing date of the sessions '^* \^ Invitations 
to a GCC regular session are issued 30 days or more prior to the opening date and 5 
days or fewer for an extraordinary session, both of which are issued by the Secretary 
General 
Along with the Heads of State, each State is allowed to send a delegation to 
the SC Summit conditional upon informing the Secretary General of their names 7 
days or more prior to the opening date of the Summit they are attending ^'^\ 
Regarding the venue of the Summits of the SC, is governed exclusively by 
Article 3 of the GCC Charter which reads: 
"The Council shall hold its meetings in the State where it has its headquarters, 
and may convene in any member State", 
and/or Article 7(3) which states: 
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"The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the territories of member States". 
But although the two Articles designate territories of Member States as the 
inclusive venue for holding the SC Summits, it is doubtful whether or not they answer 
the question of what system is employed regarding convening the SC. In other words, 
the two Articles do not clearly answer the question of whether the headquarters, being 
in the territories of Member States, is the only place to host the SC meetings or other 
systems such as the alphabetical order of the names of the States or their capitals have 
been adopted. 
In view of this uncertainty, the two Articles throw little light on that question. 
Therefore, the question can be answered by examining the practice of the States in 
this regard. 
The GCC Summit meetings held up to date were convened as follows: the 
first in the UAE, the second in Saudi Arabia, the third in Bahrain, the fourth in Qatar, 
the fifth in Kuwait, the sixth in Oman, the seventh in the UAE, the eighth in Saudi 
Arabia, the ninth in Bahrain, the tenth in Oman and the eleventh in Qatar. Clearly an 
English alphabetical order of the names of Member States has not been adopted for 
hosting the GCC Summit meetings. Had the English alphabetical order been utilised, 
meetings would have been held in this order: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Neither has the 
Arabic alphabetic order been followed,otherwise the meetings would have been 
convened in this order: the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, the 
UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar. Accordingly, examining the venues 
of previous Summits with a probe provides no understandable guide for assigning the 
places of the GCC Sunmiit meetings. 
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Nevertheless, close reading of the final communiques of all previous Summit 
meetings points to the fact that the venue of the next Summit is determined by the SC 
itself on receipt of an invitation from the State willing to host the forthcoming Summit 
meeting '^^ \^ 
Turning to other legal aspects of the SC meetings, the quorum required and 
rules governing extraordinary meetings. The quorum required for a valid meeting is 
two-thirds of the Heads of Member States, i.e. four Members "^^ l At the beginning 
of each meeting, the SC decides whether to hold a private or public meeting '^^ l^ 
An extraordinary meeting is held at the request of one Member seconded by 
another, or by a decision taken in a previous meeting ^'^\ The extraordinary sessions 
are concerned only with those matters for which the session is called ^^^\ 
d. Office 
The office of the Supreme Council is presided over by the chairman of the 
SC itself and comprises, in addition to the chairman, the President of the Ministerial 
Council and the Secretary General ^^^\ Tasks of the office include reviewing the 
drafting of decisions of the SC, helping the chairman in running the GCC Summit 
meetings and other functions assigned to it by the SC ^ ^^\ 
e. Committees 
The Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Council provide the SC with two 
kinds of committee entrusted with different functions according to their status. The 
two types of committee are technical committees and temporary ones. 
The temporary committees are assembled at the begirming of every Summit 
to study topics referred to them by the SC ^^^\ Matters are submitted to these 
Constitutional Analysis of the GCC 54 
committees based on their speciality A legal committee, for example, would study 
matters of a legal nature only. There is no limitation on the number of committees to 
be created, thus their number depends on the number of cases which need to be 
discussed by specialists. Delegates of Member States are to participate in the activities 
of such committees ^^^\ 
The second type of committee which the SC may create is the technical 
committee. Such committees, unlike temporary committees, are of a permanent 
nature. The task of such committees is to advise 
"on the design and implementation of the Supreme Council programmes in 
specific fields." (55) 
Members of the technical committees are to be appointed from specialists 
who are citizens of Member States ^ ^^\ A technical committee meets on invitation by 
the Secretary General plans of its work are drawn up in consultation with the 
Secretary General ^ ^^ ^ who also prepares the agenda of a committee after consultation 
with its chairman 
f. The Commission for Settlement of Disputes 
The GCC Commission for Settlement of Disputes, hereinafter the 
Commission, was set up by Articles 6(1) and 10(1) of the GCC Charter. Article 6(1) 
reads: 
The Co-operation Council shall have the following main organisations: 
1. the Supreme Council to which shall be attached the Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes. 
Article 10(1) provides: 
The Co-operation Council shall have a Commission called 'The Commission 
for the Settlement of Disputes" which shall be attached to the Supreme Council. 
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The Rules of Procedure of the Commission were signed and ratified 
concurrently with the GCC Charter on 25 May 1981.^^^ These rules, which describe 
the Commission's organisation and jurisdiction as well as other matters are examined 
below. 
The seat of the Commission is according to Article 2 of the Rules at Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, where the GCC Secretariat General is located. Its sessions too are to 
be convened in Riyadh; if necessary it may meet 'elsewhere'. The term 'elsewhere' is 
rather broad, hence it could hold its meetings in the territory of any State whether 
member or otherwise. 
As concerned the Commission's composition, Article 4 of its Rules specifies 
no definitive number, however, it does stipulate that they are no less than three. 
Qualifications required of its members are two: 
1) Citizenship of a Member State; 
2) Non-involvement of his State in the dispute for which the 
Conmiission is assembled. 
The Supreme Council as such appoints members of the Commission. ^^ ^^  
Such appointments are probably considered procedural matters, thus made by 
majority vote. Pursuant to Article 4(b) the Commission may seek the necessary advice 
from experts and consultants. 
The Commission once assembled enjoys itself and its members within the 
Member States the privileges and immunities necessary for the realisation of its aim, 
in accordance with Article 17 of the GCC Charter and the Agreement of the GCC 
Privileges and Immunities. ^^ ^^  
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In relation to the Conmiission's jurisdiction scope, it is two fold both of which 
are expressly stated in Article 3 of the Commission's Rules: 
a) "disputes between members states"; 
b) "differences of opinion as to the interpretation or implementation of 
the Co-operation Council Charter". 
Reading the said Article with Article 10 of the Charter cited earlier suggests 
that in both types of dispute it is the Supreme Council, rather than disputant States, 
which submits a case to the Commission. 
Obviously, once installed, the Commission, according to the width of its 
granted jurisdiction, is expected to be able to tackle all kinds of dispute between 
Member States. Paragraph (a) of Article 3 of the Commission Rules cited above 
anticipates the Commission to solve all sort of non-GCC disputes including, for 
instance, frontier disputes. Paragraph (b) of the same Article concerned itself with 
GCC-related disputes; however, it is of Umited scope, and not without confusion. It 
gives the Commission jurisdiction over GCC disputes relating only to the 
interpretation or implementation of the Charter of the GCC. Disputes concerning 
non-compliance of GCC norms, for instance, is not covered by the paragraph, unless 
the case is squeezed so as to appear as one of the differences of opinion regarding the 
source of the obligation under question. A confusion it causes is, for example, whether 
GCC agreements other than the Charter are covered by paragraph (b). Would the 
Commission, for instance, be eligible from jurisdictional point of view to entertain a 
dispute concerning the interpretation of a provision of the Economic Agreement? 
Logically, the answer is in the affirmative because all subsequent agreements are in 
essence extensions of the Charter. Bearing in mind that the GCC is based on 
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consensus building in its actions in general, an agreement between its Members 
covering all GCC agreements by paragraph (b) is very likely. However, should a 
restructuring of the GCC constitutional organisation take place, this point must be 
clarified, if the whole existing machinery is to remain. 
When a dispute is referred to the Commission, all its members must be 
present in order to constitute a valid meeting. ^^ ^^  Parties to a dispute are entitled to 
be presented by representatives who may observe the proceedings and present their 
parties' cases. 
Before venturing into the nature of the Commission, an assessment of its 
findings will be made which should by itself throw some light on the characteristic of 
the whole process. Article 9 of the Commission's Rules is devoted to this matter; it is 
entitled "Recommendations and Opinions". One possible interpretation is that the 
Commission is empowered to deliver either reconmiendations or opinions. Yet, the 
differentiation is meaningless in consideration of the fact that both opinions and 
reconmiendations of the Commission are not binding. The Commission hands its 
findings to the Supreme Council for execution which may yet necessitate another 
diplomatic method for final settlement, e.g. mediation etc. 
Sources of law appHcable by the Commission are provided for in Article 9(a) 
of its Rules, i.e. the Charter of the GCC, international law and principles of Islamic 
law. 
Voting procedures are described by Article 7 and 9(d) of the Commission's 
Rules. Every member of the Commission has one vote. Recommendations or opinions 
are made by majority vote. In cases of tied votes, the group with whom the Chairman 
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has voted prevails. Dissenting members are entitled to record their dissenting 
opinions, a matter which should not have been allowed in order to preserve the unity 
of a GCC jurisprudence and to enhance the independence and partiality of the 
members for whom a single judgment will speak without revealing who has concurred 
and who has dissented. As the Rules are, Article 9(c) requires the Commission to 
reason its opinions and for them to be signed by the Chairman and Secretary. 
Mention should be made of Article 9(b) of the Rules which provides that 
while the Commission is deliberating on a case, it may ask the Supreme Council to 
take temporary measures, i.e. seeking an undertaking by the disputants not to initiate 
any hostile actions that might inflame the situation, or it may ask the parties to 
maintain the status quo before the dispute was referred to it. 
Of no less importance is noting that the submission by the Commission of the 
finding to the Supreme Council marks the end of its task, though it might be 
summoned at any time for discussion and elaboration of its findings. ^^ ^^  
Enforcement of its opinions is a prerogative of the Supreme Council. 
According to Article 9(a) of the Rules, once opinions are made by the Commission 
and handed over to the Supreme Council, it is the later which takes 'appropriate 
action'. No details offered on the nature or type of the contemplated action. Yet 
possibilities are numerous. If the parties within the Supreme Council had agreed to 
accept the finding of the Coimnission as it is, the 'appropriate action' will be asking 
the parties to execute the findings of the Commission. Otherwise, consultation as well 
as other diplomatic means for peaceful settlement will be employed taking much note 
of the Commission's findings. 
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The above description of the Commission reveals that it is of a conciliatory 
nature for it possesses the characteristics of some historical commissions of 
concihation.^^^ Such commissions like that of the GCC apply the rule of law in 
accordance with designated rules of procedure; in addition to their fact finding role, 
they, like that of the GCC, render non-binding recommendations or opinions. 
Consequently despite the fact that its conciliatory function is not indicated by its name, 
it does do the business of conciliation as opposed to other means of settlement. 
g. Powers and Functions 
The Supreme Council is vested with supreme and wide ranging powers to 
enable it to undertake its responsibility to realise the objectives of the GCC. The broad 
powers and functions conferred upon the SC can be justified by the fact that it meets 
frequently and therefore all matters of common interest, whether of primary 
importance or not, can be decided by the SC itself without retarding the endeavour 
of integrative process by the GCC at large. In other words, because the SC meets 
aimually, there is no need to transfer some of the competence of the GCC from its 
highest organ (the SC) to a junior organ, e.g. the MC. The SC, by reason of its 
composition, is more effective in the integration undertaking than any other organ of 
the GCC. 
Although the GCC Charter in general terms singles out the SC as the organ 
responsible for realisation of the express and implied objectives of the GCC, the 
Charter stresses the responsibility of the SC in particular areas. These stressed 
responsibilities include the consideration of subjects of common interest; 
examination of reports and studies entrusted to the Secretary General for preparation; 
ratification of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission for the Settlement of 
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Disputes and nomination of its members; considering reports, recommendations, 
studies and joint ventures proposed to the SC by the Ministerial Council in 
preparation for their final endorsement; appointing the Secretary General; amending 
the Charter; approving the SC's own internal Rules of Procedure and approving the 
budget of the GCC ^ '^^ \ In addition, there are two functions conferred upon the SC 
which are of prime importance. The first is its responsibihty to determine the higher 
policies of the GCC and the basic guideHnes along which it operates Secondly, it 
is charged with the responsibility to draw up GCC external policies with other States 
and with international organisations 
Providing the SC, whose members are the Heads of State, with these 
functions, particularly the last two, was a wise choice by the framers of the GCC 
Charter. For one thing, the six Heads of State have, under their national Constitutions, 
rights and powers which enable them gradually to unify their national policies as a 
concrete base for unification of the regional policies within the framework of the 
GCC. Not only this, but the Heads of State by means of their national positions have 
considerable influence on their national institutions, thus equipping them to direct 
those institutions to take the means necessary to implement a decision made at GCC 
level, and this accelerates the intergrative process in all fields 
2.BII. The Ministerial Council (MC) 
Constituent instruments of some international organisations establish 
second principal organs with fewer lower representation requirements than their 
highest organs. The purpose as well as decision-making power entrusted to such 
secondary organs vary from one organisation to another. Generally, however, junior 
organs contribute a great deal in the decision-making process, even though they may 
Constitutional Analysis of the GCC 61 
be without the power to produce them. They make suggestions, prepare proposals and 
adopt recommendations. Moreover, items hsted on the agenda, having been agreed 
upon by members of the junior organ, are adopted by the highest organ with little 
discussion. 
Representation to secondary organs is of lower rank than members of the 
supreme bodies. Organisations whose supreme bodies are composed of Heads of 
State or of Goverimient, usually require representation in their junior organs at a 
ministerial level. Those organisations which hold their high sessions at a ministerial 
level should accept participation of lower ranking national delegates, be it ministerial 
deputies or other diplomats. 
The GCC has adopted the common practice of international organisations 
and thus formed the Ministerial Council [MC] as its junior organ. Herebelow is a 
discussion of the composition, meetings, presidency, office and functions of the MC. 
a. Composition 
The Ministerial Council (MC) consists of the Foreign Ministers or other 
delegated Ministers of the six Member States ^^^\ Hence, whilst Foreign Ministers 
are the principal representatives of their States in the MC, other Ministers can be sent 
to a meeting of the MC especially when the MC is installed to discuss matters falling 
within their areas of expertise. In practice, the participants in the MC meetings are 
usually Foreign Ministers. In some cases, specialised ministers have joined the 
Foreign Ministers in MC sessions Representation to the MC of Member States 
by specialised Ministers alone may now have been superseded by the creation of the 
Specialised Ministerial Committees, as will be examined in Section V of this chapter. 
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This contention, nevertheless, does not negate the fact that specialised ministers, e.g. 
Finance Ministers, may represent Member States in the MC meetings. 
It is worth noting that the GCC Charter requires ministerial delegates to the 
MC sessions. This requirement manifests the desire of the framers to shorten the time 
taken in decision-making as well as its stages. Allowing representations by officials 
ranking lower than the Ministers, would add yet another stage into producing a 
decision, and much more time, since such officials would need to consult their national 
Minister specialising in the topic under discussion. Therefore, having the Ministers 
themselves involved in the more preparatory and detailed work of the GCC 
programmes in the MC saves time in the Supreme Council and guarantees their 
acceptance. 
b. Meetings 
Meetings of the Ministerial Council are governed by Article 11 of the GCC 
Charter, as well as by several Articles of its own Rules of Procedure signed 
concurrently with the Charter in May 1981 According to these Articles, the MC 
holds four regular sessions a year '^^ '^ \ At first sight, four annual meetings seems an 
inadequate frequency bearing in mind that the MC is an important arm for the 
planning and execution of the GCC programmes. But taking into account the 
developed de facto competence of the Specialised Ministerial Committees to act as 
a Specialised Ministerial Council in dealing with subjects falling within their interests, 
the four regular meetings provided for appears an acceptable frequency for the 
Foreign Ministers to discuss political and general matters. 
The GCC Charter and the MC Rules of Procedure provide, furthermore, for 
extraordinary sessions as needed. Holding such meetings must be either requested by 
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a State and agreed upon by another ^^ ^^  or decided by the MC itself at a previous 
meeting In the first case, specification of the venue, date and agenda of the 
meeting is the responsibility of the Secretary General ^^^ ;^ in the second case, these 
are the responsibility of the MC itself In both cases, the Secretary General is to 
provide Member States with an invitation to the extraordinary session along with a 
note containing either the request of the Member State or the decision of the MC to 
hold such a session in addition to the date, place and agenda of the meeting which 
should include only matters for which the session is convened The extraordinary 
session is to be held no more than five days from the issuance date of the invitation 
Whilst the MC itself is responsible for deciding the place of its next ordinary 
meeting, consultation between the Secretary General and Member States is needed 
to decide the venue of an extraordinary convention Consultation is also needed 
in order to choose another venue, in the case where an ordinary or extraordinary 
session is precluded from being held at its contemplated place 
c. Chairmanship 
In accordance with Article 11(1) of the GCC Charter as amended and Article 
15(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the MC, the chairman of the MC is for the State 
"which presided the last ordinary session of the Supreme Council, or, if 
necessary, to the State which is next to preside the Supreme Council" 
The Chairman presides over meetings, whether regular or extraordinary, 
until the post is handed over to the next chairman ^^^\ I f the MC is discussing a dispute 
to which the State of the chakman is a party, an interim chairman is to be appointed 
Functions of the Chairman ^^ ^^  include calling the opening and closing of 
sessions, calling the beginning of voting and ensuring the smooth running of the 
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MC in accordance with the GCC Charter and the MC's own internal Rules of 
Procedure. The Chairman may either participate in the MC discussions and vote for 
his State, or, alternatively, he may delegate this right to another delegate of his State 
to act on his behalf ^^^\ 
d. Office 
The Office of the MC comprises the Chairman of the MC, who is the 
chairman of the office, the Secretary General and the heads of the preparatory and 
working committees that the MC itself resolved to form for a session The office 
is assigned a number of tasks. These include assisting the President in the session's 
administrative matters, co-ordinating the work between the MC and its preparatory 
and working committees charged with studying matters listed on the agenda or other 
assignments and reviewing the drafting of decisions of the MC 
e. Functions 
The Ministerial Council (MC) is the intermediate organ of the GCC. It does 
most of the detailed preparatory work of the GCC; thus, most, if not all, of the 
discussions over the GCC programmes are done within the MC. Although it has very 
limited power to make final decisions, regional plans approved by it are mostly 
accepted without discussion by the Supreme Council, i.e. the decision-making body 
of the GCC. 
Putting its decision-making power aside, the MC is in fact the heart of the 
GCC. On the one hand, it makes proposals and recommendations to the Supreme 
Council regarding the best means by which greater co-operation can be effected, on 
the other hand it follows up the implementation process of the GCC's wide ranging 
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programmes on behalf of the GCC highest organ. Furthermore, the MC advises the 
relevant Ministers on the execution of the GCC decisions concerning their Ministries. 
Broadly speaking, functions of the MC can be divided into two categories. 
The first includes the few areas in which the MC is empowered to make final decisions. 
Under Article 12, items (7), (8) and (9) of the Charter, the MC is delegated authority 
to make final decisions regarding the approval of its own Rules of Procedure as well 
as the Secretariat General's, the appointment of the GCC Under- Secretaries General 
and the endorsement of the periodic reports and internal administrative and financial 
rules and regulations. 
The second category encompasses those spheres in which the MC is 
authorised only to make suggestions and recommendations. Under this set the MC is 
assigned broad functions. It initiates policies and plans aimed at bringing close 
co-operation between Member States in various fields, makes recommendations and 
reports to the Supreme Council regarding co-operative actions, provides advice to the 
various national institutions on the execution of the GCC programmes, encourages 
private sector co-operation in al l f ields, seeks appropriate advice and 
recommendations f rom technical and specialised committees on co-operation in the 
different fields, studies proposals for amending the GCC Charter and makes its own 
recommendation, arranges for the Supreme Council Summits and examines matters 
submitted to it by the Supreme Council 
2.B.III.The Secretariat General [SG] 
A l l international organisations need a permanent organ to serve the various 
bodies and committees with secretarial facihties, and to be responsible for the 
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administrative and financial matters of the organisation. Nevertheless, it was not until 
the 1920s or thereabouts, that such organ was formally included in the structure of 
international organisations Nowadays, however, the secretarial organ has become 
a principal body in most international organisations. Functions of the Secretariat are 
usually of an administrative, financial and clerical nature, but other functions may be 
entrusted to it. 
Secretarial bodies, mostly termed "Secretariat", "Directorate" or "Bureau", 
are composed of the head of the body, assistants and international civil servants. In 
addition, they are usually divided into departments or sectors all of which are 
necessary for ensuring an adequate follow-up system and a smooth running of the 
organisation. The head of such a body is generally termed the "Secretary General" or 
the "Director General". In the case of the GCC, the Head of the GCC Secretariat 
General is known as the GCC Secretary General. Below is a sketch of the GCC 
Secretariat General he is heading. 
a. Composition 
The GCC Secretariat Genera l [SG] is composed of the GCC 
Secretary-General, two Under-Secretaries General and a number of Gulf Civil 
Servants. 
1. The Secretary General 
Head of the GCC SG, the Secretary General is appointed by the Supreme 
Council from amongst the GCC citizens for a term of three years, renewable for one 
further term only ^^^\ Since the inception of the GCC, the post of its Secretary General 
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has been occupied by Mr. AbduUa Y. Bishara ^^^\ a Kuwaiti national, who is still 
serving in that capacity. Two points, therefore, need examination. 
One is that the office of the GCC Secretary General is confined to Kuwaifi 
qualified citizens. This finding is based, in part, on close reading of documents 
produced during the preliminary steps for establishing the GCC. Those documents 
reveal that Foreign Ministers of the six Member States in their preparatory meeting 
in Oman in March 1981, agreed in principle that the GCC Secretary General would 
be a national of the State of Kuwait ^ '^^ \ The question remains as to whether the 
agreement reached was concerned with the first Secretary only, or else included all 
future Secretaries of the GCC. It would appear that their agreement meant all GCC 
Secretaries. This contention is grounded by the fact that, when the end of Mr. Bishara's 
second term drew to a close, the candidate for the post was also from Kuwait 
During that time, the Kuwaifis alone were concerned about finding a qualified 
substitute for the current Secretary. Nationals of other Member States were prepared 
only to comment on the qualifications of the nominee from Kuwait. As such, the post 
of the GCC Secretary General could be understood to be always engaged by a Kuwaiti 
national. 
The second point worth mentioning concerns the terms allowed for a 
Secretary. Article 14(2) of the GCC Charter provides for the appointment of a 
Secretary General for a period of three years renewable for a one second term only. 
Nonetheless, the current Secretary General has been in the office for over ten years. 
Thus, questions could be raised as to the legality of such practice under the GCC 
Charter, I t is obvious that the first three years term was in accordance with the Charter, 
as was the second three year term. In both terms the Secretary General was appointed 
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by decisions made by the Supreme Council in its first and f i f th Summit meetings 
Therefore, the enquiry is limited to the period after the sbcth year. Had the 
appointment of the Secretary General been renewed for a third term, a violation of 
the GCC Charter would have been committed. Absence of such renewal makes room 
for justifying the current Secretary's occupation of the post. A thorough review of the 
decisions made by the Supreme Council to date reveals no reference to a third term 
renewal. Thus, it can be argued that there is no violation of the Charter and that the 
current Secretary's engagement of the office is based on a temporary assignment 
which ends whenever the Supreme Council decides that another person who is 
knowledgeable about the regional political and economic issues is qualified to 
shoulder the responsibilities of the post. Nothing in the Charter precludes interim 
designation for the office from citizens of Kuwait including the current General 
Secretary. 
2. The Under Secretary General For Economic A ffairs 
In accordance with Article 12(8) of the GCC Charter, the Assistant Secretary 
General for Economic Affairs was appointed. He was nominated by the General 
Secretary and approved by the Ministerial Council in its first regular session in Saudi 
Arabia between 31 August 1981 and 2 September 1981 '^ ^^^ He was appointed for a 
renewable period of three years ^^^\ His main task is to assist the Secretary General 
in purely economic matters. Other functions include preparation of economic 
studies and plans for the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council and the 
Specialised Ministerial Committees; following up of the process of implementation 
of GCC programmes in the area of the economy;communication with other 
international economic organisations;organising meetings and conferences on 
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development and economic integration; and participation in economic conventions. 
In addition, he prepares the budget of the Economic Sector of the Secretariat General, 
acts as the secretary for the various ministerial economic committees and represents 
the GCC Secretariat General in international economic gatherings. 
5. The Under-Secretary General For Political Affairs 
The Under-Secretary General is the second of the two Assistant Secretaries 
General of the GCC. He was appointed in accordance with Article 12(8) of the GCC 
Charter in September 1981.^^^^ The principal funcfion of the Under-Secretary 
for Political Affairs is to aid the Secretary General in topics of a political nature. 
Accordingly, he undertakes to prepare unified political strategy for Member States in 
co-ordination with the concerned national institutions; prepares political studies and 
common plans for review by the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council and the 
various speciahsed Committees; follows up the execution of the GCC political plans 
through communication with the the concerned national bodies and evaluates the 
outcomes of the GCC common political projects. In addition, the post assumes 
responsibilty for secretarial work for sessions of the Supreme Council and the 
Ministerial Council. 
4. The Gulf Civil Servants 
Gulf Civil Servants are those officials who have been assigned certain 
positions in the GCC on either a permanent or a temporary basis. Appointment of 
such staff is the responsibility of the Head of the Secretariat General, i.e. the Secretary 
General, who selects them from amongst the qualified individuals of Member States 
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Individuals from non-member States may be appointed upon an approval of the 
Ministerial Council 
The Gulf Civil Servants, whether permanent, temporary or individuals 
appointed to work in collaboration with the GCC, must act independently of their 
national origin. To ensure independence in executing their tasks, all staff of the GCC 
are given certain privileges and irrmiunities according to their grade, as will be 
discussed in chapter three. 
b. Functions 
The name "Secretariat General" indicates a purely administrative and clerical 
body. However, in light of the development of the function of the Secretariat in most 
international organisations, functions of the GCC Secretariat General and the 
Secretary General have been extended. In addition to the conventional administrative 
tasks, the GCC Secretariat General currently maintains political and representative 
functions. 
The administrative duties encompass preparation of co-operative plans for 
joint action by Member States; following up the implementation of the GCC 
programmes; furnishing periodic reports on the GCC activities; drafting reports and 
studies needed by other organs of the GCC; preparing the GCC budget; and drafting 
resolutions and preparing the agenda for the Ministerial Council In addition, it 
assumes the Secretarial services for the Ministerial Council and its sub-committees 
and organises the relationships between the Ministerial Council and the media 
The political role of the GCC Secretariat General is seen in several forms. 
Firstly, one of its many tasks is to propose to the President of the Ministerial Council 
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holding an extraordinary session when needed The argument that all the 
Secretariat General has been granted a power to make non-binding recommendations 
for convening such sessions, is counter-balanced by the fact that giving a power to 
make recommendations implies empowering it to watch international and regional 
events and decide whether or not it is advantageous for the GCC to convene an 
extraordinary session. This task is of a political nature and the fact that its proposal 
may or may not be adopted does not strip the Secretariat General of its statutory 
political funcfion. The other form of its political tasks is of an intermediary and 
conciliatory characteristic. As the Secretariat is expected to improve the working 
climate of the various organs, the GCC Secretary General is co-charged with a 
conciliafion function. According to Article 36(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Ministerial Council, the Secretary is co-responsible to reconcile opponents and 
suggest compromises when members of the Ministerial Council cannot reach an 
agreement. 
The GCC Secretariat General, furthermore, represents the GCC at regional 
and internafional levels. According to Article 14(5) of the GCC Charter, the Secretary 
"shall represent the Gulf Co-operation Council" with other States and international 
organisations. Consequently, the Secretary took part in the dialogue between the 
GCC and the EEC Furthermore, he conducts extensive conununications with 
the Arab League for the overall interest of the Arab nation ^^^^\ In addition, he 
attends regular sessions of the U.N. General Assembly. In 1985, he met the U.N. 
Secretary General in Oman where they discussed regional events, especially the 
Iraq-Iran war and the efforts made by the GCC to put an end to that war 
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In summary, the GCC Secretariat General has been assigned tasks of a 
different nature alongside the administrative and clerical functions. In this respect, 
the GCC has adopted the new development of international secretariats in most 
global and regional organisations. 
c. Structure 
The general competence of the GCC, as well as the comprehensive objectives 
which it is seeking to achieve, necessitated the construction of a well-organised 
Secretariat General staffed by qualified personnel, in a number of departments. In 
recognition of this fact, the Secretariat was divided into several sectors, each 
concerned with an area of interest and staffed with a number of personnel. These 
sectors include the following. 
The Office of the Secretary General: consists of the GCC Secretary General, 
his two Assistants and a number of employees. The main task of the office is to provide 
the Secretary General with an environment that enables him to perform his functions 
effectively 
The Legal Affairs Sector: comprises several legal scholars with different 
backgrounds, i.e. Islamic Law, Civil Law, Common Law and International Law. This 
sector is sub-divided into four sections: the Legislative Institutions section, the 
Jurisprudence and Research section, the Legal Opinion and Lawsuits section and the 
Treaties section. Different responsibiUties have been assigned to these sections 
according to their natures. Generally, the Legal Affairs Sector has, inter alia, the 
following duties: 
1. Prepare studies and plans and conduct research aimed to co-ordinate 
legislative processes in the Member States in an attempt to unite their laws 
in the various fields; 
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2. Strengthen ties between legislative, judicial and consultative entities in 
Member States and make every effort to unify their structures, duUes and 
the procedural approaches to their tasks; 
3. Follow up the execution of the GCC legal programmes by the concerned 
bodies in Member States; 
4. Strengthen the ties between the consultative bodies and the specialised 
supreme councils and conunittees in Member States; 
5. Make preparation of legal studies and final draft of agreements and 
regulations that stem from within the framework of the GCC; 
6. Follow-up the ratification procedures of new rules and interstate 
agreements; 
7. Undertake the legal studies requested by organs of the GCC; 
8. Provide legal opinion in matters referred to it by the GCC organs; 
9. Represent the Secretariat General before courts and legal entities; 
10. Prepare, file, register and promulgate treaties and agreements aimed at 
strengthening ties between Member States and between the Members and 
Arab States, other nations and international organisations; 
11. Conduct comparative legal studies between the various laws in Member 
States and establish their common features for the ultimate objective of 
their unification; 
12. Study the possibility of unifying judicial systems in Member States; and 
13. Record the recommendations and opinions of the Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes ^^^^\ 
The Economic Affairs Sector: aims at consoUdating and co-ordinating 
economic activities in the GCC States in order to achieve ful l economic integration. 
To enable this sector properly to pursue this objective, it was divided into the following 
departments: 
1. Monetary, Finance and Investment 
2. Economic and Social Plarming 
3. Industry, Power and Water Desalination 
4. Research 
5. Trade 
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6. Works, Municipality and Housing 
7. Petroleum and Gas 
8. Agriculture and Water 
9. Communications and Transport 
The Economic Sector responsibilities are, inter alia, furnishing a draft 
economic strategy with the objective of attaining a comprehensive economic strategy; 
unifying economic laws, regulations and legislation; attaining economic citizenship 
and ensuring the involvement of the private sector in the development and integration 
process and co-operation with international, regional and Arab organisations 
operating in the economic sphere; and preparation of economic studies that are 
requested by the GCC organs or the Secretariat General considers should be supplied 
to these organs and committees ^^^^\ 
The Political Affairs Sector: aims at dealing with political, security and 
information matters of Member States within the framework of the GCC. The 
political sector consists of three departments which are as follows: 
1. Security [Military Affairs] 
2. Arab Relations 
3. International Relations 
Functions of the Political Sector include, inter alia, following up regional and 
international mihtary and political affairs, drawing up political plans, supervising 
political activities and ehminating obstacles preventing execution of the GCC political 
programmes ^^^^\ 
Man and Environment Affairs Sector: it undertakes to promote joint actions 
by Member States in fields touching upon man and his environment such as education, 
health, human resources, youth, sports, social, cultural and environment. To perform 
its functions properly, the sector is divided into the following departments: 
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1. Education 
2. Health 
3. Human Resources 
4. Social Affairs 
5. Culture 
6. Environmental Protection 
7. Youth and Sports 
The duties of the Man and Environment Sector include the preparation of 
studies in the above-mentioned areas which are requested by the various GCC organs 
as well as studies and projects the Secretariat General considers should be supplied 
to those organs; evaluating the outcomes of the GCC programmes in the areas 
mentioned above in light of their laid-down objectives; and co-ordinating with 
regional, Arab and internafional organisations concerned with the areas of man and 
envirorunent.^^^"*^ 
Information Centre: comprised of two departments: 
1. Informafion, which includes: 
- Supply 
- Operational Aids 
- Library 
- Listing and Bibliography 
- Archives 
- Stafistics and Micro-film 
2. Computer, which includes: 
- Systems Analysis 
- Progranuning 
- Maintenance 
Functions of the Information Centre encompass, inter aha, compilation of 
the GCC Member States government publications;supplying the necessary 
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information to the GCC, its organs and various committees; and co-ordination with 
other information centres ^^^^\ 
Financial and Administrative Sector: its main concern is the financial and 
administrative affairs of the Secretariat General and its respective sectors. It also 
assumes the responsibility of employing qualified officials from amongst the citizens 
of the GCC States 
2.B.IV.AncilIary Organs 
In addition to the principal institutions of the GCC discussed above, there 
are three ancillary organs formed in response to the need of the GCC for more arms 
in pursuing its objectives. These new institutions owe their origin to the GCC Charter, 
especially Articles 4 and 6. Besides, they were necessitated by the need for various 
bodies in order for the GCC to achieve its ultimate goals. The three organs which have 
been established to date are: the Gulf Investment Corporation [GIC], the Technical 
Office for Communications [TOC] and the Board for Specifications and Standards 
[BSS]. 
1. The Gulf Investment Corporation [GIC] 
A t its meeting in June 1982, the Financial and Economic Co-operation 
Committee recommended the estabUshment of the Gulf Investment Corporation 
The Supreme Council, at its session in Bahrain in November, 1982, approved 
the establishment of the GIC ^^ ^^ ^ and authorised the Ministers of Finance and 
Economy of the GCC States to sign the Agreement establishing the GIC as well as its 
Basic Statute. A t its meeting in Bahrain in November 1982, the Financial and 
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Economic Co-operation Committee approved the Agreement and the Basic Statute 
o f theGIC. 
2. The Technical Office for Communications [TOC] 
A t the first meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Telegraph, Post and 
Telephones, i t was decided to convert the Gulf Permanent Committee for 
Communications into an institution of the GCC with the name of the Technical Office 
for Communications '^^ ^^ ^ after the GCC Member States all became members of it. 
During the third meeting of the Telegraph, Posts and Telephones in January 
1986, the Internal Regulations for the Technical Office for Communications were 
approved. The Supreme Council confirmed the establishment of this office in its sixth 
session in Muscat in November 1985 
3. The Board of Specifications and Standards [BSS] 
Two sectorial Committees of the GCC recommended the establishment of 
a Gulf body concerned with specifications and standards for the GCC States. These 
two Committees were the Industrial Co-operation Committee at its meeting on 24-25 
October 1982 ^^ ^^ ^ and the Commercial Committee at its meeting on 30 October 1982 
(122) _ 
Based on these recommendations, the Supreme Council decided to convert 
the Saudi Arabian Bureau for Standards and Measurements into the Board for 
Specifications and Standards for the GCC States ^ ^ ^ \ Furthermore, it authorised the 
Ministers concerned, Ministers of Commerce, to endorse the internal rules of this 
Board.(l2^) 
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2.B.V. Specialised Ministerial Committees 
The objectives of the GCC are both comprehensive and far-reaching. Its 
Charter, in Article 4, speaks of unity amongst Member States in all fields as the 
ultimate aim of the GCC. Integration in the economic and social spheres, however, is 
the prime goal to which the GCC aspires in the short term. In order to achieve these 
ambitious goals, a number of specialised ministerial committees have been formed 
and charged with executing policies of the GCC and working out the details for their 
implementation. The composition of each depends on its speciality. The Agricultural 
and Water Committee, for example, is composed of the Ministers of Agriculture in 
the Member States. These sectorial committees owe their origin to the implied 
authority in the GCC Charter. As time passed and the meetings became more 
frequent, these committees, it is thought, drew closer to becoming a de facto 
specialised Ministerial Council of the GCC, and the Ministerial Council, composed 
of Foreign Affairs Ministers has qualified for the title of the "General Ministerial 
Council". Reviewing the tasks assigned to these committees as well as their long and 
tangible contribution to Gulf integration strengthens the basis for that contention. 
Herebelow is an enumeration of the GCC specialised committees.^^^^^ 
- The Interior Ministers Committee: 
- Defence Ministers Committee: 
- Commercial Co-operation Committee: 
- Transport and Communications Ministers Committee: 
- Telegraph Posts and Telephone Ministers Committee: 
- Civil Aviation Ministers Committee: 
- Agricultural and Water Co-operation Committee: 
- Housing Committee: 
- Justice and Islamic Affairs Committee: 
- Ports Authorities Official Committee: 
- Scientific and Technological Committee: 
Constitutional Analysis of the GCC 79 
- Auditing and Accounting Chief Standing Committee: 
- Economic and Social Planning Committee 
- Financial, Economic and Trade Committee 
- Industrial Co-operation Committee 
- Oil Committee 
- Social and Cultural Services Committee 
2.C: Decision-Making Process 
2.C.I. Initiating decisions 
Decisions of international organisations are made by working through a 
number of stages, starting with the initiatives and ending with voting. Initiators of 
international decisions include the various organs of the organisation concerned, its 
member states, individuals and interested groups. Some decisions of an organisation 
may be initiated by another organisation as in the case of the U.N. and the specialised 
agencies ^^^\ In addition, the constituent treaty of an organisation may initiate 
decisions for the overall interest of the organisation and its members. The Charter of 
the GCC, for instance, in Article 17(2), instructs Member States to conclude two 
agreements: one on the privileges and immunities of the GCC; the other is the 
headquarters agreement with Saudi Arabia. 
Member States of the GCC are the most effective initiators of its decisions. 
Initiatives taken by the States are of special importance because they employ all the 
means necessary for the survival of the initiatives during the various stages of the 
decision-making process. More importantly, the initiating State usually seeks 
consultations and opinions in the matter before it adopts the initiative under 
consideration. When other Member States are sufficiently prepared for discussing the 
matter, the sponsoring State forwards the proposal for elaboration. In the case of the 
GCC, the right of initiative of decisions is not conferred on States by the prevailing 
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practice alone; it is also invested in them by the instruments establishing the GCC in 
recognition of the importance and effectiveness of decisions sponsored by Member 
States ^ ' ^ ' \ 
The Secretariat General of the GCC has a power, albeit limited, of initiative 
by virtue of its nature. I t is empowered by the Charter to initiate the decision-making 
process in the various fields entrusted to the GCC ^^^ \ It prepares and proposes items 
for review by the Ministerial Council Additionally, it makes initiatives based on 
requests by either the Supreme Council or the Ministerial Council As an organ 
equipped with qualified manpower specialising in different subjects and a body 
charged with the day-to-day operation of the GCC, the Secretariat General has 
become an active forum for launching proposals, giving birth to several regional 
programmes. As such, it should not be unusual for the Secretariat General to take an 
initiative and send to its Member States for comments preparatory to finalisation by 
the GCC decision-making organ, i.e. the Supreme Council. 
The Ministerial Council is another arena for taking initiatives. Its statutory 
right of initiative is established by Article 12(1) of the Charter itself. 
Individual persons of GCC Member States can be indirect initiators of the 
process leading to some GCC decisions, particularly in social and economic fields. 
For example, i f some businessmen of a Member State desire a GCC decision on a 
commercial matter, they persuade their State to adopt their initiative, and to act on 
their behalf until the decision is taken. Another route open would be to submit 
complaints to the GCC regarding current programmes, along with the modifications 
needed. These complaints and demands are an indirect source for subsequent 
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decisions in their respective fields of interest. Additionally, the role of experts and 
intellectuals' in drawing up GCC educational, cultural and social plans is considerable. 
The following stage of the decision-making process is the preparation of a 
draft text of the proposal. Formulating a clear draft of the proposal influences its final 
outcome if the draft remains unchanged through each stage of the decision-making 
process. 
The next stage is the submission of the proposal. In order that consultation 
between delegations of Member States and their concerned national authorities can 
take place, sufficient time should elapse between the submission of the proposal and 
the opening of the session during which the proposal will be discussed. The GCC 
requires that items for the agenda be forwarded to Member States at least 30 days 
before the opening of a session ^^^^\ However, additional items may be included in 
the agenda if so requested by a State no fewer than 15 days prior to the opening date 
of a session, provided that these additional proposals are circulated to the States at 
least 5 days in advance of the opening of that session I f the proposal concerns 
matter which is "considered both important and urgent", it may be included in the 
agenda, "as late as the date set for opening a session" ^^^^\ 
2.C.II Voting Procedures 
Voting on an item on the agenda is the final stage of the decision-making 
process. It takes place only after the draft text of the decision has been circulated to 
all delegations and the Chairman of the session has closed the discussions and 
announced that voting has begun. Once voting is called for, every State has one vote 
on the item to be voted upon, and no State can vote for another or represent it ^ ^^\ 
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The "one State, one vote" formula of voting has been adopted by the GCC, despite 
the diverse political, economic and population size factors amongst Member States. 
Therefore, whilst Member States have widely diveregent interests in and 
commitments to any given field, they have equal voting power. However, because the 
GCC is an organisation with general competence which assumes responsibihties for 
further integration amongst the States in so many fields, rendering arduous the 
identification of good and fair grounds for extra representation, it is difficult to argue 
for providing some States with weighted representation. Consequently, lack of an 
accurate criterion upon which weighted representations can be based is enough 
reason for the GCC to adopt the "one nation, one vote" formula. The measure adopted 
by which a State can safeguard its vital interests in some fields from being outvoted 
by Members with httle or no interest at all, is the requirement of unanimity for 
decisions in substantive matters. Furthermore, unlike some organisations, voting 
power proportional to financial contribution cannot be argued for in the case of the 
GCC because the six Member States contribute equally to its budget.^ ^^^^ In brief, 
arguments of equity and/or voting abuses are unpersuasive, bearing in mind the 
unanimity requirement, as well as the way the GCC membership was selected. 
Before turning to the types of voting chosen by the GCC, mention of them 
and their origins is made. International decision-making is approached through 
different kinds of voting; the basic ones being: unanimity voting, majority voting, and 
weighted voting. According to Inis Claude, these three types were developed outside 
the area of international organisation, but were borrowed by the organisations in 
order to finalise their decision-making process.^^^^ 
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The GCC adheres to both unanimity and majority voting. Unanimity is the 
requirement for decisions in substantive matters whilst majority is used for those of a 
procedural nature The final say on whether a matter is substantive or procedural 
probably rests with the Supreme Council, but the latter may choose to accept a 
decision made by the Ministerial Council as to whether a matter is one or the other 
(138) -^Yi^jj system of unanimity voting, it may seem difficult for the GCC to obtain 
decisions which further integration amongst its Members. However, to mitigate this 
difficulty, the GCC provides that absence or abstention of a Member will not prevent 
decision- making by the unanimity of Members present and voting. In the words of 
Article 9(2) of the GCC Charter the unanimity required is that of "member states 
participating in the voting". Also, Article 5(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Supreme Council reads to the same effect^^'^^^ Since abstention is in effect 
non-participation in voting, it is counted as neither for nor against the item being voted 
upon. This conclusion applies to both substantive and procedural matters.^ ^"^^ Item 
(2) of Article 15 of the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Council, which speaks of 
abstention from voting on procedural matters, should not be taken as restricting 
abstention to cases in which procedural topics are the subject of voting, and not when 
substantive matters are voted on. Limiting abstention to topics of a procedural nature 
conflicts with Article 9(2) of the Charter of the GCC itself which does not impose 
such limitation. Additionally, Article 5(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme 
Council is supportive of the view that abstension may be made even on substantive 
matters since i t does not differentiate between the two categories. 
Since the Charter is superior to the interior rules of the various organs. 
Article 9(2) of the Charter prevails over Article 15(2) of the Rules of Procedure of 
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the Supreme Council. Thus, abstention can be exercised on both substantive and 
procedural topics. The question yet remains as to whether abstainees can escape the 
consequences of a decision made by the other Members of the GCC. The answer is 
in the affirmative. While the decision is valid, it is not applicable to Members who 
abstained from voting on it. According to part of Article 5(2) of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Supreme Council, "Any member abstaining shall record that he is not bound 
by the resolution". This Article, in effect, resembles Article 7 of the Arab League 
which declares that decisions made by a majority vote bind only Members who accept 
them. Is an absent Member bound by a decision made in his absence? The Charter of 
the GCC is silent on the issue. Whilst it requires that the abstaining Member should 
document the fact that it will not be bound by the decision, it makes no similar 
provision in the case of an absentee. Thus, equating absence with abstention was not 
probably the intent of the framers of the GCC Charter. Thus, an absent Member is 
bound by a decision taken unanimously by the Members present and participating in 
the vote^ '^^ ^^ The obvious result of this is that not all Members are bound by the same 
rules. In practice, however, this problem has been tackled by the adherence to the 
principle of "consensus". Consensus has played a considerable role in GCC 
decision-making. Most GCC decisions have used consensus as opposed to formal 
voting. Mr Bishara, the GCC Secretary General, highlighted the rule in his address to 
a Washington audience. He said: 
"Moderation is the essence of the societies and governments that make up the 
GCC. Another important quality in the GCC is flexibility. This is the basis of 
co-operation. The heads of states are used to patience, quiet persuasion, 
consensus-building and co-operative decision-making. These have been our 
traditional political tools, and they form today the foundation of unity within the 
GCC and of co-operation in the region. Moderation and flexibility form our 
natural system of operation. They are our breath, our philosophy" (i'*2). 
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Lack of consensus results in abstentions and/or absences which themselves 
result in binding the States by different rules. To avoid the latter outcome, i.e. applying 
different rules to different Members, the GCC adopted a unique approach in its 
decision-making which calls for shelving the proposal temporarily and pursuing a final 
decision in spheres where consensus is available. This approach has been elaborated 
by Mr Bishara as follows: 
"The GCC is an irreversible process, but its main characteristic is flexibility. 
There is no imposition or embarrassment to any member state. Instead we follow 
a practice of exemption: when consensus is lacking, and one or more members 
have difficulty with a policy direction, we exempt the issue temporarily and turn 
to other areas where greater consensus exists." (l'*^) 
The above shows that the practice of the GCC is really neither unanimity nor 
majority voting; in other words, formal voting is rare. Alternatively, there is a flexible 
formula in operation, based on persuasion and consensus, both of which invite 
compromises and produce decisions that find their way to implementation. 
The GCC, as a young organisation with limited and selective membership 
which includes only neighbours of identical ideology, history, language, national 
resources and future ambitions, has chosen the particular voting systems that suit its 
case. The pattern of unanimity adopted by the GCC enables it to further co-operation 
amongst its Members while it leaves States at liberty to decide whether or not to 
contract-in to new obligations. 
The States' experience with centuries of colonialism must have been borne 
in mind when unanimity was selected as the GCC system of voting on important 
decisions. Seemingly the GCC has been able to find consensus thus avoiding the 
question of sovereignty which, by reason of the States' colonial past, is very sensitive. 
Susceptibility of Members regarding the question of soveriegnty, however, has faded 
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as the first decade of the GCC's existence has closed and so, consensus has become 
readily available, as will be demonstrated in chapters five and six. 
2.C.III.The Nature of Decisions 
Broadly speaking, normative acts of international organisations fall, in terms 
of legal effect, into two categories: Hortatory and binding. Hortatory norms are voted 
under different names such as recommendations, resolutions, advice, opinions, etc.; 
whereas binding norms have been named decisions, regulations, rules, annexes, 
directives etc. ^ '^^ ^ However, the terminology is not uniform, hence the same term 
may be employed in different organisations to denote an obligatory norm in one case 
and in another a mere expression of suggestion. For instance, the term 
'recommmendation' was used by the ECSC Article 14 to denote a binding rule of law. 
Therefore, one should not rely so much upon the terminology for ascertaining the 
legal force of a normative act. For our purposes, the term 'recommendation' will be 
employed to describe non-binding norms and the term 'decision' for binding ones. 
Before venturing into GCC decisions and their legal force, words on where 
to find them seems in order. Unlike in most international organisations, there is no 
GCC 'official journal' or 'gazette', or the Hke whose function is to provide interested 
people with GCC legislation. Notably, there is a quarterly 'Legal Bulletin' which is, 
unfortunately, of no help to researchers on the GCC experience. It would be more 
beneficial i f the Bulletin starts including GCC decisions, at least as a part of its task. 
Recognising the compelling need for publicising decisions, particularly those of an 
economic nature which concern citizens most, the Economic Directorate of the GCC 
Secretariat General collected all GCC decisions, except those of a security or political 
nature, and produced them in their details in a GCC publication entitled 'Decisions 
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on the Common Work'. Although brief communiques of the Supreme Council do 
contain decisions taken, international lawyers will probably be more interested in 
seeing those decisions in the aforementioned publication, if only because it articulates 
decisions in a more detailed manner, in particular prefacing the decision by a 
preamble reciting its legal basis. Because there is no official journal, the final 
communiques sometimes serve that purpose instead, and some of their contents can 
be regarded, broadly speaking, as decisions, however summary and imprecise. 
As to the nature of GCC decisions. Article 9 of the GCC Charter and Article 
5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Council regulate the issuance of normative 
acts of the GCC. Yet neither these constituent instruments, nor any other, define the 
effects of these acts. I t is submitted that al l organisations may issue 
recommendations,^^"*^^ the GCC included. Yet the question remains whether it can 
issue norms of a binding nature. In other words, what is the legal force of GCC 
decisions? 
It has been held that the power to make binding decisions depends upon the 
constituent treaty of the organisation, or, as a supplement, its practice that has been 
accepted by all members.^^^^ With regard to the GCC, a provision on the matter is, 
as mentioned, lacking; the practice, on the other hand manifests the fact that Member 
States execute every decision as soon as it is made.^ "^^ ^^  Whether the States feel bound 
to do so is not clear. 
Theoretically, several views have been formed on the legal nature of GCC 
decisions. Admittedly, none were formulated in special studies on the issue but rather 
were produced incidentally when matters related to the GCC were discussed. This 
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should not discredit their value since they represent opinions of international law 
specialists. 
Generally, their opinions fall into two categories: one holds that they are of 
a recommendatory nature, i.e. with no binding force; it equates them with those made 
by the U N General Assembly. ^ "^^ ^^  The other views GCC decisions as legally binding 
norms but its advocates differ on the degree and scope of their force: Dr. Al-Asha'al 
says they bind Member States who accept them.^ '^^ ^^ Dr. Al-Bahurna views GCC 
decisions as legally binding on Member States, but their implementation for domestic 
purposes is in accord with each States constitutional procedures.^ ^^*^^ Dr. Makarem 
took the position that they are binding and directly effective within the municipal legal 
system of the Member States.^ ^^^^ Dr. As-Syari is of the opinion that they are binding 
upon the States on the international plane.^ ^^^^ 
As said earlier, no-one offered his reasoning for the position he adopts. 
Hence, one is not able to examine their arguments. Thus, what is left is formulating 
yet another view, which is closely similar to that of Dr. Al-Bahurna, and probably what 
both Dr. Al-Asha'al and Dr. As-Syari had in mind. 
With lack of provision on the matter, one can readily see why some argue 
that all decisions are of a recommendatory nature, especially since, from a structural 
point of view, the GCC loosely resembles organisations such as the UN, whose 
General Assembly makes non- legally binding resolutions. The logic of this conclusion 
is recognisable. Yet one is inclined to join the other view for textual as well as practical 
reasons. In international law, GCC decisions are legally binding on all Members, 
except those who abstain and record that they are not bound by the decisions. But for 
domestic law purposes their effect is dependent upon their implementation in 
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accordance with each State's constitutional procedures. Textual support of this 
opinion is found in Article 5(2) of the Rule of Procedure of the Supreme Council 
which, after stating that decisions on substansive matters are carried by unanimous 
vote, provides that "Any member abstaining shall record that he is not bound by the 
resolution". The use of the terms 'shall' and 'bound' as well as the inclusion of the 
stipulation as a whole implies that all Members, which are not abstaining and 
recording their non-acceptance of the legal impUcation of the decision, are bound by 
the decision voted. It says nothing about absentees; yet, as said earlier, mentioning 
abstention and ommitting absentees could mean that absent Member(s) are also 
bound since the unanimity required means those present and participating in the vote, 
and that contracting-out of a decision is to be put into writing. In either case, the 
quorum of two-thirds of the six Members must, of course, be satisfied, as mentioned 
earlier in relation to meetings of the Supreme Council. 
In practice, all decisions of the GCC have been incorporated in national legal 
systems ^^^ \ which supports the contention that the decisions are binding in 
international law. However, the effect of the decisions is to bind the States in 
international law only. There is no direct effect of GCC decisions in the legal systems 
of the Member States, hence the need for implementing action by them to fulf i l their 
obligations.^"'^'^^ 
Before concluding this discussion, a few words must be said on what may be 
described as GCC 'declarations'. The are established by practice rather than the 
constituent treaties. In recent years, the issuance of 'declarations' bearing the name 
of the State capital hosting the Summit have been frequent. ^ ^^^ 
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Having had the title, i.e. 'declaration', which may be employed to describe a 
normative act of any institution, practical questions may arise. In particular those 
relating to whether or not they have legal force, and if not what legal implication they 
have. 
Generally speaking, the term 'declaration' describes a class of action which, 
Schermers suggests, purport to clarify existing rules rather than creating new 
ones.(l5^) 
This observation seems applicable to GCC declarations. Reading into them 
reveal that they neither attempt to articulate specific new future programmes nor invite 
Member States to change existing laws. Accordingly, they are probably more of, as 
described by Schachter, 'political text' ^^^^ containing mere political commitments to 
honour legal obligations assumed previously. The fact that they have never been 
incorporated into the domestic law of Member States, i f they ever contain something 
transformable, indicates that the States intended to differentiate them from legal 
obligations which have been transformed immediately after their making. The language 
and the context in which they have been drawn favour the said view too.*-^^^ Instead of 
enumerating what 'shall' be done in the future, the declarations voice merely what 
'should' be considered. Additionally, their issuance alongside what contains GCC 
decisions, i.e. communiques, is suggestive of the fact that they have been intended to 
convey other than legal rules. Having said that, they are not without legal implications. 
In the case of the GCC as a regional organisation, it is enough to point out to their 
significance as evidence of the Members positions on legal rules already decreed. 
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Summary 
On 25 May, 1981, the six States of the Gulf, i.e. the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait brought into being the GCC by signing its Charter 
and other related instruments which were later ratified by the said States in accord 
with their constitutional requirements. ^ ^^^ Besides being multilateral international 
conventions concluded by sovereign States, the said constituent treaties are effectively 
the GCC constitution which enumerates the content and scope of the treaty 
relationship entered into by the States. For instance, it describes the aims of the GCC 
as co-operation in all fields with the ultimate goal of integration. 
However, while some constitutional problems have been settled explicitly by 
the Charter, others are left open for interpretation: amongst those settled is the issue 
of reservation. The Charter explicitly prohibits voicing reservation to any of its 
provisions in recognition of the fact that success of the GCC depends on part upon its 
Members assuming the same obligations including the collective work in the common 
organs. The question of unilateral withdrawal is an example of the issues on which the 
Charter kept silent, while expressly limiting membership to the sue founding States. 
On the issue of unilateral vdthdrawal from international organisation, the review of 
the legal literature reveals that opinions are far from being at agreement. Yet, the 
view which seems in line with the logic of inter State relations at the international 
plane would allow a GCC State to v^dthdraw unilaterally. Other constitutional aspects 
include the institutional setting of the GCC and the process of making and adopting 
programmes. 
As far as the organisational structure and development is concerned, the 
GCC has three main institutions: the Supreme Council, which is composed of the 
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Heads of the six States, is the highest organ and the poUcy maker within the framework 
of the GCC; attached to it is a conciUatory aJ/ioc tribunal called the Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes. The Ministerial Council consists of any delegated minister, 
but mainly the Foreign Ministers, who are charged with much of the detailed work of 
the GCC. The third main body is the Secretariat General, headed by a 
Secretary-General and two assistants, is responsible for the day to day operation of 
the GCC as well as much of the preparatory work for the various activities of the 
organisation. The institutional development so far include the establishment of the 
Gulf Investment Corporation, the Technical Office for Communications and the 
Board for Specifications and Standards. In addition, 17 specialised ministerial 
committees covering various fields have been formed, all of which aim at establishing 
as many channels for co-operation by proposing regional plans and executing 
decisions made by the Supreme Council. 
These sectorial committees are not the only initiator of GCC decisions. The 
other organs of the GCC as well as its Charter and the Member States make proposals 
to be decided by the Supreme Council. The said Council takes decisions on substantive 
matters by unanimous vote of the Members present and voting, provided, of course, 
that the quorum of four States is satisfied. Abstention and absence are counted neither 
for, nor against, a decision. In other words, only present negative votes can veto a 
decision. Procedural matters are carried out by majority vote. In practice, the 
Secretary General has made it clear that GCC decisions are reached by consensus. 
Once a decision is made, it is binding upon Member States on the international scene; 
in the municipal sphere, its effectiveness is subject to its incorporations in accordance 
with the constitutional procedures.^ ^ -^^  
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Finally, it should be mentioned that the institutional structure of the GCC 
has been described in detail, and some routine legal problems have been examined 
to show that the GCC is a developing organisation which resolves some of its problems 
in a pragmatic way. Too hteral or formal an approach to the interpretation of its text 
would be inappropriate. 
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Chapter Three 
International and Internal Legal Status of the GCC 
Introduction 
The emergence of public international organisations in such a large number 
has introduced new developments in the international legal order. The intensive 
international operations in various fields undertaken by these new actors have 
gradually attracted the attention of international law as reflected in the works of its 
theorists. Contrary to the practice in regard to private corporations or companies, 
which are the creatures of national legal systems, public international organisations 
are the product of interstate agreements and provided with organs of a permanent 
nature. Of related significance is the fact that they are offered privileges and 
immunities including jurisdictional immunities, all of which somewhat resemble those 
accorded to sovereign states. Furthermore, many organisations aim at the well-being 
and general interests of peoples of the member states and, therefore, there arise 
important issues of the relation between the interactional legal acts of the 
organisations and domestic legal systems.^ ^^  
At present, and in the light of these developments, it has become obvious 
that international organisations have been admitted to the international theatre as a 
new type of international actor. Review of the practice and history of international 
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organisations reveals that several types of activities, which used to be the prerogative 
of states, have been performed by international organisations. Then, consideration 
begins to be given to the legal consequences of the failure of international 
organisations to stay within their legal powers. 
Having stated this, few general conclusions can be reached regarding their 
international status; in general, the matter is best approached by an ad hoc 
examination of each organisation. Seemingly, it is appropriate at this stage of the legal 
work on the GCC to investigate the international, as well as the municipal legal status 
of the GCC. This chapter, accordingly, ventures into these questions as far as time and 
division of the general work allow. 
3.A: International legal personality of the G C C 
3A.I: General legal background 
a. Early trends 
Before the establishment of the League of Nations, the notion of 
international legal personality was widely thought to be the prerogative of the 
sovereign states alone; it went hand in hand with the then dominant belief that states 
were the only subject of international law. This view, then, associated the idea of 
international personality with the notion of sovereignty. Accordingly, since 
international organisations and confederations lack the de jure prerequisites for 
constituting sovereign states, they were denied the attribute of an international legal 
personaUty. Other grounds for such denial include the contention that the 
organisations do not have a will of their own distinct from that of their members, as 
discussed below; the doubts cast on the ability of an international treaty to create an 
International and Internal Legal Statiis of the GCC 102 
independent international legal personaUty, and that international organisations are 
financially dependent on their members. '^^ ^ 
However, subsequent to the creation of the League of Nations, the need to 
attribute the notion of international juridical personality to international 
organisations became imperative. Accordingly, it was conceded to the organisations 
by some theorists. 
During the process of establishing the United Nations (UN), the notion 
received more attention and gathered more support. The San Francisco Conference 
(1945), nonetheless, was not convinced of the need to provide the UN with a specified 
international personality. 
b. Opinion of the ICJ 
The absence of explicit language on the international legal personality of the 
UN was no barrier to its existence in the minds of most jurists in accordance with the 
impHcation of the terms of the UN Charter. This was confirmed by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Reparations case (1949) which determined that the UN 
was an international legal person. In this case, the ICJ was requested by the UN 
General Assembly to give an advisory opinion on the following legal questions: 
I . In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of 
his duties suffering injury in circumstances involving the 
responsibility of a State, has the United Nations, as an organisation, 
the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible 
de jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining the reparation 
due in respect of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) 
to the victim or to persons entitled through him? 
I I . In the event of an affirmative reply on point 1(b), how is action by 
the United Nations to be reconciled with such rights as may be 
possessed by the State of which the victim is a national?" (7) 
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The ICJ reached the conclusion "that an affirmative answer should be given 
to Question 1(a) and (b) whether or not the defendent State is a member of the United 
Nations." Of importance to this discussion is the fact that the Court, in arriving at 
this conclusion, considered it proper to determine at the outset whether or not the 
UN had an international legal personality because the ICJ said, "if the organisation 
[the UN] is recognised as having that personahty, it is an entity capable of avaihng 
itself of obligations incumbent upon its members". 
It noted, as did some international jurists, that the UN international juridical 
personality, i.e. capacity to have rights and duties distinct from those of its member 
states, could only be deduced implicitly from the terms of its Charter; for this purpose 
the ICJ considered "what characteristics it was intended thereby to give to the 
Organisation." ^^ ^^  In doing so, the Court identified the following characteristics of 
the UN: ^^ ^^  
1. The UN has purposes and principles expressly articulated in its Charter; 
2. It is equipped with organs; 
3. It has been assigned special tasks; 
4. Its Charter has defined its position in relation to the member states "which 
occupies a position in certain respects in detachment from its members"; 
and 
5. It exercises and enjoys functions and rights which are usually carried out 
and undertaken by a subject possessing an international legal personaUty. 
International and Internal Legal Status of the GCC 104 
In addition, the ICJ took note of the Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities of the UN which initiated rights and obligations between the signatories, 
on the one hand, and the UN itself, on the other. It went on to state that 
"it is difficult to see how such a convention could operate except upon the 
international plane and as between parties possessing international personality." 
(12) 
Having assessed the characteristics of the UN and the nature of its function, 
the ICJ reached the conclusion that the UN was an international person. To qualify 
its conclusion, the Court ruled out the possible implication of its decision as equating 
the UN's international personality with those of sovereign states. ^^ "^^ It stated, 
moreover, that attributing an international personality to the UN does not mean 
classifying it as a 'super-state'. It then distinguished between the international 
personality of the states and that of the UN stating: 
"... What it does mean is that it is a subject of international law and capable of 
possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain 
its rights by bringing international claims. ... Whereas a state possesses the 
totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law, the 
right and duties of an entity such as the Organisation must depend upon its 
purposes and functions as specified or impHed in its constituent documents and 
developed in practice." (i^) 
This distinction is based on the Court's earlier thesis that 
'The subjects of any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or 
in the extent of their rights, and the nature depends upon the needs of the 
community." (^6) 
More importantly, the ICJ confirmed the UN objective international legal 
personaUty. In justification of its opinion on this particular point, it stated: 
"... the Court's opinion is that fifty States, representing the vast majority of the 
members of the international community, had the power, in conformity with 
international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international 
personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with 
capacity to bring international claims." (i* )^ 
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This point, to be noted, has been questioned by a number of international 
jurists. Whilst some probably accept the concept of objective international personahty 
in relation to universal organisations, e.g. the UN, ^^ ^^  others doubt this concept 
altogether. ^^ ^^  
c. Current theory 
The opinion of the ICJ in Ihe Reparations case (1949) influenced and shaped 
current legal theory in respect to the possible attribution of international legal 
personality to most contemporary international organisations. The jurisprudence and 
reasoning of the Court in this case constituted a major basis for the acceptance of such 
notion by an increasing number of international legal writers. They, however, hold 
different views regarding the scope of the international personality that might be 
granted to international organisations. Their disagreement stems from their opposing 
opinion with regard to the source of the personality. 
One opinion maintains that the international juridical personality of 
intergovernmental organisations stems from general or customary international law. 
(20) r j ^ j g ^ jg^ advocated by Seyersted. According to him, once an organisation is 
established with one or more organs by more than one state, it is an international 
person in relation to both members and non-members. ^^ ^^  He therefore suggests that 
the process for discovering the rights and duties of international organisations is the 
same as that for States. ^^ ^^  His argument for putting organisations on an equal footing 
with states in terms of international personality is that only factual limitations preclude 
intergoverrmiental organisations from engaging in the undertakings thought to be the 
prerogative of states. In his own words: 
"there is no basic difference between states and intergovernmental organisations 
with regard to organic jurisdiction. With regard to territorial and personal 
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jurisdiction and with regard to certain international acts there is, however, a 
considerable difference of fact. Intergovernmental organisations exercise 
territorial and personal jurisdiction only in exceptional cases where states cede 
to them part of their jurisdiction over territory or individuals (which need not 
be done by constitutional provision or by another treaty to which the other 
Member States are parties). And when an organisation has no such jurisdiction, 
there are many international acts which it is not called upon, or is not in a 
practical position, to perform to the same extent as the traditional subjects of 
international law, states. But this is a difference of fact, not of inherent legal 
capacity. Thus, as already pointed out, when so far no intergovernmental 
organisation has been invited to participate in an international conference on 
an equal footing with states, this not because the constitutions of 
intergovernmental organisations do not authorize them to do so, but because 
such organisations usually do not represent interests comparable to those of 
states. Only when they exceptionally do represent comparable interests will the 
practical need arise. And the silence of their constitutions is then no hindrance" 
(23) 
In his conclusion, he summarised the theory of "the inherent power" which 
he advocates in a passage which reads: 
"Intergovernmental organisations are thus, from a legal point of view, general 
subjects of international law, ipso facto on the basis of general and customary 
international law, in basically the same manner as states. The main difference is 
one of fact, namely that most organisations are not in a practical position to 
exercise their inherent international capacities to the same extent as states, 
because they have no territory and population, but not because they lack the 
capacity to exercise jurisdiction over territory and persons." (2^) 
Thus the heart of this theory is that the international personality of 
intergovernmental organisations is determined by international law provided that 
such organisations be equipped with at least one autonomous organ and more than 
one member. So, the basis for the legal capacities of interstate organisations as well 
as the basis for performing international acts and to become the holders of 
international rights and obligations is general international law as opposed to the 
constitution of the prospective organisations which is seen by this theory, if it exists, 
as a possible source of negative effect. Analogy between the rules of municipal 
law, which requires positive provisions and/or incorporation for allocating a private 
organisation with a legal personality, and constitutional terms of governmental 
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organisation for the attribution of an international legal personality at the 
international level is rejected. For one thing, under some judicial systems, this view 
maintains, private organisations are legal persons unless this is "precluded by statutory 
or factual limitation." In other words, Seyersted attributes to intergovernmental 
organisations an objective international legal personality. Moreover, he sees 
international organisations as original subjects of international law. ^^ ^^  
The other school of thought which is gaining firm ground holds the 
constituent instruments of international organisations as the source of their 
international personality, if at all. In brief, they admit that a personality arises from 
and depends upon the nature and aims of the organisation. Moreover, they consider 
international organisations as derivative subjects of international law. ^^ ^^  
More importantly, within the majority recognising the enjoyment of 
international personality by some international organisations, several authors have 
described preconditions, the presence of which is necessary for accepting an 
organisation as a candidate for such attributes. Notably, the preconditions hereunder 
presented as well as possible others have been borrowed from the judgment of the 
ICJ in the Reparations case (1949), as well as from the general works in the field of 
international institutional law. This latter requires the presence of particular elements 
in an organisation for its classification as an international intergovernmental 
organisation for the purposes of public international law. 
The possession of a permanent organ is the most common precondition. 
This particular characteristic was searched for by the ICJ in the UN and found present. 
^^ ^^  The question thus is what importance this precondition carries in the context of 
the international personality of intergovernmental organisations? It seems that the 
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permanent organ is insisted on by a number of jurists for several reasons. On the one 
hand, it distinguishes between international organisations which are set up so as to be 
continuously active from the ad hoc conferences. On the other hand, the permanent 
nature of the organisation, Professor Renter writes, 
"is a measure of its independence; i f it is not permanent it can only act in 
accordance with the will of the member states; if it is permanent it can stand up 
to the states." 02) 
As such, the notion of a permanent organ is advocated to guarantee some 
sort of detachment of the will of the organisation from those of its members. ^^ ^^  
Such detachment of wills thus is another precondition; i f it cannot be 
made available by means of providing permanent organs, it has to be put in hand in 
the terms of the charters, whether expressly or implicitly. This precondition is also 
investigated and noted by the ICJ in the Reparations case (1949), although only in 
certain respects of the inter-relations of the UN and its members. ^^ ^^  Of greater 
significance is the inquiry into where in the U N Charter the ICJ found the kind of 
detachment required for allotting the U N an international personality. The Court 
apparently based its conclusion on this point on the finding of facts which include: the 
Charter of the U N 
- requires members to assist the U N in any action undertaken by it; 
- requires members to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council; 
- authorises the General Assembly to make recommendations to its members; 
- gives the U N legal capacity, privileges and immunities in the territory of each 
member; and 
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- provides the conclusion of agreements between the U N and its members. 
Accordingly, these were the criteria employed by the ICJ in determining 
whether the U N has a distinct will separate from that of its members. The Court, 
notably, paid no attention to the kind of voting system provided for in the Charter in 
measuring the detachment of the wills of the U N and its members. However, as noted 
by some authors, the adoption of a majority by an organisation is "a clear indication" 
of the distinct wills. ^^ ^^  
Regarding Soviet doctrinal international law, it is unclear whether it would 
admit the individual will of the organisations, let alone require it. In 1971, an 
international law student examined the writing of leading Soviet jurists who addressed 
the issue of the individual will of international organisations, relating some of them 
to the political circumstances under which they were produced, and wrote: 
"The general conclusion one can reach from this analysis is that Soviet doctrinal 
international law, for the most part, refuses to concede to any universal 
international organisation an individual will that is independent of the wills of 
the member states. This will is seen as being not only derived from and limited 
by, but also as being wholly dependent upon, the wills of the member states." 
(38) 
This author's discussion took note of Professor Tunkin's criticism ^^ ^^  of Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice's opinion that the U N as a subject of international law is a 
completely independent legal person. '^^ '^  He also stated that Professor Tunkin 
maintained that "It is ... inaccurate to assume that the United Nations is an entity 
independent of its member states;" '^^ ^^  yet, he mentioned nothing about Professor 
Tunkin's statement that although the U N was set up by states, it is "a social 
phenomenon distinct from states members of the Organisation (UN)." ^^ ^^  The 
surmise, therefore, is that in spite of his denial of complete independence, he concedes 
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some sort of co-ordinated wills of those of the organisations and those of their 
members. I n the light of the development of international institutional law, 
particularly as regards their personality and responsibility at the international level, 
one would expect that this would be followed by conceding some aspects of the 
restricted view which Soviet doctrinal international law holds with regards to the issue 
of the v^all of international organisations. However, such expectations, if held, at least 
up to 1982, would be misplaced. The conclusion reached by the said student cited 
above, in 1971, probably held true at least until 1982 when a comprehensive text book 
on international law was published; this work was contributed to by a number of 
leading Soviet international jurists and edited by Professor Tunkin. It contains the 
following: 
"As subjects of international law, international organisations possess their will. 
I t is a result of the concordance of wills of the member-states, exists in parallel 
with their wills (but does not take precedence over them), and manifests itself 
in particular actions by the corresponding organs of international organisations 
that implement its will . The direction and basic contents of the will of an 
international organisation are always conditioned by the contents of the wills of 
the member-states." i^'^) 
The doctrinal Soviet international law on issues relating to the legal 
international personality of international organisations, including the question of the 
organisations' independence, is most likely to be politically influenced. Views of the 
USSR on these issues reflect the governmental policies of the ruhng party. The Soviet 
Union's approach to those questions was probably influenced by its objection to 
majority decisions of the U N General Assembly, against which it had voted, where 
the Soviet Union had serious doubts about the competence of the General Assembly. 
'^^ '^  The issue was closely related to the personality of the U N because the argument, 
especially in relation to U N peace-keeping forces, turned on the implied powers of 
the GA. The Soviet Union took the view that such a doctrine had no place in 
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interpreting what was simply an ordinary treaty between States where States were 
bound only by their express understandings. ^^ ^^  
Such a view is overly narrow, and when one realises its consequences, one 
quickly recognises the imperative need for liberation from it. 
A third precondition for possible endowment of the notion of international 
personality to an intergovernmental organisation is its establishment by international 
treaty. This legal element is advocated, by its proponents, to distinguish public 
international organisations from private international organisations, and also to 
measure the distinct legal personality of the organisation. An express agreement is 
the most common means for establishing an organisation and for legal reasons it is 
preferable. However, an organisation may be founded by other means; tacit 
agreement is another way. To Dr. Rama Montaldo, parallel resolutions of states may 
suffice but with qualification; in his words: 
"Parallel resolutions of states followed by acts which undoubtedly show the 
intention of creating an international organisation may suffice. What does seem 
essential is that those acts leading to the establishment of an international 
organisation must be performed by the organs charged with the international 
relations of the State competent to bind the state internationally and to delegate 
functions and powers to the organisation to be exercised by the latter upon its 
members." (^ 7) 
'This precludes the Nordic Council from being considered as an international 
organisation, with international personality since it has been established in 
1952 by parallel resolutions of the parliaments of the original members, 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden." 
The essence of this passage is that an interstate agreement may be detected 
from acts other than a treaty. This view is shared by Schermers although he said that 
in such a case "it may be more difficult to prove the existence of the agreement." '^^ ^^  
As such, ways of concluding agreements establishing international organisations other 
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than by an express treaty are likely to prove defective when it comes to studying an 
agreement for ascertaining the whole package of internationality. 
I t is, however, worth mentioning that Seyersted does not require the 
conclusion of an international treaty for the finding of a public international 
organisation. ^^ ^^  
Yet a fourth precondition is the possession by the organisation concerned of 
defined objectives. In the Reparations case (1949), the ICJ mentioned that the UN 
Charter specified its purposes; then, it declared that for the achievement of those 
objectives the endowment of international legal personality to the U N was 
indispensable. ^^ "^^  The account taken by the ICJ of the U N aims has probably 
influenced those who require the definition of the organisation's aims in order to have 
international juridical personality. 
In sum, the above inexhaustive study of the major preconditions for providing 
public international organisations with an international legal personality shows how 
keen international jurists are to show that the organisations are independent from 
their members before attributing such legal internationality to them. In section 3.B 
of this chapter, the discussion wil l focus on the responsibility of international 
organisations, in which the individual wil l and thus the international separate 
personality wil l play a major part. But before passing to other points, this legal 
personality in relation to non-members should be examined. 
The question here is whether or not the personality so acquired by a public 
international organisation is an international legal personality erga omnes. Those who 
speak of objective international personality such as Seyersted answer this question in 
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the affirmative. ^^ ^^  Others suggest a distinction between universal and non-universal 
organisations. ^^ ^^  For example Professor Tunkin sees the personality of non-universal 
organisations in relation to non-members as res inter alios acta; whereas those of 
universal membership or enjoying wide acceptance by non-members have a status 
(54) 
er^a omnes. ^ ' 
The ICJ had the chance to state its view with regard to the U N as a universal 
organisation. In the Reparations case (1949), the ICJ took the view that the 
subscription by a majority of states in the U N rendered its personality erga omnes; in 
arriving at this conclusion, it put great weight on the number of participants; it stated: 
"Fifty states representing the vast majority of the members of the international 
community, had the power in conformity with international law, to bring into 
being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely 
personality recognized by them alone." (^ 5) 
This line of reasoning for explaining the status of the UN, a world-wide 
organisation, with regard to non-members has, nonetheless, been doubted. Without 
acceptance, it is difficult to see why non-parties to the founding treaty should be 
obliged to acknowledge the personality of an entity created by others. Since charters 
of international organisations are basically treaties, their binding effect is conditional 
on the consent given. As such, as long as third states do not consent to them, they are 
not bound by them. 
In summation, the above general theoretical overview on the notion of 
international personality of public intergovernmental organisation reveals that the 
majority of jurists are of the opinion that such personality may be attributed to those 
organisations which meet the requirements they described. They are, however, 
divided into two teams when it comes down to what gives such personality and how 
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much of it. The objective personality school of thought maintains that international 
law provides the international personality to the organisations. The other school of 
thought, which includes the ICJ and the majority of jurists, is of the opinion that the 
constituent instruments are the sources of the possible international personality. 
Within this latter school, the view that with the absence of express endowment of 
international personality to an organisation, personality may be found by necessary 
implication from powers and objectives vested in it seem to be more grounded 
inasmuch as it takes account of the need for such attribute by organisations with 
constant international activities. Additionally, it has judicial support as seen by the 
result of the Reparations case. Of more significance, is the fact that it conforms with 
the reality of international relations that international organisations, as they operate, 
are of no less need than States for an attribution enabling them to discharge their 
functions effectively. 
3A.II: The G C C 
a. International Legal Personality 
The international legal personality of the GCC will be measured against the 
above background. There, it appeared that the satisfaction of the requirements for 
the attribution of public intergoveriunental organisation is required of an organisation 
to qualify as a candidate for international juridical personality. It is, therefore, 
appropriate in this connection to examine whether or not the GCC meets the 
requirements mentioned in the previous section. The first of these is the presence of 
a permanent organ. The GCC satisfies this readily inasmuch as it has the 
Secretariat-General undertaking the day-to-day work. Another is the possession of a 
distinct wil l of its own. As noted above, this requirement is measured by different 
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people using various criteria. I f this can be met by providing the GCC with a 
permanent organ, then it is, as just mentioned, satisfied. But moreover, the Unified 
Economic Agreement in Article 27 provides that "In case of conflict with local laws 
and regulations of member-states, execution of the provision of this Agreement shall 
prevail." ^^ ^^  This probably means that there are two wills, i.e. that of the GCC and 
that of each Member-State; This confirms to an analyst of the GCC that it has a similar 
independent will to that of the U N to which the Court refers in the Reparations case. 
^^ '^ ^ The third precondition is the establishment of the concerned organisation by an 
international agreement. This, too, is met in the case of the GCC; its charter is a 
multilateral treaty concluded by the six sovereign States. The fourth requirement is 
the possession by the organisation of defined aims; in the case of the GCC, this 
requirement is satisfied as well by Article 4 of the Charter; it reads: 
The basic Objectives of the Cooperation Council are: 
1. To effect coordination, integration and inter-connection between 
Member States in all fields in order to achieve unity between them. 
2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links and areas of cooperation 
now prevailing between their peoples in various fields. 
To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following: 
a. Economic and financial affairs 
b. Commerce, customs and communications 
c. Education and culture 
d. Social and health affairs 
e. Information and tourism 
f. Legislative and administrative affairs. 
4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of 
industry, mining, agriculture, water and animal resources; to 
establish scientific research; to establish joint ventures and 
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encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of their 
peoples. 
These aims of the GCC require an independent organisation. The use of 
words such as effect, formulate and establish implies that the GCC is an entity having 
the capacity to carry out functions which are attributes of autonomous bodies. 
Having thus surveyed the preconditions of public intergovernmental 
organisation, which have also been counted as preconditions for the international 
personality, and examined them in relation to the GCC, and finding them present, it 
should be reasonable to find the GCC as a possible candidate for the attribution of 
international legal personality. Therefore, attention will be paid to finding whether 
or not the GCC possesses such personality. This will be done through examining the 
explicit and implicit terms of the Charter. 
To begin with, the Charter contains no clear-cut provision on the GCC 
international personality such as, for example, 'the GCC shall possess fu l l 
international legal personaHty.' However, it does contain Article 17 (1) which states 
that the GCC and its subsidiaries 
"shall enjoy on the territories of all member states such legal competence, 
privileges and immunities as are required to realize their objectives and carry 
out their functions." (5 )^ 
This provision in essence is similar to Articles 104 and 105, taken together, 
of the U N Charter. But in the case of the GCC, Article 1 of the Privileges and 
Immunities of the GCC adds that 
"The Gulf Co-operation Council shall enjoy an independent juridical 
personality, with a legal capacity to: a) possess movable and immovable real 
properties and funds with disposal and assignment of the same, b) conclude 
contracts, c) institute legal action." (59) 
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Moreover, the aforesaid Convention has granted the GCC wide privileges 
and immunities, as discussed below. Generally, such provisions, as noted by Dr. 
Shihata, do not specify whether personality is in international law or in national law. 
Consequently, questions such as 'are they providing the GCC with personality 
merely under domestic legal systems or under international law are raised. 
The departure point is from the submission that exact explicit language, 
whilst preferable, is not, in the last resort, essential. Yet the point with which this 
discussion is concerned is that once such vague terms exist, can they contain anything 
about the international personality? 
The above provisions which provide the GCC with firmer and wider standing 
in the municipal legal system than the rights and privileges given to private 
corporations and other legal bodies can, by itself, be taken as at least an indication of 
the presence of some sort of international personality. In addition, the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the GCC in its entirety points towards the existence 
of something more than a municipal legal person; it imposes a vast sum of obligations 
on the Member States towards the GCC; those duties which the Members have 
assumed are "reserved for entities which possess international personality." ^^ ^^  
Writing on the U N international status, G. Weissberg stated that 
"The granting of such immunities is, to a certain extent, equivalent to a 
conveyance of international legal personality to the Organisation as well as to a 
recognition of that status." (6^) 
Using the same line of logic, it may be argued that the Convention on Privileges 
and Immunities of the GCC establishes mutual rights and obligations between the 
GCC on the one hand and its Members on the other; therefore, as the ICJ noted: 
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"It is difficult to see how such a convention could operate except upon the 
international plane and as between parties possessing international personality." 
(63) 
Furthermore, the presence of the international personality of the GCC may 
be found by a necessary implication of the powers conferred upon it to materialise its 
objectives, as reflected in the Charter and other instruments, e.g. the Unified 
Economic Agreement. Based on those powers, the GCC has assumed international 
acts usually approached by international legal persons; it has concluded an agreement 
with the host of its headquarters, i.e. Saudi Arabia, and is likely to enter into such 
international interactions with other subjects of international law. 
In brief, since the GCC by and large satisfies the overstated conditions 
necessary for accepting it and the like as an international person, its international 
personality could be found by implications from its functions as well as these express 
terms cited above. The express articles in the Charter and other documents should be 
taken as indications hinting at the existence of an international juridical personality. 
In particular, the Convention on Privileges andlmmunities of the GCC is another finger 
pointing toward the GCC as an international person distinct from its Members. This, 
however, should not obscure the fact that the personality possessed by the GCC is 
narrower than that of States: that is to say limited to the areas entrusted to it - mainly 
economic - by the Charter, subsequent agreements and other internal rules. Such 
personality has no existence in relation to non-members which have not recognised 
it as such whether expressly or tacitly. 
b. Treaty-making power 
The capacity to conclude international agreements is a major competence 
needed by international organisations to be able to discharge their functions 
International and Internal Legal Status of the GCC 119 
effectively. A n indication of the importance of such a right is the large number of 
treaties to which international organisations were parties which have been reported 
in the United Nations Treaties Series. Hence, the existence of some measure of 
treaty-making competence vested in these organisations is a fact. Yet, the questions 
always asked are, 'what is the legal basis for such power?' 'What is the standpoint of 
conventional international law in relation to this issue?' 
As regards the legal foundations of the power of international organisations 
to conclude international agreements, a number of theories have been advanced. One 
opinion holds that the international personality of international organisations, as 
mentioned above, is an objective one; once the organisations with more than one 
organ and one member are established, this view goes, they are an objective 
international person possessing the "capacity to perform all types of international acts 
which they are in a practical position to perform" ^ ^^ ^ "provided that their constitutions 
do not preclude such acts." According to this opinion, international personality is 
derived from general or customary international law. Thus, the inherent powers of 
international organisations stemming from their objective personality would include 
the capacity to conclude a treaty. 
At the other extreme is the view maintaining that the treaty- making power 
of international organisations must be expressly articulated, otherwise the 
constitutionality of such international agreements is in doubt. ^ ^^ ^ 
The ICJ and the majority of the international jurists took an intermediate 
position. The ICJ stated, in relation to the U N in the Reparations case (1949), that 
"the Organisation must be deemed to have those powers which, though not 
expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication 
as being essential to the performance of its duties." (^) 
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This line of reasoning of the court has been followed by several jurists. ^^ ^^  
The Soviet doctrinal international law seems to be of this opinion also. A 
comprehensive text book on international law edited by Tunkin and contributed to 
by a number of leading Soviet international thinkers states that "One of the basic rights 
of international organisations as a subject of international law is the right to conclude 
treaties." ^^ ^^  This passage may be taken as a modification of those earlier Soviet views 
such as Tunkin's in this regard. In his earlier view, although he accepted that 
organisations can conclude treaties with the absence of a provision to this effect, he 
required the consent of the members for its legality. ^ ^^ ^ 
In brief, the legal literature in respect to the treaty-making power of 
international organisations basically contains two theories. Inherent power stemming 
from international law is the first; the second is the provided power whether explicit 
or implicit. 
As regards the codified international law in relation to the capacity of 
international organisations to enter into international treaties, the Vienna Convention 
on Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International 
Organisations of 1986, ^^ ^^  hereinafter referred to as the Vienna Convention of 1986, 
generally recognises the capacity of international organisations to conclude 
international treaties. The preamble of that Convention in paragraph 11 contains the 
following: 
"... international organisations possess the capacity to conclude treaties which 
is necessary for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their 
purposes." 
In addition, Article 6 of the same Convention reads: 
"The capacity of an international organisation to conclude treaties is governed 
by the rules of that organisation." 
International and Internal Legal Status of the GCC 121 
A t first glance, Article 6, in particular, seems to be restricting the capacity of 
international organisations to conclude treaties to the written language of their 
charters; but when this Article is read together with Article 2 (1) (J) which states: 
"'Rules of the organisation' means, in particular, the constituent instruments, 
decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with them, and established 
practice of the organisation" 
it becomes clear that Article 6 encompasses those powers expressly conferred 
upon the organisations as well as those confirmed by 
"reasonable imphcations as a competence required to enable the organisation 
to discharge its function effectively." (^ 3) 
Thus, the contents of these articles is in accordance with the view of the 
majority on the treaty-making power of international organisations and, in effect, it 
rejects the idea that there is such an inherent capacity to enter into treaties in respect 
to international organisations. According to the Vienna Convention of 1986, there is 
no parallelism between states and international organisations on the capacity to make 
international agreements. This is so because, whereas the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties of 1969 in Article 6 admits the inherent power of states to conclude 
treaties, ^^ '^ ^ Article 6 of the Vienna Convention of 1986, whilst not restating the 
principle convened in Article 6 of the Vienna Convention of1969 in relation to States, 
it recognised only the explicit or implicit power of international organisations to 
conclude treaties. Against such a theoretical legal background, the ability of the GCC 
to conclude international treaties will , in turn, be examined. 
As in most constituent instruments of international organisations, the 
Charter of the GCC contains no specific general authorisation for the GCC to 
conclude international agreements. The Supreme Council, it should be mentioned, is 
empowered by Article 8(5) of the Charter to: "Approve the basis for dealing with other 
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States and international organisations." One basis could be international agreements. 
The Charter, anyway, includes an authorisation for the conclusion of two special 
agreements. ^^ ^^  One of these two is on the privileges and immunities of the GCC; the 
other is a headquarters agreement between the GCC itself and its host state, i.e. Saudi 
Arabia. These agreements were finaUsed in 1984 and 1990 respectively, as will be 
pointed out. 
The question yet to be ascertained is whether or not the GCC is capable of 
entering into international agreements other than these two treaties specified in its 
constitution. I f the express powers doctrine, mentioned above, is to be adopted, the 
plain answer would be 'no'. If, on the other hand, the inherent power doctrine, 
aforementioned, is accepted, the answer would be a plain 'yes'. But, as mentioned 
earlier, both prove to be out of touch with the reality of the working of international 
organisations: the first is overly narrow and formalistic; the second, while presenting 
an ambitious hope for fostering the development of international relations, ignores 
the practice of the organisation in this respect, and disregards the aims for which they 
are established. 
The case of the GCC is somewhat similar to that of the U N on this very issue: 
neither of their charters carry provisions on their general treaty-making powers, while 
providing for the making of particular agreements, but the U N has made a number of 
treaties ^^ ^^  both with states and international organisations without express 
authorisation by its charter; and, more importantly, their validity has never been 
challenged. ^^ ^^  Correspondingly, the GCC may take a path similar to that of the U N 
in the making of such valid agreements under similar circumstances, e.g. Article 8(5). 
In this, it seems, firstly, that the U N acquired such a capacity for itself by pointing to 
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the fact that such capacity is a necessary means for productive functioning as noted in 
the jurisprudence of the ICJ in the Reparations case (1949); and secondly, through 
obtaining explicit or implicit consent of its members on the matter, the U N established 
a practice for itself, enabling it to make treaties accordingly. Similarly, if the GCC 
could perceive the necessity for concluding a treaty, and were able, especially in its 
beginnings, to obtain the consent of its six Members, it should be able to enter into 
valid agreements. Once a GCC practice is established, its legal basis for the conclusion 
of agreements would be its established practice in addition to the explicit power, just 
as in the case of the U N . 
The UN, however, is not the only international organisation the treaty-
making power of which was extended beyond the verbal letters of its charter. At the 
regional level, for example, the EEC treaty-making capacity has been expanded: for 
example, in the landmark case of ERTA, beyond the express provision on this 
matter. ^ ^^ ^ Furthermore, in the Kramer case, the European Court of Justice states that 
the EEC treaty-making capacity may arise implicitly from treaty or legislative 
• • (79) provisions.*- ' 
The cases of the U N and the EEC, both show the general trend for accepting 
that the right of international organisations to conclude treaties not explicitly provided 
for in the constituent instrument may be found by implication from the same, or the 
decisions and regulations of the respective organisations. This conclusion finds 
support in the Vienna Convention of 1986 in Article 2 (1). In accordance with this 
provision of the Convention as well as the judgment of the European Court of Justice 
in Kramer, not only the explicit terms of the charters are the source of such power, but 
also subsequent rules made in response to the need of the respective organisations to 
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enter into treaties for the overall interest of the organisation. ^^ ^^  In addition, a 
practice of the organisation's own can be estabUshed to be the source of such capacity 
as required by the Vienna Convention of1986. 
Having found that, from a theoretical point of view, the GCC may conclude 
treaties necessary for the exercise of its functions and attainment of its objectives, 
ascertaining the practice of the GCC in this respect seems in order. So far three 
agreements have been made, all of which have coimection with the GCC in one way 
or another: the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the GCC, that 
commonly known as the EEC-GCC agreement and the Headquarters agreement 
between the GCC and Saudi Arabia. 
The question is whether or not the GCC has been a party to these agreements, 
a mere sponsor and/or a forum for negotiations or otherwise? Admittedly, drawing a 
line between being a party and being a sponsor is difficult in any institution, and in 
the GCC it is particularly arduous. At any rate, here below is an attempt to probe the 
connection of the GCC, and whether the ways these agreements were concluded have 
any implication on the treaty-making capacity of the GCC. 
As far as the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the GCC is 
concerned, ^^ -^^  its terms as well as the exclusion of the GCC as a signatory throw 
considerable doubts on the possibility that the GCC is a party. Thus, though it concerns 
the GCC most, it is an agreement between the six States. 
Similarly, it may well be argued that in the described EEC-GCC agreement 
^^ ^^  the GCC as such is not a party but rather the sponsor and negotiating forum of 
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that treaty between its Members, on the one hand, and the EEC itself on the other. 
General reading of this agreement is supportive of this view: 
Its title reads: 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community, of the 
one part, and the Countries party to the Charter of the Cooperation Council of the 
Arab States of the Gulf,... of the other. (83) 
Further, the preamble of the said agreement when referring to its parties 
reads, in paragraphs (1) and (2): 
The Council of the European Community, hereinafter referred to as "the 
Community" of the one part, and 
the Governments of the Countries party to the Charter of the Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States in the Gulfhereinaf ter referred to as "the GCC 
Countries", of the other part.... 
In each passage, it has been made abundantly clear that the parties are the 
EEC and the GCC Member States rather than the GCC itself. Moreover, the 
agreement was signed by two representatives: one for the Council of the EC, and 
another for the Governments of the GCC States. The fact that the said agreement was 
incorporated into the legal systems of the six Members is probably neither for nor 
against the aforementioned argument, because any international obligation need be 
incorporated for its internal effectiveness, as will be discussed in chapter seven. On 
the other hand, the Supreme Council's constant supervision of the process and its 
expressed approval of the agreement when finalised provoke curiosity on the precise 
connection of the GCC with regard to this particular treaty. ^^ ^^  
Of related significance is enquiry into whether or not the two mentioned 
treaties, presuming that the GCC was not a party in either, have adverse impUcations 
on the general treaty-making capacity of the GCC? Although it may be argued 
otherwise, they seem not, since explanations for not engaging the GCC as a party can 
International and Internal Legal Status of the GCC 126 
be made. One is that Member States having recognised that unanimity is needed both 
to start and to finahse the treaty-making process, simply use the GCC's facilities to 
co-ordinate the treaty-making process. Also, at this early stage in the development of 
the GCC, the substantive content of its programmes is limited and the Member States 
may wish to keep an active interest in the content of the treaty negotiations to protect 
their essential interests. In each case, the direct participation of the Member States 
is, for the present, a guarantee that its interests will not be prejudiced. However, so 
long as it is established that the GCC has an independent treaty-making power, future 
developments may allow it to use it more extensively, even in matters on which the 
States for the present insist that they be separate parties. Such an explanations find 
support in the Headquarters agreement. ^^ -^  It was concluded between the GCC, 
represented by the Secretary General, and the host country, i.e. Saudi Arabia. In 
concluding this agreement, the other five Members could have been the parties, but 
they decided not to be. Evidently, this kind of agreement is of international rather 
than national character and area of application. This could be one explanation why 
this time Member States enabled the GCC to exercise its treaty-making power. 
When the GCC estabhshes a practice of being itself a party to treaties, its 
capacity to make treaties will be consolidated by Article 6 of the Vienna Convention 
of 1986. Yet it must be said before concluding this point that authority whether 
expressed, implied or established by practice will currently play a minor role in the 
GCC making of treaties anyway. The reason is that the entire work of the GCC is built 
on the principle of consensus; accordingly, once consensus is available, questioning 
the GCC capacity will not arise. Once consensus is lacking, the entire projected treaty 
(87) 
would be shelved until it is available, as explained by the Secretary General.^ 
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Another point which is worth mentioning is that under the terms of Article 
8(5) of the GCC Charter, cited earlier, the Supreme Council is the treaty-making 
organ. How the Council is to exercise this power is not elaborated in the Charter or 
other related documents. However, the ways the abovementioned agreements were 
made reveal that the Supreme Council has the first and last word over the process. It 
authorises the Ministerial Council or the Secretary General to negotiate and sign 
while it reserves the final approval for itself. Some treaties, like the EEC-GCC treaty, 
will require implementation in the Member States, something which will require the 
co-operation of the Member States. Their direct participation in the treaty makes it 
more likely that they will take these steps and makes it more clear that they have an 
obligation to do so.^ ^^ 
In conclusion, the GCC has an implied treaty-making power required to 
enable it to discharge its functions effectively and realise its objectives. In practice, 
this right has been exercised by the GCC, i.e. the Headquarters agreement with Saudi 
Arabia. In another two cases, i.e. the Convention of Privileges and Immunities and the 
so-called EEC-GCC agreement. Member States rather than the GCC were 
apparently the other party. 
Bearing in mind the short period of the GCC's existence, which does not 
allow it to have established practice, denying treaty-making capacity to the GCC 
altogether seems unsound as far as the prevailing theory in international institutional 
law is concerned. As said above, the objectives and tasks given to the GCC imply such 
right: in addition, attribution of international personality to the GCC should be 
meaningful at least to imply rights, e.g. treaty-making, compatible with the confederal 
nature of the GCC and its designated purposes. 
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3.B: International Responsibility of the G C C 
3.B.I: General legal background 
Legal systems, be they national or international, accord their subjects rights, 
and, at the same time, impose upon them obligations. And in those legal systems, 
wrongful acts are attributed to the wrongdoer who becomes responsible for his act 
and liable for the damage sustained. At the international level, states as subjects of 
international law are accountable for their non-compliance with the international 
obligations by which they are bound; they are also liable for the damage they cause in 
violation of such duties. In other words, international norms of states' responsibility 
have been developed by reason of their being the primary subjects of international 
law. The legal position of the responsibility of international organisations, on the other 
hand, is far less clear. Whilst their status as subjects of international law is widely 
recognised, their responsibility for their international acts has not yet been precisely 
defined in spite of their presence in large numbers and in spite of their intensive 
international operations. 
After the creation of the UN and especially subsequent to the confirmation 
by the ICJ of its status as an "international legal person", it became apparent that this 
kind of international person like states may perform acts contrary to the norms of the 
international law; therefore, questions such as whether or not the organisations are 
responsible for their unlawful undertakings arose. Only one year after the decision on 
the Reparations case. Professor C. Eagleton predicted that "the UN may be expected 
to assume responsibility for acts of these agents injurious to others." ^^ ^^  In rejecting 
hypothesised arguments to the effect of exempting the UN from responsibility, he 
stated: 
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'The United Nations has been given a legal status which enables it to do harm 
to others in certain situations, and it must, as a legal person, be able to repair 
the damages which it does. It is reasonable, however, to take into consideration 
its limited legal capacity, which would reduce its field of responsibility, and to 
take into consideration its different structure and procedures, which might 
require settlement of claims against it in a fashion different from that to which 
states are accustomed." (^) 
a. Responsibility 
Such a growing tendency to hold international organisations responsible for 
their acts seemingly went hand in hand with the acceptance of the international 
juridical personality of the organisations; hence, the scope of the former became 
dependent on that of the latter. In the case of states, their possible areas of 
responsibilities are extensive by reason of their inherent wide powers; whereas in the 
case of international organisations, their responsibilities may arise in those fields in 
which they are expressly or implicitly allowed to function. Thus, if one did not depart 
from the assumption that international organisations have objective international 
legal personality, one would find the areas of possible responsibility vary from one 
organisation to another in accordance with their charters. 
Generally, responsibility might arise from the inevitable contacts between 
international organisations, during the course of their operation, and other subjects 
of law, be it a state-member or non-member, an international organisation or other 
subject of international law. 
The responsibility of international organisations to observe the norms of 
international law in their field of operation is exemplified by the acceptance by the 
UN of the responsibility and the liability for the damage caused by the UN forces 
engaged in peacekeeping in parts of the world. The agreement concluded between 
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the UN and Belgium ^^ ^^  is an indication that the international community accepted 
the concept of holding the organisation alone responsible for its illegal acts. 
Similarly, codified international law has taken notice of the legal 
development regarding responsibility of international organisations to comply with 
the rules governing relations of the international community as well as their 
responsibility to shoulder liability resulting therefrom, as discussed below. The 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, for example, attaches a responsibility to 
international organisations to observe the provisions concerned of the treaty in their 
area of operation; under the title "Responsibility to Ensure Compliance and Liability 
for Damage", Article 139 (1) reads: 
L States parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities in the 
Area, whether carried out by States Parties, or State enterprises or national 
or juridical persons which possess the nationality of States Parties or are 
effectively controlled by them or their nationals, shall be carried out in 
conformity with this part. The same responsibility applies to international 
organisations for activities in the Area carried out by such organisations." (^ 2) 
(my italics) 
In the area of marine scientific research. Article 263 (1) of the aforesaid 
convention states: 
L States and competent international organisations shall be responsible for 
ensuring that marine scientific research, whether undertaken by them or 
on their behalf, is conducted in accordance with this convention. (93) 
Both articles call upon international organisations to fulfil those obligations 
themselves: no reference is made to member states. The Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and others, e.g. the Space Treaty, Article VI , ^^ '^ ^ have added to the 
development of the law of responsibility on the part of international organisations 
which is generally in a state of evolution. 
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b. Liability 
Non-compliance may result in injury, a matter that is likely to generate a 
search for who is to be liable for the damages. At this stage, thus, the question 
becomes: who is internationally the liable person? 
The departure point for this discussion is the submission that international 
legal personahty of international organisations is derived from the explicit or implicit 
terms of their constituent instruments, as opposed to general or customary 
international law. Hence, non- members may accept such personality expressly or 
tacitly. This is meant to overcome the difficulty of explaining how non-members of 
regional organisations come to be obliged to accept the juridical personality of an 
entity set up by few subjects of international law; and at the same time, it serves the 
purpose of making good the losses of non-members caused by the organisation. 
Turning to the question of who bears the liability, should the organisation be 
held responsible for unlawful acts, there are several possibilities, depending on the 
nature of the organisation, the provisions of its charter and the intention of the 
founders. These possibilities include: 
1. holding member states liable for the damage caused by their organisation; 
2. holding the organisation itself alone liable; and 
3. holding the organisation as the primary liable legal person and its member 
states only secondarily liable, e.g. in case the organisation is unable to 
discharge its debts. 
Holding member states exclusively liable may succeed provided that it can 
be established that the organisation in question has no legal personality distinct from 
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those of its members, or, alternatively, if it can be proven that the concerned 
organisation is a mere agent for the member states. 
On the first alternative, success is dependent upon whether the organisation 
is explicitly or implicitly endowed with legal personality; but prior to that it has to meet 
the requirements, examined in section A, for the condition of legal personality. 
Non-satisfaction of these requirements and the absence of explicit or implicit 
language on the legal personality of the concerned organisation makes it vulnerable 
to attack as a non- international person separate from its members. In such a case, 
members are likely to be found liable for acts of their organisation. 
In The International Tin Council case, Lord Templeman found that the ITC 
had a legal personality distinct in law from its members; therefore he exonerated its 
members from liability. ^^ ^^  The essence of his opinion was that once the international 
personality is established no direct liability on the parts of the members can be 
attributed. But can an organisation have such a personality and still escape liability on 
the grounds of being a mere agent for its members? 
This issue was faced by the Court of Appeal in The International Tin Council 
case; Ralph Gibson L J states that 
'The relationship of agency ... is based on the consent of both parties... The 
consent of the parties may be implied from their conduct or from their positions 
with regard to each other." W 
He then examined the constituent treaty of the FTC to identify what the 
intention of the parties was. He concluded: 
"It is ... impossible to argue that the terms of the Sixth Agreement demonstrate 
the real consent of all the members that the ITC should contract as agent for the 
members... (9 )^ The powers and duties of the members and of the ITC, and of 
the officers of the ITC, and the use of those powers in the making of contracts. 
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do not, given that the ITC has legal personality separate from its members, 
amount in law to the relationship of agency..." (^ 8) 
Such a relationship in a nutshell is difficult to estabhsh in the case of an 
organisation expressly vested with legal personality. An argument for agency 
relationship succeeds in cases where such a relationship is either expressly or 
implicitly provided for. 
The second possibility of locating the liability is holding the organisation 
exclusively liable. The practice of the UN contains a precedent in which it was found 
in violation of its international duties and thus held liable for that misconduct. As a 
result of wrongful acts by officers of the UN in the Congo, it paid a sum of money to 
the government of Belgium as compensation for the harm done. It is understood 
that the UN alone bore the liability. National adjudication, furthermore, had held an 
organisation exclusively liable for its conduct. ^^^^ Although those two cases do not 
create customary international law on the point, they do mirror the existence of legal 
theory that finds the organisation as such liable. 
The third possibility is finding the organisation primarily liable whilst its 
members have only secondary liabilities, i.e., if the liability is not discharged by the 
organisation, it is to be borne by member states. This is the opinion of Schermers as 
reflected in his much read International Institutional Law of 1980. He wrote: 
"Under national legal systems, companies can be created with restricted liability. 
An express provision thus enables natural persons to create, under specific 
conditions, a new law in such a way that they are no longer personally liable for 
the acts of the new person. 
In international law no such provision exists. It is therefore impossible to create 
international legal persons in such a way as to Hmit the responsibility of the 
individual Members. Even though international organisations, as international 
persons, may be held liable under international law for the acts they perform, 
this caimot exclude the secondary liability of the Member States themselves. 
When an international organisation is unable to meet its liabilities, the Members 
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are obliged to stand in, according to the amount by which each member is 
assessed for contributions to the organisation's budgets." (i^^) 
The message he is conveying is clear; that is, notwithstanding the distinct 
international legal personality of an organisation, its members are secondarily liable 
should the organisation default on its liability. Yet the phrase regarding limiting the 
liability of member states in international law calls for further examination; it reads: 
"In international law no such provision exist." 
If he meant that no treaty had contained a provision limiting the liability of 
its members, his perception is wide open to questioning; for even up to the publishing 
date of his valuable book, at least 16 treaties included such provisions limiting or 
excluding liability of member states. ^^ ^^ ^ If he meant that no such provisions may 
legally be made on the international level, his contention does not seem very plausible 
since subjects of international law when making treaties are at liberty to decide the 
terms of their agreements provided that they do not conflict with international law. 
In addition, Schermers' statement contradicts other authoritative writings which are 
of no less value in examining the meaning of international law on this matter, i.e. the 
bearer of Hability. 
Dr. Shihata, for instance, speaks of limited liability in international law; he 
also recognises the possible presence of unlimited liability provisions; but unlike 
Schermers who rejects the existence of provisions on limitation of liability as a matter 
of international law. Dr. Shihata emphasises the role of the intention of the parties 
and how it was made known to third parties in deciding whether the liability of member 
states is limited or otherwise. Examination of the parties' intention, according to 
Shihata, requires the studying of all relevant provisions of the constituent instruments 
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as well as the circumstances under which the organisation emerged and operated. To 
ascertain how he has formulated his view, the following is a passage from his article: 
"A question usually raised in this respect is whether the members of an 
international company can be held liable to third parties for its acts. It has been 
argued that since the company has an independent personahty, the states 
constituting it will not be answerable to its creditors unless some misconduct or 
negligence can be imparted to them in the exercise of their supervision over its 
activities. Influenced by the same logic some writers suggested that only the state 
exercising control over the company (I'etat- tuteur) assumes an unlimited 
liability. Others, having found no rule of limited hability in international law, 
concluded that all member states are liable beyond the limits of the value of 
their shares. My point here is that we cannot conclude a rule of unlimited liability 
merely from the absence of a rule of limited Hability in international law. All 
relevant provisions and circumstances must be studied to ascertain what was 
intended by the parties in this respect and the extent to which their intention 
was made known to third parties dealing with the enterprise. Present general 
rules of international law cannot, in my opinion, be quoted as basis of the 
unlimited liability of the parties to an international corporation for its acts or 
omissions, unless of course the corporation is considered, despite its 
independent personahty, an organ of the states establishing it." (^ 03) 
The inference that can be made is that Dr. Shihata would argue that an 
express or impHed terms excluding or hmiting liability of the members would put third 
parties on notice of the member's intention and thus relieve them of or limit their 
liability. 
The issue of limitation of liability, when the constitution of the concerned 
organisation is silent, was considered and decided by an international arbitration 
tribunal. In Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI) 
^^^^ the question was whether its four member states were liable for discharging the 
obligation incurred by the AOI before its collapse. The Tribunal took the view that 
the attribution of legal personality does not by itself exclude member states from 
hability. Then it examined the constitution of AOI which it found silent on the matter 
of HabiUty. Next, it examined the features of AOI in terms of form and as it operates. 
Its conclusion was that the absence of any provision explicitly or implicitly excluding 
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the liability of the members coupled with the fact that the express legal personality of 
the AOI was limited to operational needs and the fact that the member states had 
obligated themselves to the UK guaranteeing the obligation of the AOI towards 
British companies all pointed towards the liability of member states; therefore, it held 
that the members of the AOI were liable. 
In summary, responsibility and liability of international organisations have 
gradually been recognised although no complete picture of their law of responsibility 
has been drawn. Seemingly, apart from the allocation of liability, the international 
norms governing the responsibility of states are applicable to them as well unless there 
are special rules determining the organisations' responsibility. ^ ^^ ^^  It appears that the 
notion of legal personality plays a major role in measuring the magnitude of their 
responsibility in spite of the fact that such an attribute may not bar holding their 
members indirectly liable. It has been shown that establishing the existence of such 
an attribute may only deter direct action against member states. Also it mitigates the 
possibility of agent/principle and/or the mere harmonisation character of the 
concerned organisation for the purpose of allocating hability, unless, of course, either 
or both is in fact the legal relationship established. 
3.B.II: The GCC 
The GCC is, as mentioned above, endowed with a international personality 
as well as the expressly provided legal personality under the private law of its Member 
States, as discussed above. As an international person and during its operation, the 
GCC, as other subjects of international law, is able to do harm to others, whether to 
its own members, to non- members or to other subjects of international law. While 
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discharging its functions, it may violate norms of international law. This is so because 
the areas where the GCC is capable of doing damage are fairly wide. 
As noted earlier, it is responsible for compliance with international law, be 
it treaty-based or customary. Its ships and aircraft, should it possess such, are obliged 
to observe the international rules involved. The GCC, as an international organisation 
with an international personality, is bound by those conventions addressing 
international organisations along with states, e.g. the aforementioned Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 1982, if and when it becomes a party. 
Briefly, the international personality of the GCC introduced it to the 
international community as a subject of international law; therefore, it will be 
responsible for its acts which violate rights of other international persons. In general, 
it will be liable to the injured State or organisation for the damage which it has done. 
As the Westland case and Dr. Shihata suggest, there may be exceptional circumstances 
where the acts of the organisation occasion the responsibility of its Members. These 
special cases will depend on the nature of the GCC and the intention of its Members. 
To begin with, the GCC is not an agent for its Members. It has been expressly 
granted legal personality under the legal systems of Member States. It has been 
impKcitly endowed with an international legal personality. It has a number of 
international contacts including the entering into agreement with the host of its 
headquarters, i.e. Saudi Arabia. Al l of this gives support to the contention rejecting 
the agent/principle relationship between the GCC and its Members, especially with 
the absence of provisions on agency; in addition, it points towards the existence of the 
GCC as a distinct legal entity. As such. Member States should not be held directly 
hable for acts of the GCC. Yet the question remains whether the Members can escape 
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liability only because they establish an organisation satisfying the requirements of 
public intergovernmental organisation and endowed with legal personality. 
Views of distinguished international jurists on this issue have been cited and 
studied in the previous section. Additionally, the judgment of the international 
tribunal in the Westland case on the very question was also examined. Apart from the 
opinion of Schermers, the available international legal literature on the subject resorts 
to the provisions of the constitutions in determining the intentions and measuring the 
extent of the members' liability once the legal personality of the organisation 
concerned is found. In the case of the GCC, its Charter contains no clause limiting or 
excluding liability of Member States. There is no apparent reason for omitting 
provision on the matter in the Charter. No inference should be made one way or 
another. In international law, Shihata points out that "we cannot include a rule of 
unlimited Uability merely from the absence of a rule of limited hability." ^ ^^^ Resort, 
then should be made to the intention of the parties of the GCC as suggested by Shihata 
and as carried out by the arbitrators in the Westland case. Such intention may be 
reflected in the Charter of the GCC and/or the general features of the GCC, i.e. 
framework and operation. Terms of the Charter, whether explicit or implicit, do not 
point to non-, full or limited liability; they appear neutral on the subject. Its framework 
does not differ much from that of the UN which has, as noted earlier, borne liability 
by itself. As it is, and without express, or what amounts to express, acceptance of 
liability, the six Member States would probably not be bound by its obligations, as 
decided by the International Tm Council case.^ ^^ ^^  
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As a moral issue, the Members should stand and discharge the liability 
incurred by the GCC, but such an approach is of a diplomatic nature, and is therefore 
irrelevant to this issue. 
3.C: The G C C Personality and the Municipal Legal Systems 
3.C.I: Municipal Juridical Personalities 
Public international organisations which satisfy the requirements for 
acquiring the title of public permanent intergovernmental organisation will 
nonetheless be in constant need, while discharging their functions, of performing 
private-like transactions with private, natural or legal persons, or with other 
international organisations. This was observed in 1945 by C.W. Jenks who proposed 
determining specifically the status of international organisations when dealing under 
private law with third parties. He wrote: 
"Even though created as instruments of co-operation between governments and 
not entrusted with direct authority over individuals or called upon to discharge 
operating functions on an extensive scale, public international organisations of 
a permanent character which have responsibilities of any substantial importance 
will almost always be called upon... to enter into a wide variety of legal relations 
with individuals and corporate bodies in connection with banking transactions, 
real property, contracts for supplies, public utiHty services, transportation and 
insurance, printing contracts, copyright and other matters." (108) 
He then suggested that founding treaties should specifically confer legal 
personahty on the organisations created thereunder in all appropriate cases." In other 
words, he was more specific in describing what is needed. He stated: 
"In the light of experience it appears desirable that the constitutions of all new 
international organisations should embody general principles which guarantee 
effectively the independence of the organisation and its agents by the grant of 
appropriate immunities and ensure that the organisation will enjoy all the 
facilities in regard to communications, exchange arrangements, travel 
arrangements and similar matters which governments customarily extend to 
each other to facilitate the conduct of official business." (109) 
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In response to such a call, the constitution of the GCC provided in Article 17 
that the GCC (and its subsidiaries) on the territories of all the six Member States, 
such legal competence, privileges and immunities necessary for carrying out its 
functions and realisation of its aims. Moreover, Article 1 of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the GCC (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) 
provides i t with independent legal personality under the law of Member States; ^ ^^ ^^  
it may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable or immovable property, conclude 
contracts and be a party to legal proceedings. As such, the GCC legal personality in 
national laws of the Member States should be undisputed. These provisions allow the 
GCC and its subsidiaries to act within the national legal systems of its Members as 
legal persons. The said legal systems grant legal status to the GCC in the laws ratifying 
the Charter, ^^ ^^ ^ and the Convention. ^^^^^ 
The GCC, like other international organisations having personality in 
domestic legal systems, is granted not only the capacity to act but also extensive 
privileges and immunities, as will be shown. 
The enumeration of some of the legal capacities of the GCC under private 
law is probably not limitative. Those mentioned capacities are but examples of what 
is necessary for the realisation of its aims. Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern is of the opinion 
that "In its private law capacity an organisation can perform any act, which may be 
performed by any other person enjoying a private law personality," provided that they 
are in "a reasonably close connection with the aim".^ ^^ "^ ^ So far, discussion has been 
focusing on the private law capacity of the GCC in the territories of its six Members. 
In states which are non-members of the GCC, its legal personality for the 
purposes of private law may be recognised even in states that do not recognise it for 
( 
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the purposes of public international law. In cases where the GCC is in fact recognised 
as possessing international legal personality, one opinion holds, its "legal personality 
under private law follows from the international personality." ^^ '^^ ^ Alternatively, 
municipal legal personality could be granted in accordance with the rules of conflict 
of laws, i f recognised, that the legal personality granted by a law of state to an entity 
may be recognised in another. ^^^^ This alternative is available for non-members to 
recognise the GCC in its private law capacities while, should they wish, denying its 
recognition as an international juridical person. 
Under this rule of conflict of laws, the House of Lords held the Arab 
Monetary Fund, AMF, an international banking organisation established in 1976 by 
a treaty, entitled to recognition by English courts as a foreign municipal juridicial 
person with the capacity to bring proceedings in the English courts; it based its 
decision on the fact that the AMF's treaty was incorporated into the municipal law of 
the U A E which conferred on the A M F legal personality and made it a corporate body 
which the English courts would recognise.^^^^^ Furthermore, in the case of The 
International Tin Council v. Amalgamet Inc., the New York court recognised the 
existence of the ITC, although the US was not a party to its charter, because of its 
personality in U K law. ^ ^^ •^^  
3.C.II: Privileges and Immunities of the GCC 
By reason of the need for an independent organisation, laws of Member 
States are subject to limitations. The Convention contains a number of limitations; so 
probably does the Headquarters Agreement. Other restrictions on the application of 
domestic law may follow from other documents of the GCC subsidiaries. 
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The Convention provides the GCC, including its branches, the governmental 
representatives, officials, experts and advisers, with privileges and grants them 
immunities, all of which are aimed at securing the independence and effective 
functioning of the GCC. Such privileges and immunities impose limits on the 
appUcation of domestic law or its adjudication in national courts. Seemingly, 
therefore, a somewhat detailed account of these privileges and immunities is 
worthwhile. Such discussion aimed at measuring the preferentials accorded to the 
GCC in the national legal systems. It should also show whether the possible unjust 
result in respect to the GCC transactions with private persons is mitigated. 
I n contrast to the previous international capacity of the GCC, i.e. 
treaty-making, its right of privileges and immunities has been expressly provided since 
its inception. First, the Charter itself granted to it in Article 17 the privileges and 
immunities enjoyed by similar organisations. Thereafter, in response to the call made 
also by its Charter, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the GCC was 
concluded by the Member States.^ ^^^^ Hence, the GCC legally holds its privileges and 
immunities based on the express terms of this multilateral Convention. This section 
will examine the scope of these privileges and immunities; the order will be in 
accordance with that of the Convention. 
The GCC is granted an independent legal personality, and in particular the 
juridical capacity to conclude contracts, own, dispose of and assign real and personal 
properties and funds, and be a party to litigation. ^^ ^^ ^ In addition, the property and 
assets of the GCC enjoy immunity from legal process unless such immunity is waived 
expressly by the General Secretary; such waiver, however, does not extend to the 
procedure of execution. ^^^^ Moreover, the properties belonging to the GCC are 
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inviolable; in any Member State, they are not to be inspected, confiscated, seized, 
appropriated or suffer any similar act or measure of execution or compulsory 
procedure. ^^ ^^ ^ Archives and documents of the GCC are also inviolable. ^^ ^^ ^ Further, 
Member States are obliged to secure the continuous and fu l l utilisation of the GCC 
properties in their respective territories. ^^^^ 
On the fiscal immunities of the GCC, Article 4 (a) grants it the freedom from 
financial or organisational restrictions on the holding and depositing of money in any 
currency; paragraph (b) of the same Article further provides it with liberty to receive, 
carry and transfer money in any currency desired from one State to another or within 
the same State. Also, its fiscal immunities include its exemption in the territory of any 
Member from direct taxes and customs duties on its real and movable properties, 
funds and assets, with the exception of fees charged for public utilities and services. 
^^ "^^ ^ I t is also exempted from laws and orders restricting or prohibiting the import or 
export of materials and equipment provided that these items are for the official use 
of the GCC. ^ ^^^ 
In regard to its communicational privileges. Article 6 (b) exempts it from 
customs duties, laws and orders prohibiting or restricting the import or export of its 
pubHcations and printed matter, apart from the fees charged for public services. 
Generally, all correspondence and means of communication of the GCC are treated 
in the territory of each Member State in the same manner in which the respective 
Member State treats any other state, and its diplomatic mission or any international 
organisation. ^^^^ According to Article 9, the GCC may use ciphers, diplomatic 
messengers or bags, all of which enjoy the same privileges and immunities granted to 
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the diplomatic missions in the Member States. Furthermore, its correspondence is 
free f rom censorship during peace-time. ^^ ^^ ^ 
Representatives of Member States are the concern of Articles 11 -14 of the 
Convention. According to Article 11, governmental representatives in this Convention 
include not only the representatives themselves but also "their assistants, advisers, 
technical experts and the secretaries delegated with them." Article 12 grants the 
representatives of Member States including those who participate in a GCC 
conference provided they are not representatives of the host state while discharging 
their tasks and travelling to and from the conference venue, the following privileges 
and immunities: 
1. they enjoy immunity from arrest and detention of their persons and from 
the seizure of their personal belongings; 
2. they are also granted immunity from legal process even after the lapse of 
their official appointments for acts performed in official capacities; 
3. their documents and written deeds are inviolable; 
4. they are at liberty to use ciphers and receive their correspondence by 
means of special messenger or sealed bags; 
5. they, together with their families, are to be granted the necessary visas; 
6. they enjoy the facilities made available to foreign states' delegates sent in 
an interim official mission in respect of the regulations of stock exchange 
and hard currency. 
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However, the above immunities are, according to Article 13, to be waived by 
Member States in cases where it becomes obvious that such immunity impedes the 
course of justice and the Member State can do so without prejudice to the objective 
for which it was originally granted. 
As regards the permanent missions and delegations. Article 14 provides 
them, together with their members, with the same privileges and immunities granted 
to the diplomatic missions and their members at any Member State. 
Officials of the Secretariat-General are granted different privileges and 
immunities based on their rank and State of origin. However, Article 15 confers upon 
the officials of the Secretariat-General, regardless of their nationality and probably 
their rank, the following: 
1. immunity from arrest or seizure for acts performed by them in their official 
capacities; 
2. immunity from legal process for any acts they committed while in their 
capacities as GCC officials, even after the lapse of such capacities; and 
3. exemption from income tax on their salary and remunerations earned or 
earnable by them from their jobs at the GCC. 
Article 16 singles out the Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretaries 
and their families, and grants them, in addition to the three immunities mentioned 
above, the recognised status of the heads of diplomatic missions in the Member States, 
regardless of their nationality. 
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Article 17 picks up the officials of grade 8 and above, providing them, 
together with their families, the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by their 
counterparts at the diplomatic missions of the Member States. 
Those officials, other than the Secretary-General, his assistants, officials of 
grade 8 and above, and official citizens of the Seat-State, i.e. now the Saudis, are 
granted, probably in addition to those privileges and inmiunities stated in Article 15, 
the following: ^ ^^^ 
1. exemption from civil service obligations; 
2. exemption, together with their families, from immigration formalities and 
restrictions; 
3. enjoyment of foreign exchange facilities made available to their 
counterparts of the diplomatic missions accredited to the Seat-State, i.e. 
now Saudi Arabia. 
4. using the special facilities provided to diplomatic missions at the time of 
international crises regarding their return to their countries; and 
5. exemption from customs duties within two years, commencing from the 
date they assume their work. 
I n addition, officials of the GCC Secretariat-General are privileged by the 
suspension, if required, of their military service for up to two years. ^ ^^ ^^  
Having stated this, Article 21 provides that the Secretary General may 
withdraw immunity if the assertion of it would result in the prevention of the 
apphcation of justice, provided that it can do so without affecting the objective for 
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which the immunity was granted; the same Article empowers the Secretary-General 
to waive immunity of officials other than those of himself and the Assistant Secretary; 
the immunity of his Assistants are waived under the consent of the Ministerial Council. 
That of the Secretary-General is lifted when proposed by the Ministerial Council and 
approved to by the Supreme Council. 
Advisers and experts who are neither representatives of Member States nor 
officials of the GCC, while performing their functions, enjoy privileges and 
immunities including the following: 
1. immunity from arrest and detention and the seizure of their personal 
effects; 
2. immunity from judicial process; 
3. their documents and written deeds are inviolable; 
4. freedom to use cipher and exchange correspondence with the GCC by 
means of special messenger or official bags; 
5. the experts and advisers are offered the facilities granted to the 
representatives of states sent on official missions in regard to currency and 
foreign exchange regulations; 
6. their personal effects are provided with immunity and the facilities enjoyed 
by diplomatic representatives; 
7. they, together with their families, are exempted from immigration 
formalities and restrictions; and 
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8. their military service, when required, is suspended for up to two years. ^ ^^^ 
Those privileges and immunities of advisers and experts of the GCC may, 
however, be withdrawn by the Secretary-General i f it is determined, as mentioned 
above, that such immunity would prevent the achievement of justice, and its waiver 
does not affect the purpose for which it was originally provided. ^^ "^ ^^  
Settlement of disputes is provided for in Articles 24 and 25. In realisation of 
the fact that jurisdictional immunities granted to international organisations and their 
employees are not actually to free them from their duties to third parties, but only to 
relieve them from being obliged to appear unwillingly in national courts, Article 24 
authorises the Ministerial Council to set up an ad hoc committee to resolve private 
law disputes to which the GCC is a party, or which concern officials whose immunity 
has not been waived. 
Another type of dispute envisaged by this Convention is that which relates to 
the interpretation or application of the Convention itself, i.e. the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the GCC. In such a case, this Convention expects it to be 
resolved through negotiations or any other peaceful method accepted by the States 
concerned; ^^ ^^ ^ i f such methods fail, Article 25 provides for resort to the GCC 
Commission for Settlement of Disputes according to the terms of Article 10 of the 
Charter of the GCC. ^^ ^^ ^ 
The above is a manifestation of how privileged the GCC is under municipal 
legal systems of its Member States. They offer the GCC a wide range of privileges and 
immunities necessary for its independence and the effective functioning of its 
personnel. For example, national laws on custom duties, direct taxation, censorship. 
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holding and transfer of currency, search, seizure, confiscation and appropriation of 
property are not applied to the GCC. Moreover, adjudication of national laws is 
curtailed by the jurisdictional immunities granted to the GCC. Such jurisdictional 
immunities, however, mean limiting national jurisdictions to reach the GCC without 
its consent. The settlement of disputes arising from acts of the GCC or its officials 
with private third parties eases the inconvenience jurisdictional immunities may bring 
about. 
Summary 
The GCC is a public intergovernmental organisation established in 
accordance with the requirements drawn by international jurists for gaining such 
attributes. It has been granted powers and assigned functions so that it may become 
able to discharge its aims effectively, internally and internationally. By necessary 
implication from those powers and objectives, the GCC has been granted an 
international juridical personality. Such personality may be recognised by non-
members explicitly or implicitly. 
As an international person, the GCC ought to have some measures of rights 
and duties by implication as necessary means for discharging its functions in an 
effective manner, and by implication of the attribute of international personality 
which would otherwise be meaningless and a mere label. For the attainment of its 
objectives, therefore, the GCC should be able to conclude agreements in the fields 
entrusted to it. 
As an international actor, the GCC is responsible for the compliance with 
the rules and laws governing the activities of international legal subjects. 
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In the municipal legal systems of the Member States, on the other hand, its 
legal personality is beyond doubt. Even in non-member states' territories, and for 
private law purposes, it is likely to be provided with such personality by way of the 
rules of conflict of laws. What has been granted is that which preserves its 
independence from the Member States: this is manifest in the Convention of Privileges 
and Immunities of the GCC. The said Convention provides the GCC, its subsidiaries 
and officials with all necessary privileges and immunities in the territories of its 
Member States. The range and nature of the privileges and immunities of the GCC, 
as has been shown, even if they attach only to the personality of the organisation in a 
particular municipal legal system, are such that they can be explained only by the 
recognition of the international status of the GCC. States do not confer comparable 
privileges and immunities on ordinary legal persons in their legal system or on those 
of other legal systems whose personality they are prepared to recognise. 
Generally, it appears even clearer that problems related to the legal status 
of the organisation whether internal or international, responsibility and liability 
should be tackled by the founding treaty; in doing so, a third party doing business with 
the organisation, whether in its private law capacity or that of its international law, is 
made aware of the status of that organisation. 
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Chapter Four 
The Legal Character of the GCC 
Introduction 
In the first chapter some Hght was thrown on the development of the Gulf 
Corporation up to the point where the GCC materialised in 1981. In the second, 
certain legal aspects were examined in the light of developments in international 
institutional law. In the course of analysis of the legal structure of the GCC, it became 
clear that the GCC, on account of its being equipped with various principal and 
subsidiary organs, is of a permanent nature. Also it has been established that the GCC 
is an international person. However, nothing has yet been said about what kind of 
association of states the GCC is. 
It is therefore the aim of this chapter to tackle the question of the legal 
characteristics of the GCC. For this purpose, three models for international 
co-operation will be analysed from a legal point of view. These models are federalism, 
supranationahsm and confederalism. In addition, the role of law in each will be 
determined. This will be the subject of Section A. 
Section B, on the other hand, will be concerned with the application of these 
models to the GCC. This is in addition to determining what law governs the relations 
between the Members of the GCC inter se. 
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4.A: Models for International Integration 
4A.I: Federalism 
Federalism is an important concept in the theory of international integration. 
The literature of international organisations has been enriched by federalists through 
their descriptions of its history, origin, conditions, etc. In addition, some federalist 
theorists have been concerned with developing an academic theory of regional 
integration. For the purposes of this study, the classical definition of the concept of 
federalism, as well as the definitions by the new federalists, will be explored. Also, an 
examination of the impact of federalism on some of the existing organisations will be 
made in an endeavour to probe its usefulness as a model for regional integration. 
The concept of federalism has meant different things to different scholars. 
The vast majority of the definitions of the concept led one particular scholar, A.H. 
Birch, to conclude that federalism 
has no fixed meaning; its meaning in any particular study is defined by the 
student in a manner which is determined by the approach which he wishes to 
make to his materiar.(i) 
However, the influential definitions drawn by pioneers on the subject can be 
divided into two categories. In the first of these emphasis is placed upon the concept 
as a state rather than as a process, and thus describes the conditions and features of 
the federal institution. For instance, K.C. Wheare states: 
by the federal principles I meant the method of dividing powers so that the 
general and regional goverrmient are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and 
independent.(2) 
Although description of federalism varies from one writer to another, it 
seems that there is some agreement on the division of powers between the sections 
of govermnent and the utilisation of some formulas of majority or weighted voting 
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systems as in the case of the U.S. Some authors have enumerated requirements, the 
presence of which is necessary for an institution to be regarded as federal. These 
requirements encompass, besides what was mentioned above, 
- independence between central and local governments, 
- direct contact between both governments and the people, 
- a certain degree of independence of member states to manage their 
own internal affairs, 
- legal equality of member states and 
- a constitutional court.^ "^ ^ 
This classical theory of federalism offers little, if anything at all, for 
integration in most parts of the world, inasmuch as it relies heavily on the American 
school of federalism for its definition and the description of a federal state. ReHance 
on the American school may lead advocates of this theory to reject existing federations 
simply because they are not based on American models. Such a view is overly narrow, 
since it ignores the values upon which other federations of the world were built. 
In brief, the classical approach to federalism is of little use for integration, 
since it requires rapid adjustment to the new structure and the surrender of the greater 
part of members' sovereignty. This may also be attributed to the fact that the driving 
force behind modern-day federative endeavours are different from previous ones, 
which were induced by a desire for independence or fear of the immediate danger of 
war: these states were therefore ready to move rapidly beyond the nation-state. 
Nowadays the driving force for integration allows time for reaching the ultimate end 
of federation over a suitable period. This fact has necessitated the improvement of 
the definition of federalism along with its conditions. Those authors who have realised 
this may best be described as 'new federalists', seeing federalism as a process rather 
than as a condition which is either present or absent. 
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These new federalists constitute the second category of federalist theorists: 
their definition of federalism is illustrated in a work by C.J. Friedrich, in which he 
mentions that federalism is 
The process by which a number of separate political communities enter into 
arrangements for working out solutions, adopting joint policies, and making 
joint decisions on joint problems, and, conversely, also the process by which a 
unitary political community becomes differentiated into a federal organised 
whole.... In short, we have federalism only if a set of political communities coexist 
and integrate as autonomous entities, united in common order with an autonomy 
of its own.('*) 
It is not only this approach, as well as numerous writings about the European 
Communities, that chiefly called attention to a need to consider the concept of 
federalism in connection with the GCC, but also the fact that the federalising process 
ranges from the establishment of a mere league to the construction of a federal state. 
What lies between the two is the federalising process, which is subject to a 
considerable degree of variation. Thus, although there is an apparent difference 
among for instance the UN, GCC and the European Communities, each constitutes 
part of a federalising process. Most of the existing international organisations have 
one or more federal features. The more federal characteristics found in an institution, 
the closer it moves to the federal model. The most important test, it seems, is whether 
an institution has any federal aspiration in its constitution, so as to distinguish it from 
those of a more co-operative nature on the one hand, and those of fully centralised 
governments on the other. 
Consequently, one can even find a federal characteristic in the UN. In 
addition to Article 27 of the Charter which provides for binding Security Council 
decisions made by a majority vote of nine of the fifteen members, including the 
concurring votes of the permanent members. Article 25 states: 
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'The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions 
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.' 
Hence, both involve relinquishment of some sovereign powers of the states. 
Furthermore, several organisations such as the International Monetary Fund have 
adopted formulas of weighted voting, which constitutes one feature of the practice of 
federal regimes. However, in both instances, the organisations themselves are not 
formally prepared for a journey to the federal bond. It is principally the lack of such 
federal intention which keeps them outside the concept. 
By contrast, the EC, because of its federal ambitions, has departed from the 
traditional practice of international organisation since its inception. Thus a number 
of characteristics identified with federal states are exhibited by the EC but to a 
different degree. As such, it has reached an advanced stage in the federation process 
of Europe. For this reason, the EC has variously been classified as federation, partial 
federation, functional federation and international organisation with features 
resembling those of a federal state.^ ^^  Hereunder are the federal features of the EC 
which if found in any other integrative attempt places it where the EC is along the 
federal spectrum. If, however, only some federal features are shown by the new 
institution, it is still taking part in a federahsing process, but unlike the EC, is at an 
early stage. 
The most important characteristic of the EC which makes it resemble a 
federal state is the direct contact between organs of the EC and the peoples of member 
states. In Van Gend and Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen, the 
European Court of Justice pointed out that: 
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market,..., 
implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between the contracting states. This view is confirmed by the 
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preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to goverimients but to peoples. It 
is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed 
with sovereign rights, the existence of which affects Member States and also 
their citizens.(6) 
The Court then concluded that: 
The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit 
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals.(^) 
Another federal characteristic of the EC is the European Constitutional 
Court, i.e. the Court of Justice of the Communities. Based on experience of successful 
federation, a court has been created as one of the essential bodies in the federation 
en t i ty .The role of the EC Court was equated with those of federal states by the 
Advocate General in Federation Charbonniers de Belgique v. High Authority of the 
ECSC when he concluded: 
... it could be objected that our [EC] Court is not an international court but the 
court of a community created by six states on a model which is more closely 
related to a federal than an international organisation....(^) 
The European Court has jurisdiction over the acts of the EC institutions and 
may annul them on grounds, inter alia, of lack of competence or misuse of powers.^ ^^ ^ 
In addition, it has jurisdiction to decide actions against member states brought by 
other members or by the EC institutions.^^^^ Individuals and legal persons also have 
standing before the Court under some circumstances. ^^ ^^  In general, the position of 
the Court in the EC is very close, but not identical, to those of federal states. 
Another federal characteristic of the EC is the relative independence of the 
EC institutions vis-a-vis the member states^^ \^ Still another federal characteristic of 
the EC is the division of powers on the fields for which they were established. In Costa 
V. ENEL, the Court of Justice stated: 
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By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its 
own personahty, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the 
international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a 
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the 
Community, the member states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their 
nationals and themselves.(^^) 
Generally speaking, while federalism is desired in itself as an end to an 
integrative journey, it does not suit the ambitions of some contemporary national 
states which are ready to give away a certain amount of sovereignty only in instalments, 
and only if the institution is competent and has proved that it is qualified to bear its 
new responsibilities. This contention is supported by the fact that out of the vast 
number of international organisations, in only a few has there been any transfer of 
sovereign authority and then only in very limited fields. The EC is, no doubt, the fullest 
integrative organisation. It is more than 30 years old but it has achieved this degree 
of integration, at least until only recently, only in the economic fields for which it was 
originally established. 
The above leads to the conclusion that the federal approach to international 
integration may be overbalanced by the functional one, even if the long-term objective 
of the latter is still federation. Because sovereignty is the main obstacle, the functional 
approach tackles the problem by merely requiring 'pooling as much of it as may be 
needed for the joint performance of the particular task'.^ ^^ ^ Thus, sovereign power is 
transferred from member states to the common institution through a functional 
process, which in its turn pushes the organisations gradually forward along federal 
lines. This is probably what David Mitrany meant when he wrote: 
Sovereignty cannot... be transferred effectively through a formula, only through 
a function. By entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying with it 
command over the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty is 
transferred from the old authority to the new, and the accumulation of such 
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partial transfers in time brings about a translation of the true seat of 
authority.(i6) 
The essence of the functional approach is that supranationalising the 
functions of governments one at a time is more effective than the federal approach, 
which requires massive surrender of sovereignty. However, the functionahst approach 
caimot go unchallenged; on the contrary, its weakness is apparent in its avoidance of 
any mention of some sort of constitutional arrangement. 
Some regionaUsts may still relinquish federalism in favour of another 
approach to integration: they are the neofunctionalists. The neofunctionalists set 
themselves apart from the functionalists by the introduction of various variables and 
by stressing the importance of political integration. The neofunctionalist approach 
assumes that integrating non-political functions will 'spill over' to integrate the more 
politicised functions. Generally, the neofunctionalists are in favour of a system which 
goes beyond the nation-state through economic integration and the establishment of 
a supranational institution vested with limited pohtical power. ^ ^^ ^ 
Before turning to another form available for integration, the role of law in 
federal institutions should briefly be pointed out. Experience shows that in federal 
entities there are three different kinds of law, i.e. regional (local) law, central (federal) 
law and international law. While the interrelation between international law and 
federal law is dependent on whether the federation adheres to a monist or dualist 
approach, the relation between federal and local is a matter of superior and inferior. 
The federal law is supreme, meaning that in a case of conflict the federal law prevails. 
This is in addition to the direct effect of the federal law on the parts and their 
inhabitants. Above all, the federal law is passed by a democratically elected body. This 
last character of federal law may differentiate it from supranational law, which 
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in operation but not in the making process. Supranationalism and the role of law in 
supranational institutions is the subject of the following section. 
4A.II: Supranationalism 
Before the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), international organisations based on treaties between sovereign States were 
classified as international loose associations at the one end of the spectrum, or federal 
States at the other. The former is said to be the case when the organisation is based 
on the sovereign equality of its members, the principle of unanimity in the voting 
procedure, the non-intervention of the internal matters of member states, the 
governmental representation to the organs and the indirect relations between the 
organisation and individuals of the member States.^ ^^ ^ Besides, the member States 
remain subject to international Law. The second form of international association 
which may result from the establishment of an organisation is, as mentioned earlier, 
a federal state. A federal state is created when two or more states merge into a single 
state responsible under international law; relations between the merged states are no 
longer governed by international law; instead, their relations with each other, as well 
as with the newly formed federal government, are determined by the new national 
(i.e. federal) law. 
Prior to 1950, there was no theoretical category midway between 
international and federal institutions. In practice, however, there existed a few 
organisations which were, by reason of their functions and power, more than 
international yet not resembling federal regimes; these institutions included the 
German Zollverein and Danube Commission.^ ^^^ Nonetheless, their peculiar 
features waited a long time before conceptual differentiations between them and the 
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traditional organisations on the one hand, and the federal entities on the other, were 
made. It was not until the 1950s, when the term 'supranational' was born, that such 
institutions were retrospectively described as supranational. 
As such, the history of the term 'supranational' is relatively short; it dates 
back to 1950 when the ECSC was proposed. In a word, despite the earlier existence 
of supranationalism, the term 'supranationality' itself originated concurrently with the 
ECSC. It became the subject of discussion in 1950 when the French Foreign Minister, 
Robert Schumaim, proposed to place the French and German coal and steel industries 
under a supranational authority and invited other countries to join in.^ "^*^ ^ When the 
ECSC materialised in 1951, the term 'supranational' made its first appearance in a 
legal document. Article 9(5) and (6) of the ECSC Treaty read: 
The members of the High Authority shall exercise their functions in complete 
independence, in the general interest of the Community. In the fulfilment of 
their duties, they shall neither solicit nor accept instructions from any 
government or from any organisation. They will abstain from all conduct 
incompatible with the supranational character of their functions. 
Each member state undertakes to respect this supranational character and not 
to seek to influence the members of the High Authority in the execution of their 
duties. 
The term, however, did not appear in subsequent European treaties, e.g. 
EEC and Euratom. Furthermore, Article 9 just cited was repealed by Article 19 of 
the Merger Treaty signed on 8 April, 1965. Additionally, the projected European 
Defence Community (EDC) and European Political Community (EPC), which 
contain express provisions on their supranational characteristics, were both 
aborted.^ ^^^ Despite these changes, rejections and ommissions of supranationality, in 
practice the European Communities now embrace the substance of the notion of 
supranationality. 
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The rest of this section is devoted to an inquiry into the meaning of 
'supranationality' and of its elements suggested by authors in the field of law and 
international organisations. 
Although the concept has been the subject of discussion for the last four 
decades, it has acquired no definite legal meaning. It has been defined differently by 
almost every student of the concept. Hereunder is an examination of some of the 
meanings offered by recognised authors in the fields of international law and 
integration. Haas, after setting 'supranationalism' against 'federalism', concluded 
that: 
Supranationality in structural terms, therefore, means the existence of 
governmental authorities closer to the archetype of federation than any past 
international organisations, but not yet identical with it . . . . Supranationality in 
operation ... depends on the behaviour of men and groups of men. It is in this 
realm that the final answer to the query may be found.(24) 
The merit of Haas' description is that while there is a need for division of 
goverimiental power between the international and national authorities, it is the 
member states and the civil servants who determine the extent of the organisation's 
supranationality. Another definition close to that of Haas is that: 
the term 'supranationality' signifies that signatory states have transferred to an 
international institution certain limited decision-making powers normally 
exercised only by the governmental organs of a sovereign state, powers which 
include the capability of issuing, under certain specified conditions, binding 
norms to the states or to their inhabitants.(25) 
Kunz also sees the essence of supranationality in the partial transfer of 
sovereign powers from the states to the supranational authority. He writes: 
It [the idea of supranationahty] is based not on a mere restriction, but on a 
transference of sovereignty, but a transference of sovereignty in a particular area 
only.(26) 
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A slightly different definition is offered by Pierre Pescatore. He summarises 
the essence of supranationality: 
in the form of three propositions: the recognition by a group of states of a 
complex of common values; the creation of an effective power placed at the 
service of these interests or values; finally, the autonomy of this power.(27) 
This definition emphasises two other aspects of supranationalism. The first 
and quite novel one is the criterion of common values. The second is the independence 
of the power endowed to the institution. 
Having thus surveyed various definitions of supranationaUsm, attention is 
called to the elements of the concept extracted from these definitions and from those 
provided by other authors. 
1. The first and most significant criterion is the independence of the 
organisation and its institutions vis-a-vis the national governments. Such 
autonomy is attained, for instance, by providing the decision-making 
machinery of the organisation with independent individuals. 
Independence of the organs is of special importance as an element of 
supranationality inasmuch as the term 'supranational' itself was drawn in 
the ECSC treaty particularly when describing the requirement of 
independence of members of the High Authority of the ECSC. Even after 
the replacement of Article 9 (5) and (6) of the ECSC by Article 19 of the 
Merger Treaty, 'the substance of the concept, professor Mathijsen points 
out, remains.'(28) The essence of independence of an organ is to allow its 
members to act in the general interest of the organisation. 
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2. Another criterion of the supranational character of an organisation is its 
ability to take decisions which are directly binding on both the states and 
their nationals. This element is seen as essential by some authors, including 
Robertson and Schermers(29). Pierre Pescatore, by contrast, sees the 
direct effect of decisions of the organisation as an accessory criterion of 
supranationality; in his opinion, giving too much weight to the direct 
relations between the common institution and the individuals of its 
members states in judging its supranationality 
is a much too narrow conception. Whenever it is possible to 
achieve an autonomous will, there is supranationality even if 
states must, in the end, serve as 'executive arms' of that will. Of 
course, this involves an indirect, and hence to a certain extent 
hazardous, supranationality, but it is nonetheless a real 
supranationality which is not inconsequential. Thus, in the 
Communities themselves, side by side with a sphere where 
supranationality is exercised by provisions enjoying direct 
effect, there exist several spheres of action involving measures 
whose obligatory effect is real even though such measures are 
addressed only to states as such, under the form, for example, 
of directives and decisions.^^^ 
At first glance, the view of Pescatore may not seem very persuasive; but, as 
will be mentioned, when one takes into account the fact that the usefulness of this 
criterion depends upon the objective and scope of the organisation (i.e. economic, 
military, foreign policy etc.), one soon finds ways of justifying Pescatore's classification 
of this element as a secondary one. 
3. Financial autonomy. The budgetary independence of the organisation has 
been listed by authors as a condition for its supranationality. It has been 
argued that the institution which, in undertaking its activities, is dependent 
on the contribution of its members states, can be heavily influenced by the 
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members on account of their financial powers.C i^) In the case of the 
European Communities, for example, with describing the conditions, 
financial autonomy has been attained by allowing them finance from levies 
and tariffs. Such a way of financing the Communities has proved its 
usefulness. 
4. The power to make decisions requiring the vote of the majority or the 
weighted majority.(^2) Again the EC is an example, particularly after 
signing the Single European Act in 1986 which modified the 
decision-making process under Article 100 of the EEC Treaty. To 
facilitate the establishment of the internal market. Article 16 of the Single 
European Act requires qualified majority voting by the Council of 
Ministers in enumerated areas. (33) 
5. Insti tutionalisation has been counted as a requirement for 
supranationalism. The institutions of the European Communities were 
suggested as models for the supranational organs, but since most 
international organisations, other than those of mere treaty arrangements 
or alliances, have the equivalent of the Council and the Commission, one 
author finds the essence of supranationality in the existence of a judiciary 
as a principal organ of the organisation and another sees it in the presence 
of an assembly.(34) To another author, on the other hand, 
institutionahsation is of secondary importance. Pierre Pescatore finds the 
essence of supranationality in 'a real and autonomous power placed at the 
service of objectives common to several states'(35) which can be 
accomplished even by non- institutionalised grouping through the 
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employment of a majority procedure, a matter which enables the gathering 
to take decisions not necessarily in accordance with the will of all 
participants.(^) 
6. The ability of an institution to enforce its decisions has been added to the 
legal literature as a criterion of supranationality.(^^) However, Pescatore 
and Robertson rejected the connection between supranationality and the 
capability of the organisation to enforce its decisions by means of the 
application of constraint.C^ )^ Pescatore sees the notion of 'constraint' as a 
federal conception,(^9) and therefore, rejected it in favour of the political 
scientist's approach, which looks at 'integration from the point of view of 
its effectiveness by reference to criteria infinitely more subtle than that of 
constraint.'(''^) Likewise, Robertson finds the power of enforcement to be 
of a federal nature. In the context of a discussion of the High Authority's 
ability to enforce decisions of the Community, he wrote: 
The High Authority power of enforcement is, then, in the last 
resort, only through the medium of national governments; this 
is, in effect, the hmit on the 'supranational'. Indeed, if its 
powers also include those of enforcement they would be more 
in the nature of those of a federal government. As it is, the 
supranational represents, in the words of M. Robert Schuman, 
'a new step in the gradation of powers'; it must be placed, as its 
name implies, somewhere above the national level but it has 
not yet the status of a federal authority.^ '^ ^^ 
Thus, both of these writers disregarded the enforcement power as a 
criterion of the supranational characteristic of an organisation. The 
conclusion drawn from their views is that the ability of the institution to 
enforce its decisions is a thin line setting federal states apart from 
supranational institutions. 
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1. The partial transfer of sovereignty to the common institution is said to be 
another criterion.('^2) However, one author suggests, seconded by another, 
that 'with few exceptions,... the criteria for the loss of sovereignty coincide 
with those which much of the literature regards as the elements of 
supranationalism.'(43) Hence, the conclusion that an institution is 
supranational involves the admission that an amount of sovereignty has 
been invested in that institution. In this sense, transfer of sovereignty may 
not be regarded as a criterion but as a result of the existence of a 
combination of criteria which requires some measure of surrender of 
sovereignty. 
8. The impermissibility of unilateral withdrawal from the organisation. W 
Having assessed the criteria of supranationalism offered by the legal 
literature,^ "^^^ an inquiry will be made to answer questions such as: is it necessary for 
an organisation to fulfil all the above elements in order to be supranational? If not, 
how many elements are needed to be present in an organisation to acquire that 
character? 
Clearly the presence of all the abovementioned criteria removes any doubt 
of an organisation's supranational nature. Yet it seems that in practice no organisation 
can now completely fulfil all elements. Even in the European Communities, the model 
for supranational organisations, the presence of most of the above elements varies 
mostly in degree from other institutions. 
On the other hand, the presence of only one element should not be taken as 
an indication of the supranational nature of the organisation; otherwise most 
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international organisations now in existence would qualify as supranational. Further, 
supranationality would lose its attribute as a category midway between traditional 
organisations and federal entities. For instance, if independence of the individuals of 
the organs were considered the sole criterion of supranationalism, a number of 
international organisations such as the International Labour Organisation would be 
supranational.^'^^ If, furthermore, the abihty of an organisation to take decisions 
binding on its members were the required element, the UN would be supranational 
since the Security Council acting under Article 25 makes binding decisions. 
The presence of two or more elements of supranationahty in an organisation, 
however, states that the organisation is run along at least some supranational lines. 
Hence it is probably the presence of a combination of elements which distinguishes 
supranational from traditional international organisations. But the question that 
arises here is whether there are elements, the presence of which is necessary with that 
combination? It seems that there are not, because the usefulness of one element or 
another varies from one organisation to another, depending on the objectives sought. 
For example, the criterion of the direct relations between the organisation and 
individuals of member states, which seems more useful than others, may become of 
secondary importance in some organisation 'due to the subject matter of their activity 
(for instance, foreign poUcy) but which are nevertheless relatively supranational when 
compared with other international organisations'^ "^ ^^ by reason of the existence of 
several of the above- mentioned elements of supranationality. 
Admittedly, the task of the analyst is arduous when venturing into the 
classification of an organisation as supranational or international. In a few instance, 
though, the analyst finds it possible to identify the supranational characteristic of an 
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organisation, as in the case of the European Communities; but in most cases he or she 
discovers him/herself overwhelmed by uncertainty about the international and 
supranational elements which render it difficult to place the organisation one way or 
the other. Such vagueness has led some authors to reject the notion 'supranational' 
altogether.^ "^^ Schermers, by contrast, has offered students a useful guide when faced 
with such uncertainty; after the suggestion that the notion 'supranational' be used in 
a relative sense, he states: 
As long as we realise its relative value we can use the qualification 'supranational 
organisation' to indicate that the supranational elements prevail and that the 
organisation has considerable powers above the level of the co-operating 
governments. If the intergovernmental elements prevail we use the expression 
'intergovernmental organisation', keeping the name 'international organisation' 
to refer to both.(49) 
Having surveyed the various meanings and criteria of supranationalism as 
well as the suggested method of its application to international organisations, 
discussion on this new phenomenon should be concluded. It should, however, be 
pointed out that in this discussion of supranationalism no full attempt has been made 
to apply the concept to the European Communities as a guide for its later application 
to the GCC; this is due in part to the fact that supranationalism was in fact born in 
connection with the European Communities and most, if not all, of its elements were 
drawn from features of the European Communities. The coming into force of the 
Single European Act in all member states in 1987 should remove any doubts about 
the EC supranationality expressed by some authors, ^^ ^^  inasmuch as the said Act has 
strengthened the bonds of the EC, in particular its provision on weighted majority in 
defined areas which modify Article 100 of the EEC Treaty which required unanimity. 
In this context mentioned should be made of the "Delors Report" on economic and 
monetary union which if adopted would add to the supranational character of the EC 
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for it involves the creation of a supranational institution, i.e. a European System of 
Central Banks, and the transformation of the decision-making power in certain areas 
from national governments to the EC.^ ^^ ^ This potential venture once embarked upon 
ought to make the supranationality of the EC beyond question. In the discussion of 
federaUsm, its application to existing international organisations was considered 
useful in judging whether federalism is a preferable model for international 
integration; therefore, the European Communities were purposely chosen to provide 
a foundation for the examination of the legal nature of the GCC which will be the 
subject of a later section of this chapter. 
The law in supranational organisations differs in terms of its making process 
and its application from that of traditional international organisations on the one 
hand, and that of fully fledged federal entities (though less so), on the other. The 
federal law is made by a democratically elected body and directly binds the member 
states and their nationals and enforceable by federal as well as member states courts. 
In supranational institutions, the law is passed by various organs whose members are 
either appointed, though independent, or instructed governmental officials; in terms 
of application, the supranational law, as set in theory and demonstrated by the 
European Communities, although it has direct effect in most instances is enforced 
through the medium of national courts. At the other end, the supranational law is 
different from the law of traditional international organisations in that it is mostly 
made by independent individuals and has a direct effect within the member states. 
Generally, the law of supranational institutions is similar but not identical to the law 
of federal regimes. As seen in the European Communities, it may be called 
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quasi-federal law.^ ^^ ^ This contention will be relied on when discussing the concept 
of confederalism, i.e. association of states, in the following section. 
4A.III."Confederalism 
Unlike the concept of 'supranationalism', the term 'confederalism' or 
'confederation' is an old one. Nonetheless, international lawyers are not in agreement 
regarding its meaning. Some have defined it in words that amount to equating 
confederalism with federalism. Others describe it in terms used by certain authors to 
identify supranationahsm. Still others, however, define confederalism in terms that 
set it apart from both federalism and supranationalism. Before assessing elements 
attributed to confederal systems, these fragmented definitions of confederal entities 
will be surveyed. 
Apart from the fact that some federal institutions, such as Switzerland,^ "^^ ^ 
have been entitled confederation - which aggravated the vagueness of the concept - a 
legal dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary contends that the term 'confederation' 
... is more commonly used to denote that species of political connection between 
two or more independent states by which a central government is created, 
invested with certain powers of sovereignty (mostly external), and acting upon 
the several component states as its units, which, however, retain their sovereign 
powers for domestic purposes and some others.C '^*) 
According to this definition, there is little, if any, difference between 
federation in its classical form and confederation; this is so because the creation of a 
central goverrmient, the transfer of external powers (e.g. foreign policy and defence) 
and the restriction of member states' powers to domestic matters are all features of 
federal entities.^ ^^^ A corollary of accepting such an approach is equating 
confederalism with federalism, at least in terms of conditions, a matter that is of no 
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help in finding a model for co-operation that does not touch upon sovereignty from 
the outset of the collective journey. 
Still others have drawn a parallel between confederal and supranational 
institutions. M. Forsyth, for example, sees confederation as a halfway house' between 
federal states and international organisations.^ ^^^ His examples of historical 
confederations include the German Zollverein established in the nineteenth 
century.^ ^^^ Hence, an examination of the general features of the Zollverein may be 
appropriate in order to assess Forsyth's theory of confederalism. In his words, the 
'confederal aspects of the Zollverein can be seen in its organisation'.^ ^ •^^  Analysis of 
its structure shows that it had a General Congress which met annually and was 
composed of diplomatic representatives of the governments; decisions were made 
unanimously; the decisions were directly binding upon member states; supervision of 
the implementation of the Zollverein's decisions in the various member states was 
conducted through a system of reciprocal surveillance by means of placing officers of 
one member state at the customs service of another member.^ ^^ ^ Within the 
framework of the Zollverein, a common currency parallel to the then existing national 
currencies was created.^^^ Concerning their external relations, the states reserved the 
right to conclude separate treaties but, in practice, they made no use of it.^^^^ In 
addition, the Zollverein union concluded several treaties with third parties, which 
were subject to ratification by the individual member States.^ '^^ ^ 
These characteristics qualify the Zollverein for the classification of a 
supranational institution in accordance with the criteria offered by authors in 
international law and organisation, which were examined in the previous section 
(Supranationalism). When Forsyth viewed the EEC as the economic confederation 
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of the twentieth century, it became evident that the institutions which are seen as 
supranational by some authors are but confederal in his eyes. The criteria employed 
by him in judging whether an organisation is confederal are almost the same as those 
used by other authors to identify supranational organisations. The confederal 
elements of the EEC, according to Forsyth, are seen in that: 
The Community is based on a treaty which is more than a conventional interstate 
treaty. It is a constitutive treaty which, in the act of creating a new body politic, 
alters the constitutions of the partners to it. The treaty establishes common 
institutions which are capable of passing laws that are directly binding 
throughout the territory of the community, and which are also endowed with 
considerable discretionary power to fulfil the general objectives of the Union. 
The treaty is concluded for an 'unlimited period'.(^^) 
The above passage thus shows in a nutshell the criteria that Forsyth used 
when characterising the EEC as an economic confederation. Therefore, if he does not 
mean that the EEC features the highest form of confederalism, then his confederal 
institutions are for others supranational or quasi-federal. The difference his view 
makes is that confederal arrangements exhibit a relationship between confederal and 
national legal systems, i.e. direct effect, different from that maintained between the 
law of traditional international organisations and their members. 
This, however, is contrary to the common belief that confederal institutions 
possess a type of law, which is in essence international law of co-operation, but 
concerning those particular confederate states. In other words, the confederal law is 
equal in force to international law, since both are dependent upon the member states' 
consent and implementation for their internal effectiveness.^^^ Consequently, 
scholars of this school of thought see confederation differently from both federations, 
which are governed by federal law, and supranational, which are governed by the 
supranational law or the law of integration. For the sake of distinguishing 
The Legal Character of the GCC 179 
confederations from other types of associations, each author has listed one or more 
elements to differentiate it from those of federal and supranational entities. 
Hereunder are some of these elements of confederalism. 
1. The states retain their sovereignties.C^ )^ Hence in a confederation, 
member states do not lose their international personality and as such 
remain states. 
2. The interrelations of a confederation's member states are determined by 
international treaty. 
3. Confederations are based on the principle of non-intervention in domestic 
affairs of member states.(67) 
4. Decisions of the confederations are taken unanimously.(^) Other types of 
voting procedures may be employed for procedural matters. 
5. Laws of the confederation have no direct effect within the member 
states.(69) 
6. Member states of a confederation are at liberty to leave.C^^ ) 
7. Common organs of a confederation are usually composed of diplomatic 
representatives of the member states.C^i) I n other words, the 
independence of the representatives is lacking. 
The features of the confederal system described distinguishes it from the 
federal and supranational entities inasmuch as, as mentioned in the previous sections. 
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the last two require stricter conditions and the sovereignty, to a variety of degrees, is 
involved. 
An example of a contemporary confederal institution which has been 
mentioned by more than one author is the Arab League. ^ ^^ ^ At this point, therefore, 
it should be appropriate briefly to consider the general features that made those 
scholars classify it as a confederal entity. 
Firstly, the Pact establishing the Arab League is an international treaty as 
opposed to a constitution which involves the transference of sovereignty of member 
states to the institution that becomes the new sovereign state. In addition, the member 
states of the Arab League are, according to Articles 1 and 9 of the Pact, independent 
and full sovereign states; in other words, member states retain their international 
competence in all matters not explicitly covered by the Pact. As far as the internal 
affairs of member states are concerned, the Pact, in Article 8, makes it clear that the 
League is based on the principle of non-intervention in the domestic matters of its 
members. Moreover, unilateral withdrawal from the League is permissible provided 
that the state wanting to leave notifies the Council of the League of such intention 
one year in advance.^ "^^ ^ Another confederal feature of the League is the diplomatic 
representation of member states to its organs.^ '^^ ^ Decisions of the Council of the 
League in substantive matters are made unanimously; if, however, the decisions are 
taken by majority vote, they are 'binding only upon those states which have accepted 
them'.^ '^ ^^ In either case, the decisions have no direct effect in member states; they 
are 'enforced in each member state according to its respective basic laws'.^ ^^ ^ 
Before attempting to classify the GCC, two points should be mentioned. The 
first is that organisations which meet the requirements for being international ones, 
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i.e. international treaty, organ, individual will, being established under international 
law (intergovernmental) and permanence,^ ^^^ have been considered confederations. 
Examples include, beside the Arab League, the UN and the Organisation of American 
States.^ ^^ ^ Such organisations by and large bear the features of confederal institutions 
described earher. But the answer to the question of whether or not to these authors 
the term 'confederation' is a synonym for 'international organisation' is not really 
clear. For the purpose of this study, the term will be considered synonymous only in 
that the GCC is preparing for a journey towards integration. This should distinguish 
between the organisations which are set up to co-ordinate mere governmentally 
orientated activities such as defence and/or diplomacy (e.g. NATO) from those which 
are, with or without the governmentally orientated functions, concerned with 
activities which touch upon the life of the member states' nationals aiming at 
integrating the whole (e.g. the Arab League). 
The second point concerns the classification of the law of the confederations. 
The law of confederations, when taking into account the elements discussed above, 
appears to be equivalent to international law since it has no direct effect within the 
confederate states unless they expressly implement it, or on the basis of case-by- case 
consent to its direct effect. Thus, though it may be called the internal law of the 
confederation, the requirements for its effectiveness within the states are the same as 
those required for international law. 
4.B: The Legal Character of the GCC 
The GCC is currently in a state of evolution; therefore the task of classifying 
its legal characteristic is no easy one, and answers to questions regarding its nature 
may not be accurately given. However, in this section an attempt will be made to 
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measure its general features against the criteria of federal, supranational and 
confederal theories discussed earlier, and to see to what extent it matches each; it will 
be classified as either one of them if it fits it more comfortably than the others. If 
possible, there shall be an endeavour to probe where the GCC is heading. 
In the previous sections, three selected models for integration, i.e. 
federalism, supranationalism and confederalism, were defined and their elements 
were identified. It appeared that federations are the strongest institutions, 
supranationals the second strongest, and confederations are the third. 
Clearly, the GCC is not a federal institution; not only because it was based 
on an international treaty concluded by sovereign States, but also because its legal 
framework resembles few, if any, of the features of federal entities. There is no division 
of powers between the GCC and its Member States, there is no independent judiciary, 
there is no merger of sovereignty and no direct relations between the GCC and 
citizens of its Member States. Indeed, neither the founders of the GCC nor the 
advocates of Gulf integration have contemplated federalism as a model for the Gulf 
integration when the GCC was established. Only on one sole occasion has the question 
of a federal arrangement arisen. Three years before forming the GCC (1978) the ruler 
of Kuwait, then Prime Minister, suggested: 
creating a form of unity or federation that is based upon firm and sound 
foundations, for the benefit and stability of the peoples of the region.(79) 
Thus, the GCC in its form and practice is evidence that the federal concept 
was not adopted as the model for Gulf integration. If the GCC is not a federal 
organisation, is it, then, a supranational institution? 
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but an interim one.^ "^*-^  When asked in 1991 to classify the GCC, his view was the same, 
i.e. confederation.^^^^ 
The above thus showed that writers in the Gulf see the GCC as a high form 
of confederation moving towards a tighter form of interstate co-operation yet not 
similar to the supranational or federal institutions. For this contention, and because 
the GCC as examined above does not satisfy the federal and supranational 
requirements, an application of the confederal elements to the GCC to see whether 
it is possible currently to classify it as a confederation, will be made; also, an attempt 
will be made to examine whether or not the GCC is really developing so as to be more 
than a confederation. 
One element of confederal institutions is the retention by sovereign states of 
their sovereignty. In the case of the GCC, there is no clear indication that Member 
States have or have not transferred a portion of their sovereignties. What is clear is 
that the Members did not merge and lose their international personality. Yet the 
Economic Agreement provisions have preference over national laws in case of 
conflict.^^^^ Hence, in the case of the GCC, it seems that some powers in particular 
fields have been delegated to the common institutions. Nonetheless, this does not 
negate the fact that each State still maintains its independence and sovereignty. 
In addition, the relations between Members of the GCC are determined by 
its Charter and subsequent agreements which are not a constitution, as in the case of 
federations. 
Although there is no express provision for the non-intervention in domestic 
matters in the GCC Member States, the force of the GCC decisions was so restricted 
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One author, who could be the only one tackling the issue (though not at 
length) rejected the supranationality of the GCC; his rejection was based on the 
GCC's lack of 'independent legislative and judicial authority' and the 
non-transference of sovereignty from Member States to the GCC.^ ^^ ^ Since this 
author did not fully examine the concept of supranationalism and its various criteria 
when deciding that the GCC was not supranational, it seems appropriate here to apply 
the criteria of supranationalism, discussed in section A.II , to the GCC; the result 
should be that the GCC is not supranational, or that the GCC is on some sort of 
supranational lines, or that the GCC is a supranational organisation. 
Independence of the institution is, as mentioned earlier, the most stressed 
criterion of supranationality, but not the only one. Thus if the GCC and its organs are 
independent from the governments of Member States, one important element of 
supranationality is counted for its supranationality. However, since such autonomy is 
seen in providing the decision-making organs of the organisation with independent 
persons and/or adopting voting procedures other than unanimity, two matters which 
are lacking in the case of the GCC, the autonomy of the GCC organs is wanting. 
Moreover, the GCC cannot take decisions that are directly binding on the 
inhabitants of Member States. Although the GCC decisions always find their way 
towards execution, they are nonetheless treated procedurally in the same way as other 
international laws. The fact that the GCC decisions reach citizens of Member States 
so fast should not obscure the fact that those decisions are implemented in accordance 
with the constitutional requirement of each state, but with extra speed and 
determination to execute what has been agreed upon. However since, as mentioned 
above, this criterion is controversial, its non- existence alone, or even the absence of 
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both it and the previous criterion (i.e. autonomy), should not negate the supranational 
character of the GCC if the GCC satisfies other conditions for supranationality. 
Another element of supranationality is the financial autonomy of the 
organisation. Hence the question is whether the GCC is financially independent? The 
answer is plainly no: it is dependent upon its Member States which contribute equally 
to its budget, as provided in Article 18 of the Charter. 
On the other hand, the GCC is an institutionalised organisation; as 
mentioned in chapter two, it has three principal organs and a number of ancillary 
bodies. Consequently, the institutionalisation element of supranationality is present 
in the GCC. However, those scholars who see the essence of supranationality in the 
possession of a judicial organ or an assembly ^^ ^^  may not find this element present in 
the GCC for the lack of both. 
Also, the required ability of the organisation to take decision by means other 
than unanimity should not be taken against the supranationality of the GCC, if it can 
be attributed to it by the combination of other conditions. This is so because the 
minority's vital interest can be outvoted by the majority, a matter which may endanger 
the existence of the organisation. This is especially true in the case of the GCC since 
its decision-making organ is not composed of independent persons who may take 
account of the interests of all states. The weakness of this criterion is thus apparent 
in that it could lead to crisis in a developing organisation which has not yet attained 
federal character. Consequently, though in the GCC decisions are made unanimously 
in substantive matters and the majority vote is confined to procedural matters, the 
supranational character of the GCC can be established by proving the existence of 
other supranational features. 
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Likewise, the inabihty of the GCC to enforce its decisions in Member States 
by its own means, if taken alone, may not negate its supranationality if it can be 
attributed to the GCC by the existence of other elements of supranationality. This is 
in accordance with Robertson's suggestion that the power of enforcement is a feature 
of federal entities and not of supranational institutions.^^^^ 
Another criterion of supranationality that was discussed in the previous 
section is the transfer of sovereignty from Member States to the organisation. In the 
case of the GCC, one author maintained that Member States did not transfer their 
sovereignty to the GCC,^ ^^ ^ another, however, indicated that the member states 'have 
to some degree transferred their sovereign prerogatives to the organisation 
[GCC]'.^^^^ As a whole, it seems that membership of an international organisation 
mostly requires the restriction or partial transference of sovereignty, however small. 
In the case of the GCC, there is no express language on the transference or the 
restriction of sovereignty. Nonetheless, its limited restriction in some fields is implied 
in providing for, for instance, the supremacy of the Economic Agreement provisions 
over the local laws in the case of conflict between them.^ ^^ ^ But it seems that the loss 
of sovereignty, as suggested by authors and discussed earlier, should be regarded as 
an outcome of the presence of enough supranational elements in an organisation, and 
not in itself as an element of supranationality. In other words, the investment of 
sovereignty or part of it in the institution is an indication that the necessary elements 
of supranationalism are already present in the organisation. Thus, answering 
questions such as whether or not the sovereignties of the GCC Member States have 
been handed in (in whole or in part) to the GCC, depends on the result of the enquiry 
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into whether supranational elements are present in the GCC in terms of structure and 
operation. 
The last condition of supranationality that was examined earlier was the 
impermissibility of member states leaving the organisation unilaterally. This issue, 
however, is highly disputed,^^^ Thus, since the unilateral withdrawal from 
international organisations (supranational and otherwise) is controversial, its 
employment to judge the supernationality of organisations, including the GCC, 
becomes of little use. 
In summary, the above showed that the GCC bears very few features of 
supranational institutions in accordance with the requirements described by authors 
of international institutional law. The fact that the GCC is doing far more than other 
non-supranational organisations and its effectiveness in integrating its Member States 
are different matters. They were, in fact, the result of the sincere desire of its Members 
to achieve what supranational organisations can accomplish, but without resort to 
their theoretical and institutional framework. The question, then, is: if the GCC does 
not seem to be supranational (on account of the lack of most supranational elements), 
nor a mere alliance (on account of the existence of common and permanent organs), 
is it a confederation? 
Because the GCC can be classified neither as a federal organisation nor a 
mere alliance, apart from the difficulty of classifying it as supranational, it may well 
be considered a confederation. Therefore, an appUcation of the confederal criteria 
offered by the legal literature to the case of the GCC is appropriate. But before 
venturing into this, an examination of the writings of GCC officials on the nature of 
the GCC will be made since unlike other models for regional co-operation, the 
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confederal approach has been looked upon a number of times by the GCC Secretary 
General, Mr. Bishara. 
Three days after the inception of the GCC, Mr. Bishara was quoted by 
Al-syasah [Newspaper] as saying 
the GCC is neither a confederal nor a federal organisation, but a co-operation 
council.(^^) 
But in 1982, only six months after the establishment of the GCC, Mr. Bishara 
stated that 
the philosophy of the GCC is a confederal structure aiming at an ultimate 
integration.(^) 
In stressing the confederal structure of the GCC, he said that drawing a 
common constitution for Member States is but a hope,^ ^^^ however. During the third 
year of the GCC's existence, Mr. Bishara elaborated more on the working method of 
the GCC as a confederation. While emphasising that the substance of the GCC 
Charter is the first attempt in the Gulfs history to establish such a wide confederation, 
in both geographical and demographical terms, he pointed out that the Economic 
Agreement, which was drawn so as to touch upon every aspect of people's life, was 
the principal means for pursuing Gulf integration.^^^ At that time, he agreed that the 
confederal structure of the GCC was based on several foundations: economic, 
poUtical, security, socio-cultural and educational co-operation.^^^^ He explained why 
the founders of the GCC chose the confederal structure from amongst the various 
models of integration, such as the federal and supranational systems, in a passage 
quoted by the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), saying: 
Despite the fact that the GCC Charter does not contain a clear-cut political 
theory, there is consensus on some form of confederacy between its six member 
states. Every Arab country is keen to maintain its special characteristics, 
independence and legislative authority, while at the same time a strong desire 
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exists among these states to promote their regional potential within one 
framework. There is common agreement that, acting under the umbrella of the 
council, they wil l be able to pool their political, economic and other efforts in a 
confederal maimer,(92) 
I t is interesting to note that after all he has said about the confederal model 
of the GCC, Mr. Bishara said in 1987 that the GCC is neither federation nor 
confederation, but unlike his statement in 1981, this time he pointed out that the GCC 
structure is a unique one resulting from the region's own experience with the various 
attempts at integration as well as the experience of others: in a nutshell, he emphasised 
that the GCC was not modelled on any existing organisation.^^^-^ This view of Mr. 
Bishara may well be taken as an indication of his opinion that the GCC has moved 
away from a confederal nature to a tighter kind of association, which is more than 
confederation but less than a federation: it is in a midway position between these two 
categories that he places the GCC, seeing it as a unique organisation which does not 
fit any of the three well-known categories, i.e. federal, supranational and confederal. 
Yet since the view of Mr. Bishara, although a strong guide to the nature of 
the GCC, is not a decisive one, an examination of the opinions of other GCC officials, 
as well as the writings of legal scholars who have addressed themselves to the issue, 
is necessary to measure the dimension taken by the nature of the GCC. 
Dr. As-Syari, the Director General of the Legal Department of the GCC 
Secretariat General, has unofficially addressed himself to the question, and wrote, in 
1986, that the nature of the GCC is closer to confederation, basing his opinion on the 
general features of the GCC; Further, he points out that the GCC objective is 
integration amongst Member States in accordance with Article 4 of the GCC Charter. 
Therefore, he stressed that the classification of the GCC as confederation, is, if at all. 
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but an interim one.^ "^*^  When asked in 1991 to classify the GCC, his view was the same, 
i.e. confederation. ^ ^^ ^ 
The above thus showed that writers in the Gulf see the GCC as a high form 
of confederation moving towards a tighter form of interstate co-operation yet not 
similar to the supranational or federal institutions. For this contention, and because 
the GCC as examined above does not satisfy the federal and supranational 
requirements, an application of the confederal elements to the GCC to see whether 
it is possible currently to classify i t as a confederation, will be made; also, an attempt 
v^dll be made to examine whether or not the GCC is really developing so as to be more 
than a confederation. 
One element of confederal institutions is the retention by sovereign states of 
their sovereignty. In the case of the GCC, there is no clear indication that Member 
States have or have not transferred a portion of their sovereignties. What is clear is 
that the Members did not merge and lose their international personality. Yet the 
Economic Agreement provisions have preference over national laws in case of 
conflict.^^^ Hence, in the case of the GCC, it seems that some powers in particular 
fields have been delegated to the common institutions. Nonetheless, this does not 
negate the fact that each state still maintains its independence and sovereignty. 
In addition, the relations between Members of the GCC are determined by 
its Charter and subsequent agreements which are not a constitution, as in the case of 
federations. 
Although there is no express provision for the non-intervention in domestic 
matters in the GCC Member States, the force of the GCC decisions was so restricted 
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that their effectiveness within the states is dependent upon their consent and 
implementation in accordance with the states' constitutional requirements.^^^^ The 
GCC integrative projects that touch upon purely local matters are adopted only after 
their approval by the Member States. This leads to the conclusion that laws of the 
GCC have no direct effect within the Member States - a distinctive feature of a 
confederal institution.^^^^ Thus, these two features of confederal entities are present 
in the GCC. 
Another characteristic of confederations that has been listed by authors is 
the unanimity vote on decisions of substantive nature. In the GCC, resolutions of the 
Supreme Council are passed by unanimous vote of the Member States. But, it should 
be pointed out, absolute unanimity is not required.^^^ Decisions of the GCC in 
procedural matters, however, are taken by a majority vote. Generally, the GCC, as 
indicated by its Secretary General, approaches its decision by means of consensus 
rather than formal voting.^^^^ Consequently, although unanimity is the formal voting 
procedure in important matters, its role is in decline in favour of consensus. But in 
any event, a consensus power does allow a State to protect what it regards as its vital 
interests by preventing consensus from arising. 
Yet another feature of confederalism is the ability of the member states to 
leave the confederation, should they decide to do so. In the case of the GCC, as noted 
earlier, there is no express authority to this effect. With the absence of such authority, 
the legal literature is not in agreement in this respect.^ ^^^^ One opinion holds that 
unilateral withdrawal is permissible. This is in effect in agreement with those who 
count this right as an element of confederalism. Another view, however, sees 
unilateral withdrawal of any organisation impermissible if not expressly provided for 
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in the constitutive treaty. Since the division of legal opinion applies to all types of 
international organisation, including the confederal ones, this element shall be 
shelved in discussing the confederality of the GCC. 
The last confederal element of an international organisation is the existence 
of common organs, which are composed of diplomatic representatives of member 
states. In the case of the GCC, three principal organs have been set up, two of which 
are composed of government personnel, i.e. the Supreme Council and the Ministerial 
Council. The Secretariat General, however, is composed of independent persons 
chosen from amongst citizens of the Member States. By and large, the GCC is 
composed of a number of organs consisting mainly of diplomats from the Member 
States. Broadly speaking, this element is met by the GCC. 
The above application of confederal criteria to the GCC showed that the 
GCC comfortably fits the confederal mode of co-operation. One reason is that the 
requirements of international organisations are very much similar to those of 
confederations. In other words, almost any organisation which is more than a mere 
organless alliance and less than supranational, would be a confederation. But unlike 
most static organisations, the GCC is in a constant state of evolution, a matter best 
illustrated by examining the difference between what the words of its Charter say and 
what its practice indicates. Thus, i f an analyst takes its Charter as his source in 
examining its nature, he will conclude that the GCC (as other international, especially 
regional organisations) is at best a confederation. If, on the other hand, he employs 
the theory and practice of the GCC, he should find that the GCC started formally as 
a confederation, but in pursuing its ultimate objective of integration between its 
Members has gone a respectable distance along the way.^ ^^^^ Where it is in the 
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spectrum of interstate bonds in the distance between confederalism and 
supranationalism may not be answered exactly. And this wil l probably be so until the 
formal documents, such as the Charter, correspond to the practice and expressly state 
its theory, or, alternatively, add some provisions capable of satisfying the requirements 
of the supranational or federal models of integration. 
Unti l then, all that can be said about the nature of the GCC is that its 
constitutional framework is of a confederal nature, while its objectives and 
achievements are of supranational character. Consequently, it is probably a high form 
of confederation making its journey towards supranationality. To put it in different 
words, it started as, and still is a co-operative institution which will become an 
integrative organisation. It is a confederation built on some sort of supranational lines, 
i.e. it has supranational aspirations. 
Summary 
The discussion of the federal idea in section A I reveals its unsuitability as a 
model for integration in this century when the waves of nationalism are so high. 
Although federalism is desirable in itself as an ultimate end to a number of integrative 
stages, its requirement for massive surrender of national prerogatives in a very short 
period leads to its rejection altogether as an approach for integration. 
Supranationalism, on the other hand, is a less demanding model than the 
federal one. Despite the fact that its elements are almost similar to those of the federal, 
they in fact vary widely in terms of degree. Also, the common organs are short handed 
when it comes to the enforcement of what is agreed upon beyond the nation-states. 
Besides, the supranational institutions, as seen in the European Communities, can be 
The Legal Character of the GCC 193 
limited to particular fields. In short, it establishes a union of states but not a unity of 
govenmient. For those reasons, it appears that some existing organisations, though 
not fully supranational, show some features of supranationalism. This in itself shows 
its suitability as an approach for integrating states which are willing to move beyond 
the nation-state but are not ready to form a federal entity. In terms of operation, the 
law in such an institution is very similar to that of federal states. The obvious difference 
between the two is manifest in the enforcement of the supranational law; in this type 
of law, the enforcement power is exercised through the medium of member states. 
ConfederaHsm is another form of interstate co-operation; this kind of 
association of states is a conventional one. By reason of its less demanding character, 
most of the existing international organisations are considered confederal entities. It 
has been differentiated from those organisations whose nature is merely that of an 
alliance by the presence of common organs of a permanent nature which acquire some 
kind of individual wil l . The law governing the relations between the confederate states 
inter se, and between them and the conmion organs, is basically international law, be 
it general or particular - i.e. the internal law of the confederation. 
The GCC shows few features of supranationalism; therefore, it is probably 
not a supranational institution, let alone federal in character. It is at best an 
organisation proceeding on supranational lines. It fits the category of confederalism 
far more comfortably. The elements of confederalism apply to the GCC in varying 
degrees. In general, they are all evident in the GCC of today. The law of a 
confederation in its making process, as well as in its application, is of an international 
nature. Hence, the law of the GCC, as it appears today, is in essence an international 
The Legal Character of the GCC 194 
law.^ "^ ^^ ^ The special treatment of the GCC law by its Members, as well as the impact 
it has made on their laws and legal systems, should not change its international nature. 
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Chapter Five 
Free Movement of Goods Within the GCC 
Introduction 
In a previous chapter, it was noted that from a legal point of view, the GCC 
is at present of a confederal nature, seeking closer unity amongst its Members by 
means of integration in all fields. Economic integration is, however, considered by 
officials of the GCC as the best tool for approaching their unity.^^^ This is evident in 
the sizeable achievements made in the economic field. The Unified Economic 
Agreement (EA) signed on 11 November which stipulates the creation of free 
trade area, then customs union and eventually a Gulf common market,^ "^ ^ shows that 
the GCC as a confederal structure stresses the economic needs as a significant driving 
force, capable of paving the way for integration in other fields. That the GCC is in 
pursuit of establishing a Gulf common market is manifested not only in the EA, but 
also in speeches of officials and official documents of the GCC^'^\ 
The process of establishing this common market involves the adoption and 
harmonisation of laws for such a project; those laws and rules as adopted by the GCC 
constitute the legal principles upon which a common market may be formed. Amongst 
those general principles are the free movement of goods and persons. 
Free Movement of Goods Within the GCC 201 
Consequently, this chapter will examine the free movement of goods within 
the GCC. This wi l l cover the formation of free trade area. Next, it wil l measure the 
process for completion of the GCC customs union. The concept of elimination of 
quantitative restrictions and assimilated measures wil l also be examined. The chapter 
concludes with analysis of the possible justifications for derogating from the rules of 
the free movement of goods. Throughout the examination of the principle of free 
mobility of goods as applied by the GCC, two factors must be borne in mind: The first 
is the short period of GCC existence, in particular the beginning of executing the EA, 
1983. The second is the lack of a judicial or quasi-judicial body which, by providing 
materials on problems and resolutions, could enrich this discussion. This attempt, 
consequently, will investigate the basis laid down in the EA, and, furthermore, 
measure the scope of these rules adopted by the GCC and implemented by Member 
States. 
5.A: Formation of the Free Trade Area 
5A .I: Abolishing Customs Duties and Assimilated Charges 
A free trade area is established when the customs duties and other charges 
of assimilated effect and quantitative restrictions on goods originating in the 
territories of members of a community are eliminated.^^^ 
Within the GCC, the provisions of abolishing customs duties and charges 
with equivalent effect are enshrined in the EA; Article 1(a) reads: 
The Member States shall permit the importation and exportation of agricultural, 
animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin. 
Article 2 provides: 
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1. A l l agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that 
are of national origin shall be exempted from customs duties and 
charges bearing equivalent effect. 
2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, 
transportation, freight or unloading shall not be considered as 
customs duties when they are levied on domestic products. 
Those provisions envisage the creation of a GCC free trade area and were 
implemented by the Supreme Council in its third Summit in 1982 when it decided, 
inter alia, 
to exempt agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products from 
customs duties and other charges having equivalent effect as of March 1 1983.(6) 
To facihtate the movement of goods, it furthermore decided on the same 
Summit: 1) to grant the same rights on the same conditions to the means of 
transportation belonging to nationals of GCC States, as are accorded to the means of 
transportation belonging to nationals of the host States provided they are driven by 
their owners or authorised persons; 2) to grant the steamers, ships and boats owned 
by any Member State the same port facilities and treat them equally with their own 
in docking, pilotage and docking services, loading and unloading, freight, 
maintenance, repair, storage of goods and other assimilated services,^ ^^ effectively 
denying discrimination on grounds of nationality in these spheres. 
When this decision was first announced, there was a question as to whether 
or not those privileges were inclusive of the goverimient's own vessels. This ambiguity 
was later clarified by the Committee for Financial and Economic Co-operation; it 
construed the phrase 'belonging to any Member State' liberally so as to include vessels 
of citizens of any Member State provided that: a) the vessel is owned wholly or partially 
by a citizen; b) it is registered in a Member State; and c) it carries the flag of a Member 
State.^ ^^ 
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Also at the same summit, i.e. the third in 1982, the Supreme Council resolved 
to grant the necessary facilities for the transit of goods belonging to a Member State 
in accordance with the GCC Regulations Governing Transit Rights.^^^ 
The above decrees made by the Supreme Council to effectuate the formation 
of a free trade area and to encourage the intra-GCC trade were implemented into the 
national legal systems by the following laws: 
UAE: Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 113/20M of 1983^^^\ which 
implemented all aspects of the GCC decision presented above. 
Bahrain: The Ministry of Finance and National Economy issued directives to the 
concerned entities to take the appropriate measures,^ ^^^ to effectuate the four aspects 
of the decision. 
Saudi Arabia: The Ministry of Finance and National Economy directed the Customs 
Authority to take the necessary measures for implementing the decisions of the 
Supreme Council in its entirety. ^ ^^ ^ 
Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 6 of 1983 by the Deputy Prime Minister for Financial 
and Economic Affairs. However, it should be noted that this legislation enumerates 
some commodities as not exempted f rom customs duties - namely, cement and its 
by-products, asbestos products, polyethylene, plastic products, dyestuffs, edible oils, 
hydrogenated oils, detergents, car batteries, and electric bulbs.^ '^^ ^ 
Qatar: Law No. 6 of 1983.^ '^*^  Articles 1, 5, 6 and 7 incorporates the terms of the 
decision under discussion. 
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Kuwait: a) Decree No,. 52 of 1982 by the Minister of Commerce and Industry exempts, 
in Article 3, the prescribed products from customs duties and similar charges. 
b) Decree No. PPA/0/88-274 by the Minister of Communications, Decree No. SPA/10 
of 1985 by the Minister of Oil and Industry and Decree No. SPA/6 of 1983 by the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry all incorporated in somewhat similar terms the 
Supreme Council decision on equal treatment of vessels, ships and boats belonging 
to nationals of the GCC provided that they meet the three requirements mentioned 
above. 
c) Decree No. 6 of 1983 by the Minister of Finance incorporates the GCC Regulations 
Governing Transit Rights. 
d) Decree No. 85 of 1984 by the Minister of the Interior recognising driving licences 
issued in a GCC Member State. Also the General Administration of Customs issued 
the Directive No. 2 of 1983 granting vehicles belonging to GCC nationals the same 
rights accorded to those owned by Kuwaitis, provided that their documents are 
effective and driven by their owners or authorised persons.^ ^^^ 
Before concluding this point, clarification of the meaning of the phrase 
'charges having equivalent effect' in Article 2(1) of the EA seems appropriate. 
Paragraph 2 of the said Article limits its generality. It reads: 
Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, transportation, 
freight or unloading, shall not be considered as customs duties when they are 
levied on domestic products. 
As such, those enumerated fees for services cannot be asserted as charges 
with equivalent effect. 
To decide whether a charge is with equivalent effect, it is likely that the GCC 
wil l look to the practice of other organisations, and particularly the ECJ which has 
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had to decide this very issue under the EEC treaty. From this researcher's experience, 
legal experts in the GCC, anyway, build up their legal knowledge in the law of 
integration through the constant review of legal materials on the EC, as witnessed by 
this researcher. Therefore, it would not be surprising to find judgements of the ECJ 
on the construction and scope of the phrase 'charges having equivalent effect' taken 
by them as an important source for legal consultation of the GCC Member States. 
The ECJ had defined the phrase in a number of cases. In Commission v Luxembourg 
and Belgium, the ECJ described the 'charges having equivalent effect' as 
'duties whatever their description or technique, imposed unilaterally, which 
apply specifically to a product imported by a Member State but not to a similar 
product and which by altering the price, have the same effect upon the free 
movement of goods as a customs duty.'C^^) 
Furthermore in Bouchuis v Netherlands, the ECJ declared that the phrase 
means 
'any pecuniary charge, whatever its designation and mode of application which 
is imposed unilaterally on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier 
and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense'.(i^) 
Examples of charges that have been held by the ECJ to have equivalent effect 
to customs duties include imposition of tax on the export of articles of arts^ ^^^ and 
charges for health inspections.^^^^ 
5 A.II : Speciflcation of Goods and their Origin 
In the GCC, types of goods which might be freely moved without subjection 
to customs duties or charges with equivalent effect are enumerated in the above-cited 
Article 1(a) of the EA. However, the wording of that paragraph allows for the 
inclusion within this list of almost all moveable goods. More importantly, the same 
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paragraph places a condition which must be fulfilled before goods can cross borders, 
namely, that the goods must be of a national origin. 
The term 'national origin' is explicitly defined in the EA. Besides products 
which have been wholly produced within the GCC, Article 3(1) includes those goods 
which have been produced in a foreign or undetermined origin with two conditions: 
1) that the 'value added ensuing from their production in Member States shall not be 
less than 40% of their final value as at the termination of the production phase'; 2) 
that 'Member States Citizens' share in the ownership of the producing plant shall not 
be less than 51%. ' 
5A.III: Equal Treatment of Goods Originating from the G C C 
Equal treatment of goods originating in the Members' territories is provided 
for in Article 1(b) of the EA, it reads: 
A l l agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are from 
Member States shall receive the same treatment as national products. 
One step of materialising the principle of equal treatment of goods called for 
in Article 1 of the E A is seen in the Supreme Council's decision in its f i f th Summit, 
granting priori ty to national products of Member States in governmental 
purchasing.*-^ -^* In its seventh Summit, the Supreme Council endorsed the Unified 
Rules for Granting Priority to the Purchase of National Products and Products of 
National Origin, i.e. of the GCC Member States.^ ^^^ 
Since Member States have incorporated the exact terms of the Rules, it seems 
appropriate to summarise their contents before enumerating the implementing 
national measures. 
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The Rules are composed of 11 Articles, the first of which defines national 
product as "every product produced in a Member State and considered as such under 
the law of that State", and product of national origin as "the products which the added 
value ensuing from their production in a Member State is not less than 40 percent of 
the final value at the termination of the production phase and that GCC citizens 
sharing in the ownership of the producing plant is not less than 50 percent." 
Article 2 describes the manner whereby the priority is given: National 
products have priority over similar foreign products by 10%, and over similar products 
of national origin by no more than 5%. Where there is no national product, products 
of national origin are accorded priority over similar foreign products by 10%. 
Paragraph (b) stipulates that shortages of a national product to meet the demand of 
governmental entities are to be made up from a product of national origin, then from 
foreign products. 
Art ic le 3 commands governmental establishments including public 
companies and those which a government own more than 5 1 % of its capital to satisfy 
their demands from national products and those of national origin. 
Article 4 stipulates that governmental entities include express provision in 
their contracts obliging suppliers or contractors etc. to meet their needs from national 
products or those of national origin. This Article, furthermore, provides that a breach 
of that express provision will be considered a breach of the concerned contract, a 
matter which involves a charge of no less than 20% of the value of the product in 
addition to the apphcations of the stipulations provided for in the contract. Cheating 
and fabrication to bypass these Rules are according to Article 8 severely punished by 
means including blacklisting the suppher. 
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Articles 5,6 and 7 instructs governmental entities to draw their contracts with 
the application of these Rules in mind. Article 6 specifically states that a foreign 
supplier or contractor may not build a production unit for the purpose of supplying 
products needed by the concerned governmental project. 
Article 9 contemplates that each Member State sets up a body to supervise 
the execution of these Rules. The Committee for Financial and Economic 
Co-operation, Article 10 contains, has the right of interpreting and amending these 
Rules. Article 11 stipulates these Rules to be effective as of 1 March 1987. 
Member States of the GCC took the appropriate steps to enact legislation to 
give effect to the Rules decreed by the Supreme Council. Those measures are as 
follows: 
UAE: Decision of the Council of Ministers No.2/2 of 1987.^ ^^^ Its Article 9 appoints 
the Ministry of Finance and Industry as the supervisory body in the UAE. 
Bahrain: Decree No. 16 of 1987 amending Decree No. 11 of 1985. Also the Council 
of Ministers Decree No. 21 of 1987.^ ^^^ 
Saudi Arabia: Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 139 of 
1987(24) 
Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 18 of 1987 made by the Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers for Financial and Economic Affairs. Article 9 of the Rules as 
annexed to this Decree provides that these Rules are not applicable to the contracts 
and projects of the defence and security units. The Decree appoints the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy the responsibility of supervising the application of the 
Rules.^^^^ 
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Qatar: Law No. 6 of 1987.^^^ In Article 9 it assigns the Central Committee of Bids 
the task of supervising the application of the Rules. 
Kuwait: Ministerial Decision No. 6 of 1987 by the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry.(^^^ As such, this Ministry is the supervisory body. 
In the context of equality between goods originating within the GCC, it is 
worth noting that the GCC prohibits discriminatory taxation as a necessary measure 
to enhance the free mobility of goods. In its ninth Summit, the Supreme Council 
decided to treat citizens of the GCC equally in terms of taxation to facilitate 
movement of goods, as well as persons, as will be seen in chapter sk.*-^^ Like the GCC, 
the EEC expressly prohibits the imposition of 'internal taxation of any kind in excess 
of that imposed... on similar domestic products.'^^^^ Thus, such prohibition, while 
leaving the state at liberty 'to decide on the rate of taxation to be applied to a particular 
product, does not mean that they are free to apply rates which discriminate between 
the domestic and imported products, or which afford indirect protection to the 
former'.^^^ 
Equal taxation of goods of national origin is the rule in the GCC for yet 
another reason; this is because differentiation in terms of taxation between domestic 
and GCC goods would constitute charges having equivalent effect to customs duties 
- a matter which the Member States bound themselves not to apply to products 
originating from the GCC.^^^^ 
5 A I V : Re-exportation of Foreign Goods 
A question that may arise in this context is whether or not re- exportation of 
goods imported f rom non-member states is permitted. The GCC Committee for 
Free Movement of Goods Within the GCC 210 
Finance and Economy in its f i f th meeting in approved the recommendation of the 
GCC Customs Directorate Generals that: 
concerning the re-exportation of foreign goods that have been imported by a 
Member State and accorded importation aids may be re- exported to other 
Member States after the sum of such aids are refunded from the exporter of such 
goods.(^2) 
Accordingly, response to the question regarding the re-exportation of foreign 
goods which have not been aided, or which have been but refunded of such aids, is in 
the affirmative. 
The question yet remains: when foreign goods are exported from one 
Member State to another, are they liable for yet more customs duties? In other words, 
are they in free circulation or not? 
The concept of free circulation of goods as understood in EC means 
that goods which come f rom a third country have satisfied the following conditions: 
1) completion of relevant formalities, i.e. the necessary paper work applicable in a 
member state; 2) the payment of appropriate customs duty or charges with equivalent 
effect which are payable in that state; and 3) no partial or total drawback^'^^ has been 
claimed for re-exportation. In the case of the GCC, this issue is ambiguous. It is not 
clear whether the above-mentioned permission is for a mere exportation, or whether 
i t further puts a product into a GCC free circulation after customs formahties and 
duties are paid to a GCC Member State and the aid i f any is refunded. 
Currently, the logical answer would be in the negative, because, as will be 
discussed below, the Common External Tariff (GET) which ranges between 4-20% 
allows unduly for unfair competition, since an exporter can export a product through 
a GCC customs point adhering to a lower percentage of customs duty and then 
Free Movement of Goods Within the GCC 211 
re-export it to the Member State adopting the higher percentage. Until a CET is 
precisely determined, for instance 10% in all states and aids on import are 
standardised, such logical assumption holds true. Even if such CET is drawn up, it may 
still be argued that the concept of free circulation may not be adopted by the GCC 
because some Member States rely heavily on customs duties as a main source of their 
national revenue, and may thus be reluctant to reduce their tariffs. Of course this kind 
of problem can be tackled by means including a 'package deal'. It is generally accepted 
that once a GCC external customs wall is evenly built, the question of free circulation 
will force itself into the open and hence be answered either by practice or decision. 
By then, free circulation as a GCC concept will differ slightly from that of the 
EC. Within the GCC, it will require, besides the three conditions described in the EC 
law as mentioned above, uniform classification of foreign goods and standardisation 
of the amounts of aids on import. Alternatively, the three mentioned conditions be 
satisfied, and the exporter returns the amount of aids in excess of that provided by the 
State of destination, so that benefits within the GCC by importers are equalised, hence 
levelling the price in the State of destination. 
5.B: Completion of a GCC Customs Union 
5.B.I: Common External Tariffs 
The adoption of a Common External Tariff (CET) in the relations with the 
outside world by a community such as the GCC constitutes one of the two 
complementary elements for the creation of a customs union in that community. The 
Treaty of the EEC, for example, provides that the community is based on a customs 
union and thus stipulates the adoption of a common customs tariff in relations with 
third countries.^^^^ The GCC, too, in pursuing its long-term objective of economic 
Free Movement of Goods Within the GCC 212 
union,^•'^^ realised the need for unification of its Members' external tariff as a step 
forward. Consequently, the EA provides for the adoption of an external tariff within 
five years. But unlike the EEC, the GCC at first sought the establishment of a 
Minimum External Tariff (MET), to be setup gradually within five years, commencing 
f rom March 1983.^ "^ ^^  The MET is provided for in Article 4 of the EA which reads: 
1. Member States shall establish a uniform minimum Customs tariff 
applicable to the products of countries other than GCC Member 
States. 
2. One of the objectives of the uniform Customs tariff shall be the 
protection of national products from foreign competition, 
3. The uniform Customs tariff shall be implemented gradually within 
five years from the date on which this agreement becomes effective. 
Arrangements for its gradual implementation shall be agreed upon 
within one year from the said date. 
Notably, notwithstanding the gradual approach stipulated in the above 
Article, an M E T of 4 percent, as well as a maximum of 20 percent, was agreed and 
implemented by Member States within the first year: Kuwait and Bahrain already had 
their customs tariffs in that range (i.e. 4 and 5 percent r e spec t ive ly .The U A E 
increased its tariffs from 1 to 4 percent).^^^^ With regard to Saudi Arabia,^ "^^^ Royal 
Decree No. M/52 of 1983, increased the customs tariff from 3 to 4 percent; Royal 
Decree No. M/16 of 1985 approved the decision of the Council of Ministers No.L/02 
of 1985, which further increased the tariff from 4 to 7 percent. Oman, too, passed a 
Royal Decision, No. 4 of 1983, increasing customs tariff f rom 2 to 4 percent. ^ "^ ^^  Qatar 
issued a decree in Law No. 4 of 1984, modifying the Customs Law of 1975 and 
providing 4 percent as the minimum customs tariff.^"^^^ 
Mention should be made of the fact that while the above national measure 
taken by the States to implement the M E T shows their keenness to effectuate GCC 
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programmes, one should recall that the GCC, through the EA, aims at economic 
integration. Furthermore, the policy-makers of the GCC have always expressed their 
aspiration for a GCC common market. Such factors give weight to the argument that 
the framers of Article 4 stipulated the eventual setting up of a CET to be worked out 
in accord with the prevailing economic circumstances, including the existence of 
MET. This finds support in paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 4 itself; both refer to 
'uniform Customs tar i f f rather than minimum. 
A t any rate, the process to form a defined CET was begun in 1988 when the 
Supreme Council issued the 'Al-Manamah Declaration', stressing 'the necessity for 
setting up a Common External Tariff for the establishment of a Gulf common market 
in light of the principles laid in the EA and decisions of the Supreme Council'.^ ^^^^ As 
regards the level of the expected unified tariff, the GCC Under-Secretary General for 
Economic Affairs has indicated that this would not necessarily be higher than the 
existing levels (i.e. 4-7 percent). '^*^^ More consultations on the CET have been taking 
place at the highest level, '^*^^ but until the eleventh Summit in December of 1990 no 
agreement has been reached. 
5.B.II: Common Commercial Policy 
Like the CET, the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) constitutes one 
characteristic of a common market. But the CEP apparently includes, besides the 
economic aspects, poHtical elements, and therefore the processes of establishing a 
CCP appear slower than those of constituting a CET. This is manifested, for example, 
in the experience of the EEC. 
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In the case of the GCC, Articles 7 and 23 are of relevance. Article 7 of the 
E A provides that: 
Member States shall co-ordinate their commercial policies and relations with 
other states and regional economic groupings and blocs, with a view to creating 
balanced trade relations and equitable circumstances and terms of trade 
therewith. 
To achieve this goal, the Member States shall make the following arrangements: 
1. Co-ordination of import/export policies and regulations; 
2. Co-ordination of policies for building up strategic food stocks; 
3. Conclusion of collective economic agreements in cases where joint 
benefits to Member States would be realised; 
4. Taking of action for the creation of collective negotiating power to 
strengthen their negotiating parties in the field of importation of 
basic needs and exportation of major products. 
Thus this Article on a GCC Commercial PoUcy is largely concerned with its 
international trading arrangements. It calls for standardisation of policies regarding 
import/export relations with the outside world, and it stresses the need for collective 
work as a significant bargaining tool in dealing with non-member states and 
organisations. 
Article 23 of the E A is also of some relevance to the developing Common 
Commercial Policy of the GCC. It reads: 'Member States shall seek to co- ordinate 
their external policies in the sphere of international and regional aid'. 
Although these calls for co-ordination touch upon sensitive issues of a 
political nature, Member States were not so slow in laying foundations in this area. 
This is to say that a GCC Commercial PoHcy has got off the ground. The Unified 
Industrial Development Strategy which came to light after the E A supports such 
theses; this Strategy contains in Part I I I that 'Member States are to adopt a collective 
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international industrial relations policy based on encouraging the possibility of adding 
new terms to foreign aid and trade agreements concluded with industriaUsed and 
developing countries to promote the industrial exports of the GCC states'.^ "^^ 
The steps taken so far are considerable as measured against the practice of 
most international organisations in the area of commercial relations towards 
non-members. The guidelines articulated in Article 7 of the EA have been closely 
followed. 
In the field of importation of the basic needs such as rice, television 
programmes, educational equipment, and papers. Member States entered into 
collective bulk purchases of such imports. '^*^^ 
Furthermore, the GCC is empowered by its Members to negotiate 
commercial agreements with other states and international groupings. Accordingly 
there were a number of negotiating rounds with the EEC, ending in 1988 with the 
conclusion of an economic agreement.^ '*^^ The GCC, moreover, is conducting trade 
negotiations with the United States^ "^ ^^  and Japan.^ ^^^ 
In the CCP arena, the Supreme Council's decision in its ninth summit in 
December 1988 is of great significance; it 'endorsed the Unified System for the 
Protection of Industrial Products which are of National Origin'.^^^^ 'National Origin', 
as spelled out in Article 3(1) of the EA, means that the added value ensuing from the 
production of an item in a Member State is not less than 40% of the final value as at 
the termination of the production phase and that citizens' share in the ownership of 
the producing plant is not less than 51%. 
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The Unified System is basically a protectionist tariff measure of up to 25% 
of the products' value on arrival at the port, or the value determined by the Protection 
Committee established by this system.^ '^^ ^ According to Article 2 of the system, its 
aims include enhancing the competition, capacity of GCC products against unjust 
competition by foreign products, providing chances for developing national industries 
to acquire experience and the needed technical, administrative and marketing 
know-how to lower production and distribution costs, so that it may be possible to 
compete with foreign industries which possess long experience, and especially 
encouraging the use of national resources to satisfy the requirements of the GCC 
market, and encouraging trade of industrial products of national origin. Pursuant to 
Article 1 of the System, 'protectionist tariffs' means imposition of customs duties, 
either on the quantity of the imported products, or their value, or both; in cases 
involving dumping, the same Article provides that protectionist measures include, 
besides those just mentioned, the imposition of quantitative restrictions on 
importation, or prohibiting it altogether, or any measure recommended by the 
Protection Committee. Having said that, Article 3 of the System provides that such 
measures, i f taken, are to be of a temporary nature. Thus, the overall goal of the system 
is to bring about an atmosphere where GCC industries can grow, and at the same time 
to guarantee that the imports of particular products do not prejudice the interests of 
the GCC producers. 
Generally, it is worth mentioning that in the eleventh Summit held in 
December 1990, the Supreme Council issued the 'Doha Declaration' emphasising its 
determination to promote economic integration by means including laying down 
programmes for estabhshing a 'unified trade policy'.^^^^ 
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The above examination of protection measures and restrictions leads this 
discussion into another aspect necessary for the application of the principle of 
intra-GCC free movement of goods, i.e. elimination of quantitative restrictions as 
between its own Member States. 
5.C: Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions and Similar Charges in 
Intra-GCC Trade 
ReaHsation of the principle of free movement of goods in a community 
requires the abolition of restrictions on the quantities of exported/imported products 
in intra-community trade. 'Although a customs union is, strictly speaking, limited to 
the elimination of internal customs duties and the setting up of a common external 
tariff, free trade between Member States could be jeopardised if it were possible to 
limit, in one way or another, the quantity of goods crossing the inter-state borders'.^ '^*^ 
A quota, as a measure restricting the import or export of a product by amount or by 
value may disturb the flow of trade to a greater extent than tariffs, since such measures, 
inter alia, may render the supply unable to meet the demands of the restricted area, 
since reciprocal measures and mutual arrangements are difficult to set up. For this 
reason, the Treaty of the EEC provides for the abolition of quantitative restrictions 
and measures with equivalent effect on imports and exports^^^^ and contains in 
addition the so-called 'standstill' provisions precluding Member States from 
introducing any new quantitative restrictions or measures with equivalent effect. The 
seeming complexity of the concept of measures having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions is defined to some extent in the EC Commission Directive of 
22 December 1969,^ ^^^ as well as the jurisprudence of the ECJ. The ECJ case law on 
the issue of what amounts to 'quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent 
effect' has developed to a stage where it is necessary for those concerned with the 
- i 
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equivalent ideas in organisation to take it into account. For the purpose of this study 
on the GCC, it seems of significant importance to seek definition of this concept; and, 
since the concept was developed more in Europe, the say of the ECJ is of much weight. 
In Geddo v Ente Nazionale Risi, the ECJ declared that: 'the prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions covers measures which amount to a total or partial restraint of, according 
to the circumstances, imports, exports or goods in transit.'^^^^ Then, on definition of 
the phrase 'measures having equivalent effect' the ECJ said in Dassonville that it 
includes 'all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade'.^^^^ Actions held 
by ECJ to constitute quantitative restrictions include the suspension of import of a 
commodity.^^^^ Examples of the measures held to have assimilated effect to 
quantitative restrictions include a requirement for import or export licences in 
intra-community trade.^^^ 
Turning to the case of the GCC, the concept of 'elimination of quantitative 
restrictions and measures having equivalent effect' has not been straightforwardly 
addressed in its constituent documents. However, the wording of Articles 1(b) and 
2(1) of the E A amounts to the effect that restrictions on quantities of imports and 
exports or measures with assimilated effects may not be imposed. 
Article 1(b) reads: 
7 
A l l agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are from 
Member States shall receive the same treatment as national products. 
Article 2(1) provides: 
A l l agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of 
national origin shall be exempt from customs duties and other charges having 
equivalent effect. 
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Both begin with the term 'all'; in the former, the initial 'all' most probably 
means: in all matters products of Member States shall receive the same treatment as 
national products. In the latter the inclusion of the word 'all' may be taken as an 
indication of the intention of the framers of the EA. That is to say that the framers 
drew the term 'all' to prevent the elimination of customs duties on fixed quantities 
from which may follow quantitative restrictions on imports and or exports. Yet, more 
measures to prevent quantitative restrictions should be taken. 
With the absence of provision on the issue, or a decision of the Supreme 
Council, it may be argued that a quantitative restriction may covertly be imposed even 
if applying the same rules to domestic and imports alike. This may be demonstrated 
in, for instance, a case where the same maximum selling price is applied to both 
imported and domestic goods where the former cost more than the latter. This 
measure is of equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions since it covertly drives 
importers out of the market. 
Much of the development of the concept with regard to the GCC will depend 
upon its practice. The practice of the GCC and the steps it takes for the creation of a 
Gulf common market will, in one way or another, indicate whether the GCC, even 
with the silence of its documents on some issues, intend to adopt the principles 
developed by other regional organisations for efficient intra-GCC trade, including the 
principle under discussion, i.e. elimination of quantitative restriction on imports and 
exports and measures having equivalent effect. Notably, the first signs of its practice 
point towards its trend to fi l l the gaps in the EA by a number of measures. For instance, 
the Supreme Council passed a decision allowing access of products of Member States 
to the domestic market of other GCC Members without having to appoint an agent 
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or representative in the territory of the importing Member State/^ ^^ This decision 
was rapidly transformed into the national legal system/^ ^^ Of relevance to this 
discussion is the fact that under the EEC law, particularly Directive 70/51 Article 
2(3)(g), the requirement of a local agent would constitute unlawful measure 
amounting to a quantitative restriction/^'^'^ 
Thus, the fact that the decision of the Supreme Council and the national laws 
implementing it stress the non-need for local agency, shows the general trend toward 
abolishing not only quotas, but also the assimilated measures. 
In this context, the discussion would not be complete without making 
reference to Article 6 of the EA; this Article permits national laws to blacklist or 
restrict some goods, and thus deny them the right of transit which is granted by the 
EA and the earlier mentioned decision of the Supreme Council with respect to other 
goods; Member States, according to Article 6 of the EA, are to exchange lists of such 
goods. The GCC Secretariat General assumed responsibility for informing customs 
authorities of the Members about changes and developments on the lists.^^^ In this 
respect, a non-GCC analyst may hold this as a quantitative restriction undermining 
intra-GCC trade. GCC observers may view it differently, especially when such 
measures are grounded by reference to Islamic principles. Hence, if one takes into 
account that the social values inspired by Islam are shared by almost everyone in the 
territory of the GCC, and that such values take precedence over economic gains, he 
or she realises that they may not, in fact, amount to quantitative restrictions, just as 
the world is in an agreement that prohibiting the importation/exportation of narcotics 
does not constitute a quantitative restriction on international trade. 
Free Movement of Goods Within the GCC 221 
Generally speaking, the test is subjective. Thus, whereas in Europe, for 
instance, prohibition on the import of pornographic items may or may not amount to 
a quantitative restriction,^^^^ in the Gulf, it would not. This leads this discussion to 
cases of possible justification for derogations from the prohibited customs duties or 
assimilated charges and quotas and assimilated measures, 
5.D: Possible Limitations on the Principles of Free Movement of Goods 
There can be no doubt that full application of the principles of free movement 
of goods Hberates trade, and thus increases the volume of goods crossing the 
inter-state borders. However, rigid adherence to those principles mentioned above 
can be destructive, not only in economic terms, but also in political and security as 
well as social terms. Such a possible result, coupled with the fact that most rules have 
their exception (which can be found either in the source of the law itself or in the 
interpretation of the rule), was not absent from the minds of the draftsmen of the 
treaties of some integrative economic institutions such as that of the EEC. This 
Community is seeking the attainment of economic objectives similar to those of the 
GCC, but unlike the GCC, it has drawn provisions including the grounds on which a 
member state may legitimately make exceptions to the free movement of goods. 
In the EEC, Articles 30-34, as noted earlier, prohibited quantitative 
restrictions on import/export and all measures having equivalent effect. Article 31, in 
particular, prevents the introduction of new quotas or assimilated measures. 
Justifications for derogation from applying the principles laid down by these Articles 
are spelled out in Article 36 of the EEC Treaty which reads: 
The provisions of Arts. 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions 
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, 
public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic 
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or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. 
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States. 
While this Article takes account of security and social values, and hence 
permits derogation from the principle of free movement of goods for the sake of their 
protection, it maintains that the exercise of such powers by Member States shall not 
be arbitrary. This is to say that the scope of these justifications has to be interpreted 
narrowly, so as to avoid undermining the free movement of goods. The strict 
construction has been decreed in Commission v Italy where the ECJ stated: 
It must be recalled that in accordance with the settled case- law of the Court 
Article 36 must be strictly interpreted and the exceptions which it lists may not 
be extended to cases other than those which have been exhaustively laid down 
and, furthermore, that Article 36 refers to matters of a non-economic nature.(^) 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the list of exceptions embodied in 
Article 36 is suggested to be exhaustive. ^ ^^ ^ Further exposition of them was made by 
the ECJ when it had the opportunity to determine the scope of some of the 
justifications and define their concepts. Hereunder are grounds, the scope of which 
the Court had determined: 
• Public Morality;^^^ 
• Public Policy:^^^) 
• PubHc Security^ "^ ^^  
• The Protection of Health^^^^ 
• The Protection of Health and Life of Plants^ ^^ ^ 
• The Protection of National Treasures^ ^^ ^ 
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• The Protection of Industrial and Commercial Property^ '^^ ^ 
As mentioned eariier, strict adherence to the principle of free movement of 
goods may also result in economic problems. For this reason. Article 25 of the EEC 
Treaty allows derogation from the common customs tariff under specific conditions; 
paragraph (1) provides that if the Commission finds that demand for a particular 
product cannot be met by supply from within the community and traditionally depends 
to a considerable extent on imports from third countries, the Council shall grant a 
Member State tariff quotas at a reduced rate of duty or duty free; paragraph (2) 
contains that the Commission may grant similar exemption when shortage of supply 
within the community is such as to entail harmful consequences for the processing 
industries of a Member State; paragraph (3) envisages that where agricultural 
products are concerned, 'the Commission may authorise any Member State to 
suspend, in whole or part, collection of the duties applicable, or may grant such 
Member State tariff quotas at a reduced rate of duty or duty free, provided that no 
serious disturbance of the market or the products concerned results therefrom'. 
In the case of the GCC, its operative nature plays a major role on the 
application of its documents. Yet, this should not make a legal analyst of the GCC 
lose sight of the fact that the people concerned, i.e. businessmen, await an answer to 
questions including the one at hand, i.e. whether there is a legally possible derogation 
from the concepts governing the free movement of goods in the GCC. Although the 
shortage of the experience coupled with the gaps in the Charter and the EA are in 
some points so wide that one is unable to form an opinion, examination of the potential 
legal direction the GCC may take in a given issue is an apposite work an analyst can 
do. This approach is adopted in discussing whether there is room at all for making 
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exceptions in the GCC. What are the grounds on which a given derogation may be 
based? 
Taking into account the contents of Article 24 of the EA, which mirrors the 
operative nature of the GCC, one would consider exceptions to the free movement 
of goods possible: the said Article reads in part: 
Any Member States may be temporarily exempted from applying such 
provisions of this Agreement as may be necessitated by temporary local 
situations in that State or specific circumstances faced by it. Such exemption 
shall be for a specified period and shall be decided by the Supreme Council of 
the Co-operation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf. 
Accordingly, this Article allows exemptions with three conditions: Firstly, a 
State must face an internal situation temporarily necessitating the derogation from 
the agreed principles of free movement of goods. Secondly, exemption must be of an 
interim nature. Thirdly, the Supreme Council must agree to provide a State with an 
exemption. 
Possible grounds for derogation from the rules on intra-GCC trade may 
include all those enumerated by Article 36 of the EEC Treaty which was discussed 
above. However, the prevailing political and social values in the GCC may 
differentiate between their scopes in terms of degree. Thus what constitutes a security 
threat in a GCC State may be considered a minor criminal offence in an EEC State, 
and in the 'public morahty' concept, an article which can be regarded by a GCC State 
as having the tendency of degrading its national may not be regarded in an EEC State 
as such; and so on with regard to other grounds. In brief, justifications provided for in 
Article 36 of the EEC Treaty are, in principle, likely to justify derogation by a GCC 
Member State from the agreed rules on free movement of goods in the GCC. Other 
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exceptions may be found justifiable, especially those reasoned by violation of Islamic 
teachings, e.g. objects intended to be worshipped by some people in the States. 
Generally speaking, this issue deserves special attention from the 
policy-makers of the GCC; since there is no court of justice to which questions of this 
nature can be addressed, an addition to the EA or a decision of the Supreme Council 
is needed in order that concerned persons, whether natural or legal, take notice of the 
GCC stand on this problem. 
A final remark concerns the proper procedure to minimise the possible abuse 
of power to derogate by the Member States of the GCC. In this respect, the addition 
of a provision obliging Members intending to apply any of the allowed derogations to 
inform other Member States through the concerned division of the GCC General 
Secretariat of the intended derogation and its duration as well would minimise the 
adverse effects of derogation. 
Summary 
The EA explicitly embodies the principle of free mobility of goods of national 
origin. It envisages the elimination of customs duties and other charges of assimilated 
effect, a matter that was implemented into the national legal systems. Furthermore, 
the GCC is pursuing the creation of a GCC external customs wall through progressive 
stages as a step towards a customs union. The process in this direction reached a stage 
where the States bound themselves to an external customs tariff ranging between 4-20 
percent. Efforts to set up a common external tariff are ongoing at the highest GCC 
level, i.e. the Supreme Council. Efforts to form a GCC common commercial policy 
are promising. 
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In materialisation of the principle of equality among goods originating from 
within the GCC, several measures have been taken, hence facilitating the free 
movement of goods, i.e. equality between means of transportation belonging to the 
GCC nationals and equal opportunity for making use of the ports and the services 
provided therein in any Member State. 
The EA, though, is silent on the issue of quantitative restrictions. 
Nonetheless, it is suggested that they may not be imposed since they may constitute 
an obstacle to the free flow of goods. 
Possible grounds for limitations on the free movement of goods are enshrined 
in Article 24 of the EA, i.e. temporary local situations or specific circumstances. 
Besides those vague justifications, grounds of public morality, public policy, public 
security and breach of Islamic teachings, are likely to be held legitimate. 
Generally speaking, in the 10 years of its existence, besides laying down the 
basis, the GCC has accomplished admirable goals in the direction of realising the 
principle of free movement of goods, hence establishing a Gulf common market. The 
latter, however, depends on the implementation of other principles, such as the free 
movement of persons; this principle accordingly is the subject of the following chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
Free Movement of Individuals Within the GCC 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explored one component of the establishment of a Gulf 
common market, i.e. the free movement of goods in the GCC. This chapter will 
enumerate the steps which have been taken within the framework of the EA to realise 
yet another essential element for creating a Gulf common market, which is the free 
movement of individuals. The importance of attaining this principle in an economic 
community is reflected in its enshrinement in the constituent treaties of a number of 
regional communities. Apart from the Charter of the GCC, the free mobility of 
individuals in the EEC Treaty, for instance, is one of its fundamental principles 
which has been conformed by the ECJ and shown by the Community secondary 
legislation.^ "^^ Provisions for realisation of this principle aim inter alia at the creation 
of 
a 'common market in manpower' which would serve the purpose of moving 
labour to areas which reveal shortage of manpower and to solve the problem of 
unemployment in overpopulated areas.(^ ) 
It is the purpose of this chapter to identify and examine the measures taken 
by the GCC to erect this pillar of the desired Gulf common market. The discussion 
will include determination of its personal scope, the rights of entry and residence in 
the Member States, the extent of equality of treatment of citizens of the GCC, the 
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right to practice liberal professions and the right to engage in economic activities. The 
final part of this chapter explores the possible grounds for exceptions to the rules on 
the principle of free movement of persons. 
Throughout and following the presentation and discussion on the rules 
adopted by the GCC on the free movement of persons, there will be enumeration of 
national legislation effectuating GCC rules. For the purpose of this chapter, the 
presentation of such legislation should throw light on the degree of Member States 
responses towards GCC law. Furthermore, when put together, they sometimes 
determine the meaning as well as the personal and material scope of the concerned 
GCC law. At any rate, for reasons to be explored in some detail in chapter seven, 
making sure that a GCC rule has been incorporated in national law is of crucial 
significance. 
The place of this chapter within the arrangement of the whole thesis may not 
allow detailed consideration of national legislation on each and every GCC decision. 
On the other hand, some contents of such legislation require pointing out. 
Consequently, they will be approached as follows: in cases where a national legal 
system receives a GCC rule in the exact terms formulated by the GCC, or even the 
substance of the rule, only reference to that national law will be made, especially since 
GCC decisions themselves are analysed, anyway, prior to the presentation of national 
legislation. In cases where a municipal law makes exceptions to a GCC rule, changes 
of its substance, changes of its effective date etc., these matters will be pointed out for 
they bear on the needed uniformity of the appUcation of GCC law within the Member 
States, lack of which could be a hindrance of the free movement of persons. 
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6A: Personal Scope 
The EA does not elaborate on the personal scope of free mobility of 
individuals provided for in its Article 8, which reads: 
Member States shall agree on executive principles to ensure that each Member 
State shall grant the citizens of all other Member States the same treatment as 
is granted to its own citizens without any discrimination or differentiation in the 
following fields: 
1. Freedom of movement, work and residence. 
2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest. 
3. Freedom to exercise economic activities. 
This Article is worded in rather general terms, using the word citizens, for 
example, as opposed to workers or liberal professionals. Additionally, an economic 
nexus does not seem to be regarded as a prerequisite for a GCC citizen to be entitled 
to exercise this right of movement, unlike, for example, in the EEC.^ ^^ The inclusion 
of the provision for the free exercise of economic activities in the same Article suggests 
that those two rights, i.e. freedom to move and freedom to exercise economic 
activities, are not interdependent. However, references to 'economic citizenship' as 
opposed to the plain 'Gulf citizenship' in some official documents, e.g. the 
Al-Manamah Declaration,can be taken as an indication of the desire for economic 
mobility, until the personal scope of the provided rights are clearly determined. Until 
then, 'citizen' is not a GCC concept and thus its definition in each Member State must 
be left to the respective national law. 
Notably, the personal scope of the Article cited above has a limited effect on 
the free movement of individuals in the GCC. This is because the economic sectors, 
industry, trade, agriculture, etc. in the Member States, whilst wholly or partially owned 
by GCC nationals and most likely managed by them, are still heavily dependent on 
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foreign labour. Consequently, it is apt to enquire whether such foreign labourers, e.g. 
truck drivers, are also beneficiaries of the right of movement as a necessary extension 
of GCC citizens wishing to exercise their rights to move and engage in economic 
activities. According to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Riyadh, freedom 
of movement has not been extended to include these labourers in most Member 
States.^ ^^  The problem, therefore, needs to be solved. One possible way would be 
through, first, the unification of the procedures of importation and recruitment of 
foreign labour in the Member States; and secondly, through the exchange of lists of 
names of those involved in cross-border economic activities. The establishment of a 
GCC office to monitor these processes would control their movement properly, and 
would be likely to advance improvements in the machinery. Alternatively, the States 
could agree terms on mutual recognition of work permits. Generally speaking, it is 
necessary to work out a practical system which allows GCC citizens who are compelled 
by need to import a foreign workforce to establish themselves and/or provide services 
within the GCC. 
6.B: Right of Entry 
6.B.I: Entry 
In the GCC, the right of entry is implicitly provided for in the EA; its Article 
8 stipulates that GCC nationals in any Member State are to be treated equally with 
its own inhabitants, including the exercising of freedom of movement, work and 
residence. Free mobility, work and residence can be exercised only if the right of entry 
is made available. 
The EA says nothing about the required document for crossing frontiers 
between Member States. It appears that this is left to the Members to work out. In 
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practice, as experienced by this researcher, the national passports are the only 
required documents. The pre-GCC visa requirements have been eliminated. Not only 
this, but the previous separate passport control counters at entrances to the Member 
States for their own citizens have been converted to GCC ones. Additionally, there 
have been uniform simplifications of border crossing formalities throughout the 
Member States. 
Mention should be made of the intention of the Member States to introduce 
a GCC passport with a uniform format as a means of facilitating free mobility of 
individuals within the GCC.^^^ The commencement of this venture is anticipated to 
occur in 1990, in progressive steps.^ ^^ However, no steps in this respect have been 
taken possibly due to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, and its 
consequences in terms of security. 
6.B.II: Residence 
The right of residence in the GCC is expressly guaranteed by Article 8 of the 
EA. Seemingly, this right is available to any GCC citizen regardless of the purpose of 
his/her movement. 
So far no specific measures governing the exercising of this right have been 
made. Of course, a GCC regulation detailing its personal and material scope would 
answer many questions in this regard. Up to now, it is not clear whether residence in 
a Member State by a national of another Member State is conditional upon the 
issuance of a special residence permit. Reportedly, citizens of the GCC are exempted 
from those residence permits required of foreign workers. ^ '^ ^^  Moreover, since the 
wording of Article 8 of the E A is general, i.e. 'citizens', it would seem that every GCC 
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citizen is eligible, making the need for such a permit unlikely. Statistical and other 
reasons for its requirement can be satisfied by other means, such as registration at the 
check-in points. 
6.C: Equality of Treatment 
Article 8 of the E A expressly calls on Member States to ensure that their 
citizens are treated equally in any fellow Member State. By implication, it prohibits 
discrimination based on nationality in recognition of the fact that equal treatment of 
nationals in a community is necessary to clear the way for their cross-border 
movement. 
In all States, except Saudi Arabia, nationality laws, in one way or another, 
distinguish between classes of nationals, but such distinction is solely concerned with 
political rights, e.g. voting or running for elected public posts, and for a specified 
period of time. Rights arising under GCC law are, as will be seen, of economic and 
social character. Consequently, the distinction, should it continue, has no effect on 
the treatment of GCC nationals in these States since their citizens of any class have 
the same non-political rights. 
At any rate, the concept of equal treatment in the GCC is a growing one. It 
is not as developed as in some other regional organisations, such as the EEC. In 
principle, its attainment by a number of organisations including the GCC indicates its 
importance for the integration of the community concerned. Unequal treatment of 
nationals in a community could hinder the free movement of individuals and hence 
the attaiimient of the integration sought. 
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In implementing the principle of equality amongst its citizens, the GCC has 
decreed a number of measures in the areas of real estate ownership, possession of 
company shares, education, health, investment and taxation. 
6.C.I: Home ownership 
One measure taken by the GCC for the realisation of the free movement of 
persons and the attainment of equal rights of ownership is the GCC Regulations on 
Real Estate Ownership. This set of regulations was approved by the Supreme Council 
in its f i f t h Summit in 1984.^ ^^^ Recognising the importance of the availability of 
housing for migrants, the said Regulations in Article 1 provide natural citizens of a 
Member State permission to own real estate. However this right is restricted to one 
piece of property, whether land or building, provided that its area is no more than 
3,000m . Legal persons, according to Article 7 of these Regulations, are granted rental 
privileges only. Additionally, real estate in Makkah and Madina, according to Article 
8, are beyond the reach of these regulations. 
Notably, whilst Article 8 of the E A creates a right of ownership for citizens 
of the GCC States equal to those of the Member State's own nationals, the 
Regulations nonetheless contain only a tiny privilege for the GCC nationals inasmuch 
as most of its 12 articles, while establishing a new right, in essence constitute 
restrictions on such ownership. These restrictions include specifications of the citizens 
who may own real estate, allowing the possession of only one piece not exceeding 
3,000m , and restricting the transfer of title, according to Article 4, before the eighth 
year of possession unless exempted. 
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Mention should be made however of the fact that pursuant to Article 5 of the 
Regulations, where the ownership is obtained through inheritance, the inheriting 
owner is treated on an equal footing to citizens of the Member State where the estate 
is located. Article 12 of the Regulations expHcitly indicates that these Regulations in 
their current form were experimental; they were to be evaluated by the Ministerial 
Council in March 1990. As such, deficiencies in them are expected to be tackled so as 
to suit the current co-operative stage of the GCC. In the meantime. Member States 
of the GCC have made the following arrangements for implementing this decision of 
the Supreme Council: 
• U A E : Nowhere in the Official Gazette does any measure appear on this matter. 
• Bahrain: Decree on Law No. 6 of 1985.(12) This law incorporated the exact terms 
of the Regulations on the right of real estate ownership. 
• Saudi Arabia: Royal Decree No. M/55 of 1985,(13) which ratified the Regulations 
in their entirety. 
• Oman: Royal Decree No. 70 of 1987.(1'^ ) It instructs the Housing Minister to 
execute the Regulations endorsed by the Supreme Council. The Regulations are 
not annexed to this Decree. However, since no exceptions or reservations are 
made, the presumption is that the right of housing ownership as determined by 
the aforesaid Regulations is applicable in Oman in accord with the exact terms of 
the regulations. 
• Qatar: Law No. 2 of 1987.(15) As of 5 November 1991, the regulations will be 
applied in Qatar in their entirety. I t is worth mentioning that Qatar was exempted 
f rom the provision of Article 6 of the Regulations by a decision of the Supreme 
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Council in its seventh Session, (i^) The said Article provides that: "In case the 
citizen who wishes to own in accordance with these Regulations has acquired his 
nationality of a Member State through naturalisation, it is required that at least 10 
years in total elapse from the date of his naturalisation." According to the said 
decision this exemption was valid only until February 5, 1991. As such, in Qatar 
naturalised persons of the GCC Member States may acquire real estate after the 
mentioned date provided that 10 years or more have elapsed since their 
naturalisation. 
But Article 6 of the aforementioned law incorporating the Regulations, unlike in 
the other States where it is effective as from the date of issuance and publication 
in the Official Gazette, will be effective only from 5 November 1991, 9 months in 
excess i f the exemption given to Qatar by the supreme council. The said Qatari 
law Article 6 reads: 
In case that a person wishing to own property according to this law is a 
naturalised national of a GCC Member State, and was not born in one of the 
States, such ownership is allowed as of 5 November 1991 provided that ten years 
have elapsed since the date of his naturalisation. 
• Kuwait: The General Secretariat of the GCC received a letter from the Ministry 
of Justice and Legal Affairs in 1985 indicating that the concerned entity, i.e. the 
Bureau of Land Registration and Notarisation, has been directed to execute the 
Regulation on Real Estate Ownership.C^"^) 
Bearing in mind that exemptions like in the case of Qatar, or reservations would 
be voiced, the assumption is that, the right of real estate ownership and the 
Regulations thereof are effective in Kuwait too. 
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Notably, no evaluation of the Regulations was made in March 1990 as stipulated, 
or thereafter. 
6.C . I I : Acquisition of Company Shares 
In the furtherance of GCC citizenship and affirming the principle of equality 
among nationals of Member States, the Supreme Council in its ninth Summit in 1988 
took a decision entithng citizens of the States to own and transfer the title of company 
shares established in the Member States in accordance with specified Rules -
translated and produced in volume 2 - attached to this decision. ^ "'^ ^^  
These Rules, which came into force in March 1989, determine the personal 
and material scope of the concept of the right to own and dispose of company shares. 
According to the said Rules, holders of this right are both natural and legal citizens 
of GCC Member States. On the other hand, the material scope of the concept as seen 
in the Rules is rather narrow. 
Limi ta t ions of the concept are found in Articles 2 and 4 of the 
aforementioned Rules. The former reads to the effect that this right may be exercised 
in relation to the shares of only two kinds of companies. Companies which were 
estabhshed in national laws before the Rules do not fall within its provisions unless 
they are joint national stock companies as defined by Article 1(2) of the Rules. The 
Rules require the creation of new stock companies, according to Article 1(1) in which 
GCC national other than of the State of registration may hold shares but only if the 
companies are carrying on the economic activities set out in the EA, Article 2 of the 
Rules. A further restriction follows from Article 4 which allows in some cases a State 
to provide that its citizens must hold up to 5 1 % shares. The result is that wholly 
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nationally owned companies established before the decision and companies which 
carry on activities outside the E A are beyond the scope of the Rules. A l l other 
companies fall within them. 
In summary, shares of the two kinds of companies may be owned by GCC 
citizens: 
1. Joint stock company which holds the nationality of a Member State and 
whose shares are owned by nationals of more than one Member State. This 
includes companies established before and after the GCC decision. 
2. New stock company which meets these requirements: a) the nationality of 
a Member State; b) being established after the GCC decision; c) its capital 
is divided into equal shares; and d) engagement in an economic activity 
decreed by the GCC to be exercisable by GCC nationals. 
Ment ion should be made here of the content of Art ic le 8 of the 
above-mentioned Rules: i t stipulates review of the Rules in March 1992, i.e. three 
c 
years from its effective date in March 1989. This provision makes those seemingly 
restricting requirements understandable as a first step. 
The extent of the six national laws executing the decision of the Supreme 
Council on the ownership and transference of titles of shares is of some interest, apart 
from being an indicator of the willingness of Member States to effect the GCC 
decisions. Hereunder are those enactments: 
• U A E : Federal Law No. 8 of 1984 on Commercial Companies in Article 22 allows 
non-UAE nationals to own and transfer the title of shares of stock companies, 
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whether estabhshed under this Law or before it was passed, provided that 51 
percent or more of the capital of the concerned company is owned by U A E 
nationals.(i9) The requirement of 51 percent is permitted under GCC Rules 
mentioned above. Therefore the Ministry of Trade and Economy of the U A E 
communicated to the GCC Secretariat General that what has been decreed by the 
Supreme Council is already the law in the UAE, i.e. under the aforementioned 
Federal Law, hence, the letter goes, GCC nationals have the right to own and 
negotiate shares of stock companies established before and after that law.(20) 
• Bahrain: Ministerial Decree No. 4 of 1989 by the Minister of Trade and 
Agriculture which incorporated the exact terms of the Rules of the GCC. 
Moreover, Law No. 17 of 1986 amending some provisions of the Company Law of 
1975 confers upon GCC nationals a right to own up to 25 percent of stock 
companies owned wholly by Bahrainis. Hence in Bahrain, GCC citizens may own 
shares in three kinds of company: 
1. Joint stock companies whose shares are owned by the citizens of more than 
Member States. 
2. New stock companies established after the GCC Rules were sanctioned, 
provided that they operate in an economic activity exercisable by GCC 
nationals by a GCC decision as wil l be discussed. 
3. Stock companies even i f undertaking economic activities not yet listed as 
available for GCC nationals, but in this latter case, as pointed out earlier, 
GCC citizens may only own 25 percent of the shares.(2i) 
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• Saudi Arabia: Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 102 of 1989 and Royal 
approval No. 5/16179/B of 1989 incorporating the Supreme Council's decision and 
the Rules annexed to it.(22) 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 62 of 1989 by the Minister of Trade and Industry 
implementing the above mentioned decision and attached Rules.(^) 
• Qatar: Law No. 12 of 1989 incorporating the exact terms of the GCC decision and 
Rules on the possession and disposal of the shares of stock companies.(24) 
• Kuwait: In this Member State, the right had already been established when the 
GCC decision was taken. About six months before the ninth Summit of the GCC, 
Law No. 33 of 1988 confirmed that nationals of the GCC States had the right to 
own shares of the Kuwaiti stock companies established before and after this 
law.(25) The Ministerial Decree No. 52 of 1988 concerning regulations of the 
ownership of shares by citizens of the GCC Member States of Kuwaiti shares, 
unlike the GCC Rules, defines stock companies as all those listed in the Kuwaiti 
Capital Market without reference to whether or not a company is engaging 
economic activities open for citizens of the GCC. Article 2 of the said Decree 
however provides that shares of banks and insurance companies are the 
exceptions.(26) But, anyway, these two activities, as wil l be discovered, are not yet 
available for GCC citizens in other States. 
In summary, taking into account the fact that the GCC is in the early stages, 
taking such a step to enable citizens of the GCC Member States to negotiate shares 
in stock companies, though limited, is in principle a sizable accomplishment. From 
the above presentation of the national laws on the subject, it appears that what the 
GCC Rules provide for is the minimum measure inasmuch as several States extended 
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the scope of this right of ownership beyond that enshrined in the Supreme Council 
decision. Bearing in mind this fact, one is inclined to expect further liberalisation of 
the terms of the GCC Rules when they are reviewed in March 1992. Indeed the express 
provision of such a review may imply that the framers initially intended the Rules in 
the current form to be experimental. 
6.C.III: Loans for Investment 
A t its seventh Summit in 1986, the Supreme Council decided to open the 
door for investors who are citizens of a GCC Member State to obtain loans from banks 
and industrial development funds in other Member States on an equal footing with 
investors of the host State.^ ^^^ This principle of equalisation is governed by the 
Regulation annexed to the said decision. Obviously this step, as determined by the 
said Regulation, which became effective as of March 1987, is a major achievement for 
the GCC on the road to economic integration. Reportedly, this decision made its way 
to implementation. Because Bahrain and Qatar currently have neither lending banks 
nor industrial development funds, implementing measures on this matter was 
probably considered superfluous, hence no enactment was made. On the other hand, 
the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait informed the GCC Secretariat General 
that they have instructed the concerned entities to put this decision of the Supreme 
Council into effect.^^^^ 
6.C.rV: Education 
Another step in the application of the principle of free movement of persons 
was taken by the Supreme Council at its sixth Summit in 1985, in accordance with 
Article 16 of the E A which provides that: 
Member States shall formulate policies and implement co-ordinated 
programmes fo r technical, vocational and professional training and 
Free Movement of Individuals Within the GCC 
— 245 
qualifications at all levels and stages. They shall also develop educational 
curricula at all levels to link education and technology with the development 
needs of Member States. 
In the execution of this Article, the Supreme Council in its above mentioned 
Summit decreed: 
1) The treatment of students in elementary, intermediate and high schools 
of any Member State in the same manner as the students in the same level 
of the host State; 
2) Mutual recognition of diplomas and educational qualifications. 
Interestingly, the substance of this decision by the GCC had already been 
applied in half of the States by the time it was made: 
• The UAE, Oman and Kuwait informed the Secretariat General that equal 
treatment of students in elementary, secondary and high schools as well as the 
recognition of diplomas and other qualifications had been in effect prior to its 
sanctioning by the GCC.(^) 
• Saudi Arabia issued the Ministerial decree No. 35/4/26/368/1 of 1986 by the 
Minister of Education implementing both parts of the said decision.(3i) 
• Bahrain passed the Ministerial decree No. 23/6/1989 of 1989 by the Minister of 
Education providing for equal treatment between Bahraini students and their 
counterparts f rom other GCC States.(32) I t says, however, nothing about 
recognition of diplomas and other educational qualifications. 
• Qatar passed Law No. 9 of 1989 incorporating the provisions of this decision on 
equalisation of students and recognition of educational qualifications.03) 
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This measure showed that progress towards the free movement of persons 
was being achieved in several socio-economic sectors. No doubt, equalisation and 
recognition of diplomas, certificates and other educational documents concerning the 
primary, intermediate and high schooling eases the way for parent citizens willing to 
exercise their right of free movement. In the case of the GCC, hence, a potential 
hindrance of freedom of movement, (i.e. the fear by parents of exercising this right at 
the expense of their children's educational future) has been eliminated. 
This is not the sum total of the GCC's educational co-operative efforts. In 
this field, as a means of giving substance to the principle of free movement of persons 
for the purposes of creating a genuine Gulf common market, the Supreme Council in 
its eighth Summit in 1987 decreed the equalisation of GCC students in the Member 
States' higher educational establishments.*-^^ Such equahsation includes, besides 
academic aspects, such requirements as fees, housing, allowances, etc. 
Like their positive reaction with regard to equal treatment of students in 
public schools, the Member States took the necessary measures to implement equal 
treatment of GCC students in higher educational institutions. 
• Whi le Saudi Arabia has treated GCC students in higher educational 
establishments equally with its nationals, even prior to the adoption of this 
decision, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait communicated to the GCC 
Secretariat General that they have directed the concerned entities to execute this 
GCC measure.(35) 
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• Oman issued the administrative decree No. 168 of 1988 by the Chancellor of the 
Sultan Qabus University implementing the exact terms of the decision into the 
rules of that university. (^ 6) 
6.C.V: Health 
The free movement of individuals has been further facilitated by the GCC in 
the field of health services. With due regard to the role of health care in the execution 
of the principle of freedom of movement and the further implementafion of Article 
8 of the EA, the Supreme Council decided that citizens of the GCC Member States, 
whether residents or visitors of any Member, are to be treated on equal footing with 
the nationals of the host Member State in the use of medical centres, clinics and 
general hospitals.^^^^ This decision of the Supreme Council was implemented into the 
national legal systems through the following measures: 
• U A E : Ministerial Decree No. 572 of 1989 by the Minister of Health.(38) 
• Bahrain: Decree No. 4 of 1989 by the Minister of Health.(39) 
• Saudi Arabia: Ministerial Decree No. 1/16 of 1989 by the Health Minister. W 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 2 of 1989 by the Health Minister, (^i) 
• Qatar: Law No. 8 of 1989.(42) 
• Kuwait: Ministerial Decree No. 114 of 1989 by the Minister of Health.C'*^) It should 
be pointed out that this decree expressly states that this right does not include 
providing "the special rooms" which may be provided for Kuwaitis. 
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I t is worth mentioning that this right to use medical estabHshments means 
States owned ones. When this right is to be exercised, proof of a Member State 
citizenship is to be given, e.g. passport, identity card or other official documents. 
6.C.VI: Taxation. 
In this context, mention must be made of the decision of the Supreme Council 
at its ninth Summit in 1988, which enhanced the realisation of the principle of free 
movement of persons. This decision entitles the citizens of the GCC Member States 
within the territory of any Member to the same tax advantages as nationals of the host 
State as of March 1989.^ '*^^  Thus, whilst States are free to decide the rate of taxation, 
they restrict their liberty to apply rates which discriminate between nationals of their 
own and of their own fellow Members. EquaUty between nationals of the GCC States 
in terms of taxation seemingly covers natural as well as legal persons. This may be 
detected f rom the implementing national measures. For example, the Saudi 
implementing decree No. 3/719 of 1985 refers to both national and legal persons.^ "*^ ^ 
This may well be the understanding of the equal taxation measure. Hereunder is listed 
the said national legislation: 
• U A E : Decree of the Ministerial Council No. 106/5 of 1989.('^) 
• Bahrain: Decree by the Minister of Finance and National Economy of 1989.('*'') 
• Saudi Arabia: (1) Before this GCC Supreme Council decision, the Royal Decree 
No. 5/506/M of 1985 had already been issued providing for the treatment of all 
GCC nationals in the same manner as the citizens of the Kingdom, thus submitting 
all to the Islamic principle of Zakat i'^) instead of the income tax formula now 
applicable to non-GCC natural and legal persons; (2) Ministerial Decree No. 
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3/719 of 1985 by the Minister of Finance and National Economy; (3) approval of 
the Council of Ministers No. 151 of 1989 on granting citizens of the GCC Member 
States the same tax advantage as the citizens of the Kingdom.C'*^) 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 18 of 1989 by the Deputy Prime Minister for 
Financial and Economic Affairs.C^^) 
• Qatar: Law No. 9 of 1989.(51) 
• Kuwait: Ministerial Decree No. 3 of 1989.(52) 
I t must be pointed out that all national incorporating measures provide that 
equal taxation treatment is conditional upon engaging in an economic activity, or a 
liberal profession which GCC citizens are allowed to pursue in Member States by a 
decision of the Supreme Council, as will be discovered. 
6.D: The Right to Practise Liberal Professions 
Since the Supreme Council resolution to begin the implementation of the 
provisions of the E A as of March 1 1983, several liberal professions were made 
available for professionals who are nationals of the GCC Member States, e.g. 
medicine, law, accountancy, engineering, consultancy, pharmacy, translation, land 
surveying, soil inspection, and programming, analysing and operating computers.^ '^^ ^ 
Involvement in these activities by professionals has been facilitated partially by the 
Supreme Council decision in 1985 to grant mutual recognition to diplomas and 
academic documents issued by official educafional establishments in Member States 
as mentioned earlier. 
Before the list of these permitted professions was further enlarged, the rules 
governing the practice of these professions were endorsed by the Supreme Council 
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in its eighth Summit in 1987 and were adopted by the Member States. These rules, 
entitled Regulations for Practising Liberal Professions by Nationals of the GCC Member 
States Therein are truly liberal. They do not seem to constitute restrictive or 
limiting measures. Generally speaking, once a profession is regionalised, these rules 
come to play the role of determining who is eligible and how he is to be treated. 
According to Article 1(4) of the Regulations, 
Nationals of the GCC States are the natural persons who are holders of the 
nationaHty of any Member State or the legal persons, provided that they are in 
professional joint liability companies, owned wholly by nationals of the GCC 
Member States. 
The treatment provided for by the Regulations is of an equalising nature, i.e. 
between nationals of the host State and those of other fellow Members in terms of 
requirements, conditions of employment and the working environment. Pursuant to 
Article 7 of these Regulations, they are solely concerned with liberal professions 
which have not been accorded special rules. Article 8 provides that these Regulations 
do not prejudice preferential privileges currently granted or those which might be 
granted in the future to the citizens of the GCC Member States. 
The said Regulations were implemented in the national legal systems by the 
following instruments: 
• U A E : Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 306/2 of 1988.(^ 5) 
• Bahrain: Decree on Law No. 9 of 1988,(5 )^ Article 5, providing for the treatment 
of liberal professionals in Bahrain in accordance with the terms of the said 
Regulations. 
• Saudi Arabia: Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 200 of 1988.(57) 
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• Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 48 of 1988,(^ 8) implementing the exact terms of the 
Regulations. 
• Qatar: Law No. 7 of 1988/^^) incorporating the Regulations as sanctioned by the 
Supreme Council. 
• Kuwait: Article 2 of the Ministerial Decree No, 7 of 1988 by the Minister of Trade 
and Industry on the regulations of practising liberal professions by citizens of the 
GCC Member States.(60) 
Turning to the listed professions, firstly the reference to professions already 
regionalised which was made in the preamble of the Regulations mentioned above 
referred to the professions of medicine, law, accountancy, engineering and pharmacy. 
As pointed out, in its third Summit in 1982, the Supreme Council decided to 
open the door for doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers and administrative, 
economic, technical, agricultural, fisheries and industrial consultants to practice their 
respective professions in any Member State in accordance, of course, with the above 
mentioned Regulations. That decision of the Supreme Council was implemented in 
national legal systems in the following Laws: 
• UAE: Article 2 of the Federal Law No. 2 of 1984.(61) The Ministerial Decree No. 
24 of 1985 details in Articles 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 conditions for engaging in the 
professions of medicine, law, accountancy, engineering, including engineering 
consultancy offices, and administrative, economic, technical, agricultural, fisheries 
and industrial consultation.(62) It is worth mentioning that such conditions are 
contemplated under Article 3 of the Regulations. 
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• Bahrain: Amiri Decree No. 3 of 1983 provides in Article 2 that citizens of the GCC 
Member States are to be treated in the same manner as their counterpart nationals 
of Bahrain in the professions of medicine, law (including legal consultancy), 
accountancy (including legal accountancy), engineers (including engineering 
consultancy)/^^) 
• Saudi Arabia: The Royal Approval by Telegram No. 4585 of 1983 containing 
general permission for citizens of the GCC States to engage in economic activities 
in the Kingdom.(^) Presumably, lawyers, doctors, engineers and accountants are 
covered by the general terms of this Royal Approval. 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 13 of 1983 by the Minister of Trade and Industry 
providing in Article 2 that nationals of the GCC Member States may practice the 
following professions: medicine, law, accountancy, engineering (including 
engineering consultancy), and administrative, economic, technical, agricultural, 
fisheries and industrial consultancy.C^ )^ 
• Qatar: Law No. 6 of 1983 provides in Article 2 that citizens of the GCC Member 
States are allowed to practice medicine, law, accountancy, engineering (including 
engineering consultancy), and administrative, economic, technical, agricultural, 
fisheries and industrial consultancy.(^) 
• Kuwait: Ministerial Decree No. 51 of 1982 allows nationals of the GCC States to 
engage in the following regionalised professions: Medicine, law, accountancy, 
engineering (including engineering consultancy), and administrative, economic, 
technical, agricultural, fisheries and industrial consultancy.(67) 
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One other liberal profession was listed along with those regionalised ones by 
the Supreme Council at its fourth Summit in 1983. It was decided, inter alia, to enable 
pharmacists who are nationals of Member States, to practice their profession in any 
Member State provided that they hold educational qualifications enabling them to 
pursue the profession of pharmacy; the effective date of this decision was 1 March 
1984 (68) execution of the above GCC decision, the Member States produced the 
following implementing steps: 
• UAE: Decree by the Council of Ministers No. 264/2 of 1984 on the approval of 
Decisions of the Supreme Council in its fourth session, including allowing GCC 
pharmacists to practice in the UAE has been reported to the Secretariat 
General.(69) 
• Bahrain: Decree on Law No. 4 of 1984 Article iX^^) Reportedly, unUke 
professionals of non-GCC States, those of a GCC origin are exempted from the 
requirement of holding non-Bahrain permits; instead, they are granted 
identifications granted to their counterpart Bahraini citizens.(^i) 
• Saudi Arabia: Royal Order by Telegram No. 5/2023 of 1983 on inter alia allowing 
quaUfied pharmacists who are citizens of GCC Member States to practice 
pharmacy in the Kingdom.C^^) 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree, by the Minister of Trade and Industry, No. 25 of 1984 
in Article 2 which equalises the practitioners of pharmacy who are citizens of the 
GCC Member States with those of Oman.(73) 
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• Qatar: Law No. 1 of 1984 states in Article 4 that citizens of Member States of the 
GCC with educational qualifications enabling them to practice pharmacy may do 
so in the State of Qatar, on an equal footing with their Qatari counterparts. (^ 4) 
• Kuwait: Ministerial Decree No. 43 of 1983 by the Minister of Trade and Industry 
allowing pharmacists who are citizens of Member States of the GCC to practice 
this profession in the State of Kuwait.C^ )^ 
Mention should be made of the fact that all above national implements 
require that drugs be imported through national approved agents. In addition, some 
stipulate that the pharmacists are permanent residents and themselves engaging in 
the profession. Once each stipulation is made, it finds legal basis in a Supreme Council 
decision in its fourth Summit.^ ^^ -^  
An addition to the list of liberal professions which may be practised by any 
citizen of the GCC Member States on an equal footing with nationals of the host State 
was made by the Supreme Council at its eighth Summit in 1987; it decreed that in 
accordance with the GCC Regulations on Practising of Liberal Professions, 
translators, land surveyors, soil inspectors, and programmers, analysts and operators 
of computers could practice their respective professions in any other Member 
State.(^^) 
Subsequently the professions of translation, land surveying, soil inspecting, 
and programming, analysing and operating computers were received by the States as 
professions available to qualified professionals who are nationals of any GCC 
Member State in the same manner as nationals of the host State by virtue of the 
following: 
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• UAE: Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 306/2 of 1988.(^ 8) 
• Bahrain: Law No. 9 of 1988 in its Article 4.(79) 
• Saudi Arabia: Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 57 of 1988.(80) 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 49 of 1988 by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry.(8i) 
• Qatar: Law No. 10 of 1988.(82) 
• Kuwait: Decree by the Minister of Trade and Industry No. 7 of 1988 in its Article 1.(83) 
As pointed out earlier, by the time these professions were sanctioned by the 
GCC and incorporated by Member States, the Regulations on practising liberal 
professions had been endorsed by the Supreme Council. The above national 
measures, therefore, were clear in giving effect to the GCC decision on these 
professions, hence referring to the Regulations to determine the personal and 
material scope. Reportedly, at this stage, the Supreme Council delegated to the 
Ministerial Council the power to enlist further liberal professions based on 
recommendations to be made by the Committee of Financial and Economic 
Co-operation.^ ^"^^ 
Of related importance is recalling the Supreme Council's decision at its 
fourth Summit: according to that decision, professionals are allowed to practice the 
said professions provided that, as well as being qualified and personally engaged, they 
are permanently resident in the State where they practice their profession.^ ^^^ 
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It is worth mentioning, unfortunately, that there are no statistics on the 
movement of professionals within the GCC to show how much those rights have been 
exercised. 
6.E: The Right to Engage in Economic Activities 
Freedom to exercise economic activity has been made a GCC principle 
embodied in Article 8 of the EA. As soon as the GCC programmes for the 
implementation of the EA began on 1 March 1983, realisation of this right was one 
of the major priorities on the GCC agenda. Concurrently with the decision to begin 
the execution of the EA, a number of economic activities were made available to 
nationals of the GCC States therein. Before venturing into enumeration and 
examination of these permitted activities and their reception into the national legal 
systems, it seems appropriate to make note of the Regulations - translated and 
produced in volume 2 of this work - governing the undertaking of such activities. They 
are of both personal and material scope; their personal scope includes, besides natural 
citizens of the Member States, legal persons which are wholly owned by nationals of 
the GCC Member States. Their material scope affords equalisation between nationals 
of GCC Member States and those of the host State in their engagement in the allowed 
economic activities. 
These Regulations were to come into effect in March 1988. The national 
enactments implementing the regulations into the legal systems of the Member States 
are: 
• UAE: Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 306/2 of 1988.(86) 
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• Bahrain: Law No. 9 of 1988,(87) in Article 3, the exact terms of the Regulations 
are incorporated. It has been effective from 1 June 1988. 
• Saudi Arabia: Decree of the Council of Ministers No 199 of 1988,(88) incorporating 
the regulations as annex to the said Decree. 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 29 of 1988,(89) by Deputy Prime Minister for 
Monetary and Economic Affairs implementing the verbal terms of the 
Regulations which became effective as of 1 April 1988. 
• Qatar: Law No. 6 of 1988, (90) according to which the Regulations became effective 
on 1 April 1988. 
• Kuwait: Decree No. 8 of 1988 in Article 2 by the Minister of Trade and Industry. (91) 
The effective date was 1 June 1988. 
Now that the contents of the GCC Regulations governing the engagement in 
economic activities in Member States have been summarised, we can move on to 
examine the steps taken by the GCC to put the said principle into practice. This entails 
identification of the allowed economic activities as well as the national measures taken 
to guarantee availabihty in the municipal sphere. 
To begin with, concurrent with the Supreme Council decision to start 
implementing the EA, it decreed that natural as well as legal persons who are nationals 
of the Member States are allowed to engage in industrial activities, agriculture, animal 
husbandry, fishing and construction in any Member State. It permitted, however, that 
States could continue for five years (1 March 1983 to 1 March 1988) to make it a 
condition that 25% of such economic projects should be owned by their citizens. 
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Rights to engage in these activities were incorporated into municipal law by 
virtue of the following measures: 
• UAE: Federal Law No. 2 of 1984 in Article 1.(92) 
• Bahrain: Amiri Decree No. 3 of 1983 in Article 1.(93) 
• Saudi Arabia: Royal Approval Telegram No. 4585 of 1983.(94) 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 6 of 1983 in Article 1.(95) Ministerial Decree No. 
13 of 1983 in Article 1,(96) by the Minister of Trade and Industry. The former law 
emphasised that the right of GCC nationals to engage in the fishing industry in 
Oman does not include the actual catching activity. 
• Qatar: Law No. 6 of 1983 in Article 3.(97) 
• Kuwait: Ministerial Decree No. 52 of 1982, by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry.(98) 
Notably, whilst the laws of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia 
provide that participation of up to 25% may be required for a period of five years, that 
of Kuwait, although requiring the same, does not specify a period of time. Reportedly, 
however, the five year period which ended in March 1988 was observed by all States 
and thus the concerned national entities were instructed not to require such 
participation.^^^ As such, it can be said that industrial activities, agriculture, animal 
husbandry, fishing and construction are available in any Member State to any citizen 
of the Members, provided that they are undertaken in accordance with the above 
mentioned Regulations. 
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More economic activities were added to the list by the Supreme Council in 
its fourth Summit in 1983. It decreed inter alia, that nationals of the GCC Member 
States have the right to estabUsh hotels and restaurants as well as the right to work in 
them. Additionally, they have the right to engage in maintenance activities relevant 
to the economic activities in which they are allowed to operate, i.e. industrial, 
agricultural, animal and fish fields, contracting, establishment of hotels and 
restaurants.*-^ ^^ The decision similarly permits Member States to require the 
participation of nationals in no more than 25% of the plant built for the purpose of 
hotel or restaurant operation, and maintenance, for a period of five years (1 March 
1984 - 1 March 1989) after which activities in these areas would be unrestricted. The 
five year period, it should be stressed, ended in March 1989. 
A question which might arise is whether this later decision, especially the 
specification of five years, has been observed by the Member States. This is best 
answered through reference to the national enactments implementing that decision: 
• UAE: Decree by the Council of Ministers No. 264/2 of 1984. (lOi) The Decree of 
the Council of Ministers No. 195/2 of 1989 dropped the conditional participation 
of UAE nafionals in economic projects estabhshed by other GCC nationals in the 
areas of hotels, restaurants and maintenance.(i02) 
• Bahrain: Law No. 4 of 1984; according to Article 1 of this law, establishment of 
hotels and restaurants and the engagement in maintenance work in the permitted 
fields of economic activity are unrestricted as of 1 March 1989.(^ 03) 
• Saudi Arabia: Royal Order by Telegram No. 5/2023 of 1983; pursuant to the 
regulations and rules attached to this Order, exercising the economic activities of 
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hotels, restaurants and maintenance in the allowed fields are unrestricted as from 
1 March 1989.(104) 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree, by the Minister of Trade and Industry, No. 25 of 1984: 
this makes the exercise of the above mentioned activities unconditional as of 1 
March 1989.(105) 
• Qatar: Law No. 1 of 1984, Article 3 provides that the requirement for the 
participation of no more than 25% Qataris is valid only until 1 March 1989.(106) 
• Kuwait: Ministerial Decree No. 45 of 1983 by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry:(i07) although this decree reads to the effect that the participation of up 
to 25% Kuwaitis may continually be required, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Trade and 
Industry notified the GCC that the concerned entities have been instructed to 
allow GCC nationals to own wholly the establishments built for the purpose of 
pursuing the specified economic activities, e.g. hotels, restaurants and 
maintenance works in the allowed economic areas, as of 1 March 1989.(108) 
Further growth in the number of permitted economic activities was promoted 
by the Supreme Council at its seventh Summit in 1986, when it decreed that citizens 
of the GCC Member States may engage in the practice of retail and wholesale trade 
in any Member State according to annexed Regulations.^^^^ Although that decision 
indicates equalisation of nationals of GCC States with nationals of host GCC States, 
the attached Regulations indicate that complete equality is still a future step. Close 
examination suggests that the Regulations were drawn up in such a way as would 
mitigate the negative impact of the effect of free mobility of individuals on a 
community with some Members less economically advanced than others. In their 
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current form, the Regulations render the right to engage in retail and wholesale trade 
of limited material scope. Hereunder is an exposition of their provisions. 
The Regulations define retail trade as: 
the practice of selling and buying of any good or goods directly to the consumers 
without a middleman on a continuing basis and from licensed premises. 
The Hmitations these regulations place on nationals of the GCC Member 
States in undertaking such commerce may be summarised as follows: 
A: On GCC natural persons: 
1. He himself has to be engaged in this activity; 
2. He must be a resident of the Member State where his retail trade 
takes place; 
3. He may not engage in more than one activity; 
4. He may not have more than one place of business; 
5. His activity is restricted to retail trade made directly to the 
consumers from his licensed place; 
6. He has no rights of importation and commercial agencies. 
B: On legal persons: 
1. The host state may require participation of its nationals of up to 50% 
of its value; 
2. Its activity must be restricted to one licensed shop in direct contact 
with the consumers; 
3. It has no rights of exportation and commercial agencies. 
According to paragraph 1(2) of the Regulations, however, these seemingly 
restrictive requirements may not prejudice any preferential privilege granted to 
citizens of the GCC by a Member State or decreed by the Supreme Council. 
Wholesale trade has been defined by the same Regulations as: 
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the practice of selling, buying, importing and exporting of any good or goods, 
the practice of which is made on a continuing basis and from licensed premises. 
The limitations imposed upon wholesale traders who are nationals of a 
Member State in a GCC Member State are, more or less, the same as those stated 
above relating to retail trade, with one exception: this is that GCC wholesale traders 
have the right to export his goods on an equal basis as traders of the host state. Here, 
again, the limitations on GCC wholesale traders embodied in the Regulations 
according to paragraph 2(2) may not prejudice any preferential privilege granted by 
a Member State or decreed by the Supreme Council. 
Again, it should be restated that those Regulations which could have a 
negative effect have been kept to a minimum. Admittedly, the step by itself is an 
admirable one in affirming its Members' determination to realise the principle of free 
movement of persons and eventually to create a GCC common market. The above 
mentioned limitations on retail and wholesale traders are doomed to future 
elimination, taking into account their number and scope as well as the provisions of 
paragraph 1(2) and 2(2), stated earlier. In addition, one must bear in mind that the 
Regulations on retail and wholesale trade are due to be reviewed in 1992 and 1993 
respectively. 
In its present form, this GCC-created right as governed by the Regulations 
was implemented in the national legal systems in the following instruments: 
• UAE: Federal Law No. 2 of 1989 which requires that a GCC legal person wishing 
to engage in retail or wholesale trades acts in the form of a company of which at 
least 50% of its capital is owned by UAE nationals.(iiO) 
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• Bahrain: Law No. 6 of 1987 on retail commerce(m) requires that legal persons 
operate in the form of a company of which 50% at most is owned by Bahrainis. 
Otherwise, it incorporates the substance of the provisions of the said Regulations. 
The wholesale trade Regulations are incorporated by Law No. 19 of 1988.(112) 
• Saudi Arabia: Reportedly, Directive No. 231/303/1945, issued by the Deputy 
Minister of Commerce, Directive No. 221/741, issued by the Director General of 
Internal Commerce in the Ministry of Commerce and Directive 231/669 by the 
Deputy of the Minister of Commerce, all addressed the concerned entities to 
implement the decision of the Supreme Council about retail and wholesale 
trade.(li3) The former requires that companies engaging in trade are to be owned 
by Saudis up to 50%, 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 18 of 1987, (n^ )^ by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, requires that legal persons be established in the form of companies 
registered in Oman, of which at least 50% of its capital is owned by Omanis. 
Otherwise, it incorporates the terms of the GCC Regulations on retail and 
wholesale trade. 
• Qatar: Law No. 7 of 1987(115) in Article 2 stipulates that GCC legal persons 
comprise no more than 50% Qatari capital. The other provisions incorporated the 
exact content of the Regulations. 
• Kuwait: Ministerial Decree No. 2 of 1987 on retail trade, by the Minister of Trade 
and Industry, requires that legal persons be instituted in the form of companies. 
Furthermore it states that the Kuwait Ministry of Trade and Industry may require 
participation by Kuwaitis of no more than 50% of its capital.(ii6) Generally, this 
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Decree incorporates the provisions of the Regulations on retail aforementioned. 
Apparently, the provision on wholesale has not been incorporated. 
The arena of permitted economic activities was further expanded in 1987 
when the Supreme Council, at its eighth Sunmiit, decreed that citizens of Member 
States are allowed to engage in two areas of economic activity in any Member 
State.^ ^^ '^ ^ These are (1) inspection, which is defined as discovering the obvious 
defects with the naked eye or by utilising some mechanical means including testing, 
weighing, measuring etc., to ensure conformity of the good(s) with the terms of the 
contract; and (2) operation and maintenance, which is defined as assuming 
responsibility for a project or an entity for the operation and maintenance of 
mechanical and electrical machines and other equipment, including making spare 
parts, and having the necessary labourers available, bearing in mind the Regulations 
relating to undertaking such economic activities as mentioned earlier in this section. 
The decision was to be effective as of 1 June 1988. 
These two areas of permitted economic activity were implemented in the 
national legal systems in the following: 
• UAE: Decree by the Council of Ministers No. 306/2 of 1988.(118) 
• Bahrain: Law No. 9 of 1988,(ii9) in Article 1 incorporating the two economic 
activities as defined above. 
• Saudi Arabia: Decree by the Council of Ministers No. 57 of 1989.(1^0) 
• Oman: Ministerial Decree No. 28 of 1988 by the Deputy Prime Minister for 
Financial and Economic Affairs.(l2l) 
• Qatar: Law No. 9 of 1988.(122) 
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• Kuwait: Ministerial Decree by the Minister of Trade and Industry No. 8 of 1988 
in Article 1.(123) 
The stipulate effective date, i.e. 1 June 1988, was observed by Member States. 
At its eighth Summit, the Supreme Council delegated the power to decree 
more regionalised economic activities to the Ministerial Council based on the 
recommendations to be made by the Committee for Financial and Economic 
Co-operation.^ ^ "^*^ Based on this delegated power, the Ministerial Council, in 
November 1989, decreed the regionalisation of several economic areas, hence 
became available to any GCC national in any Member States. These include 
engagement in supply services, marketing, weighing and measurement and cleaning 
services.^ ^^ ^^  Bahrain has incorporated this Ministerial Council by Law 12 of 
(126) 1990. 
6.F: Possible Limitations of the Free Movement of Persons 
The view expressed in the previous chapter in relation to the possible 
limitations on the application of the principle of free mobility of goods also applies to 
the principle of freedom of movement of individuals.^ ^^^^ As such, the grounds such 
as public policy, public health and public security maybe invoked by the GCC Member 
States. In addition, temporary derogation would be legitimate when the criteria stated 
in Article 24 of the EA is met, the said Article provides in part: 
Any Member State may be temporarily exempted from applying such provisions 
of this Agreement as may be necessitated by temporary local situations in that 
State or specific circumstances faced by it. 
Consequently, the right to enter, reside, work, pursue liberal professions, 
engage in permitted economic activity may lawfully be denied during upheavals such 
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as a military coup d'etat or the threat of aggression or war, etc., matters which are 
usually the responsibility of sovereign States towards their societies. Generally 
speaking, once this principle is further realised and the GCC becomes of an integrated 
nature rather than merely a co-operative institution, elaborated justification for 
derogation would find its place on the agenda of the GCC. 
Summary 
In the light of the above, it is clear that the EA contemplates the application 
of right of entry, residence, work, ovmership, engagement in economic activity and 
pursuit of liberal professions, all of which have been gradually decreed by the Supreme 
Council and have been received by the Member States. 
In the area of cross-border mobility of individuals, it is suggested that the 'citizens' 
referred to in Article 8 of the EA are the nationals of the Member States in accordance 
with their own laws of nationality. That is to say that the term 'citizens' is not a GCC concept 
which may be taken as including, for instance, non-GCC labourers who are involved in 
intra-State economic activities for citizens of the GCC Member States. 
The right of entry is granted to any national of a GCC Member State. After 
the required visas are abolished, the document needed at this stage is a passport. The 
right of residence is also available to citizens of the GCC Member States in any fellow 
Member State. 
The concept of equality of treatment amongst citizens of the GCC is provided 
for in Article 8 of the EA and discussed above at some length. In the light of that 
discussion, it is manifest that numerous measures have been taken to realise this 
concept. Although the approach has been one of progressive steps, most areas needed 
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for the application of the principle of free movement of persons have been covered. 
They have been equalised in the fields of housing ownership, acquisition of company 
shares, loans for investment, education, health and taxation. 
Citizens of the GCC Member States are also allowed to practice a number 
of liberal professions. These include law, medicine, accountancy, engineering, 
consultancy, pharmacy, translation, land surveying, soil inspection and programming, 
analysing and operating computers. They are also permitted to engage in several types 
of economic activity. These include operating hotels and restaurants and working 
therein, industry, agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing, construction, retail and 
wholesale trade, inspection, operation and maintenance, supply services, weight and 
measurement and cleaning services. 
This chapter concludes with the identification of the possible ground for 
derogation of the rules laid down by the EA and implemented by the Supreme Council 
and the component GCC organs. Article 24 of the EA is suggested to count for a 
criteria with temporary limitations, e.g. internal upheavals, but other justifications, 
such as public policy, public health and public security, are also possible grounds for 
limitation on the principle of free movement of individuals.^^^^ 
This chapter has shown that the Member States have been largely faithful to 
their obligations arising under the GCC treaties in these areas. However, they do 
implement these obligations domestically each in their own way, in some exceptional 
cases making reservations to the GCC rules. In these circumstances it is important 
that national courts and officials who have to apply the national rules remember their 
international origins and the purposes of the GCC so that differences in the national 
laws will be as little as possible. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Relationship Between GCC Rules and Municipal 
Laws of the Member States 
Introduction 
The last two chapters have shown that the GCC has elements of its 
programme of economic co-operation which clearly resemble elements in the EC 
design. However, earlier, it was shown that the GCC was not of the same institutional 
structure as the EC and that it was not possible to regard the GCC as a supra-national 
institution. Nevertheless, the effective implementation of these similar policies is 
designed to protect the economic activities of individuals and companies against 
arbitrary interference, particularly discriminatory interference, by the Member States 
of the organisation. That objective is partially to be achieved under the EC system by 
the integration of the national legal orders with the Community legal order, allowing 
individuals to rely directly on Community rules before national courts. The object of 
unification and harmonisation of laws is a much higher priority for the EC than the 
GCC, a matter of increasing practical importance as the Single Act takes effect and 
EC law effectively supplants national legislation in many areas. Although direct 
reliance on the GCC standards in the national legal systems on the supra-national 
level by analogy with the EC is not (yet) an option for the GCC States, the importance 
of domestic implementation of the agreed international standards, if necessary by 
actions brought by individuals in national courts, is obvious. The GCC Constitution, 
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certain associated treaties and, arguably, certain decisions are international legal 
obligations of the GCC States. As is commonly the case, no specific means of giving 
effect to these obligations is set out in the GCC agreement but it is clearly the case 
that some device whereby individuals may rely on the content of the international 
rules in domestic proceedings will contribute to ensuring that a state does observe its 
international undertakings in this sphere. How this is to be done is primarily a matter 
for the constitutional laws of the Member States themselves, but the more effective 
those laws are, the better implemented will be the objectives of the GCC. It is 
necessary, therefore, to try to discover how the GCC States deal with the domestic 
implementation of their international obligations, at the same time emphasising the 
special qualities of the GCC regime which might point to a more receptive approach 
of States than that which they take towards their international obligations at large. 
Such an undertaking requires the identification of the nature of GCC law, 
whether it is international or supranational. It has already been established that the 
GCC is an international institution rather than a supranational one and this conclusion 
will be enforced by an examination of its legal rules later in this chapter. Accordingly, 
rather than using the EEC model for investigating the relationship between GCC law 
and the law of the Member States, the inquiry will be based on the theories of the 
interrelation between international and domestic law. A brief theoretical section on 
the doctrines of the relationship between external and national law prefacing this 
chapter seems in order. 
For an overall appropriate examination and evaluation of the relationship 
between external and domestic law of GCC Member States, the practice of the UK 
and US in this respect will be sketched in the theoretical section. As a whole, this 
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chapter finishes with a discussion on the domestic status of GCC treaty law, decisions 
and possible customs in terms of way of implementation and priority. 
7A: Theoretical background 
7A.I: Doctrines on the relationship between external and national law 
a. Monism 
There are many variants to the monistic school of thought. Generally 
speaking, it is based on the assumption that national and international law are both 
manifestations of a single concept of law, that they essentially have the same sources 
and that both directly govern the behaviour of individuals 
Regarding the primacy of one or the other, i.e. national or international law, 
monistic doctrine is divided. On the one hand, the opinion of a tiny minority maintains 
that municipal law is superior to international Seemingly, however, this view has 
been abandoned. Professor O'Connell even argued that: 
The theory that municipal law is in its nature superior to international law has 
never found favour in international tribunals and is no more than an abstract 
possibility. (3) 
The dominant view, on the other hand, holds the pre-eminence of 
international law where there is a conflict between them.^ "^ ^ 
b. Dualism 
The dualist doctrine maintains that international law and municipal law are 
two fundamentally distinct systems It is based on a number of assumptions. One 
is that the two systems regulate different subject matters, i.e. inter-state relations are 
governed by international law whereas the individuals' relations are governed by 
municipal law. Another basis of this theory is that the two derive from different 
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sources. According to Triepel, the source of municipal law is the will of the state itself, 
whereas that of international law derives from the common will of states 
Accordingly, the dualist theory requires the transformation of rules of 
international law into municipal law for their internal applicability and enforceability. 
As such, supremacy of international law in a dualist state is dependent upon its 
constitution or fundamental law, or its judicial decisions. 
c. Co-ordination 
Some international jurists favoured the practice of international and national 
tribunals over the monist-dualist debate, hence offering a practical solution to the 
problem. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice declared: 
the entire monist-duahst controversy is unreal, artificial and strictly beside the 
point.C )^ 
He rejects the theses that municipal and international law have a common 
field of operation and exposed his theory, described as Co-ordination, stating: 
In order that there can be controversy about whether the relations between two 
orders are relations of co- ordination between self-existent independent orders, 
or relations oisubordination of the one to the other, or of the other to the one -
or again whether they are part of the same order, but both subordinate to a 
superior order - it is necessary that they should both be purporting to be, and in 
fact be, applicable in the same field - that is to the same set of relations and 
transactions. For instance it would be futile to speak about a conflict between 
the laws of science and the laws of diplomatic intercourse, because they do not 
purport to apply to the same things. On the other hand it would make sense to 
talk, for instance, of a controversy about the relationship between the rules of 
private morality and the rules of private law, because they have a considerable 
common element: at least, both apply to the relations between and the conduct 
of private individuals.(^) 
By way of illustration, he then equated the relationship between international 
and municipal law with that existing between the English and the French legal systems, 
each of which is supreme in its own place of operation, i.e. the French in France and 
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the English in England. Conflict between French and English law is governed in each 
country by its own rules of conflict law. Therefore, he states: 
there can be no conflict between any two systems in the domestic field, for any 
apparent conflict is automatically settled by the domestic conflict rules of the 
forum.(9) 
According to him, conflict between two systems on the inter- goverimiental 
level would be tackled by international law because it is the law of the international 
field and the only law appUcable. Hence international law in the international field is 
supreme. He goes on to distinguish between the supremacy he attributes to 
internafional law, and that bestowed by the monists, who speak of its inherent 
superiority, saying it is one "not arising from content, but from the field of operation", 
as the French law is supreme in France, "not because the law is French but because the 
place, the field, is France." ^"^^^ 
It should be menfioned, moreover, that this view, as noted by Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, had been expressed by Anzilotti when he wrote: 
It follows from the same principle that there caimot be conflict between rules 
belonging to different judicial orders, and, consequently, in particular between 
international law and internal law. To speak of conflict between internafional 
law and internal law is as inaccurate as to speak of conflict between the laws of 
different States: in reality the existence of a conflict between norms belonging 
to different juridical orders cannot be affirmed except from a standpoint outside 
both the one and the other.(ii) 
7.A.II: Methods for the application of external law in national law 
For completion of the brief theoretical backgroimd on the interaction between 
international and mvmicipal law, it is apposite to ascertain the machinery whereby national 
courts apply and enforce the rules of international law. States' practice on this point is of 
considerable importance; therefore, an example will be selected and examined by way of 
illustration, before movmg on to the practice of the GCC Member States. 
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Basically, there are two methods for incorporating the rules of international 
law into a municipal legal system: one is termed "transformation", the other "adoption" 
or "incorporation" - hereafter adoption. 
a. Transformation 
The term could be employed to mean different things by different people. 
Here the concept of "transformation" means that rules of international law form part 
of municipal law only insofar as they have been accepted by the state concerned 
through legislation or judicial decision. Individual states would find this concept useful 
for a number of reasons. Internally, states in which the powers are separated make 
sure that the executive (which is usually responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs) 
is not exceeding its powers, indirectly assuming a domestic legislative function. New 
states also find this method effective in protecting their legal systems from 
international rules which were created at a time when they could not take part in their 
formation. Following this method renders the validity of international law subject to 
the state authority, hence preserving their sovereignty which they are mostly keen to 
protect. This is indeed one of the disadvantages of the "transformation" method, i.e. 
strengthening the notion of state sovereignty at times when people, for the interest of 
the international community as a whole, should look beyond the nation-state. Another 
drawback of this method is the fact that it changes the content of the rule of 
international law in the domestic sphere as, for example, the national rules of priorities 
and rules of interpretation are likely to take over. 
b. Adoption 
The concept of "adoption" shall mean that the rules of international law 
automatically form part of the municipal legal order. Internal legislation or executive 
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orders are not needed for national courts to apply international rules. An 
internationalist would surely conclude that the method of "adoption" is an ideal one 
for enhancing the status of international law and attaiiung the aim of unifying the law 
in the states constituting the international community. Presumably, under this method 
the application of international rules of interpretation is maintained. However, the 
fact that the international community is composed of members with different 
ideologies and, as mentioned above, the fact that a number of the international actors 
are newly established, and hence they may distrust international rules, both make the 
dominance of this method only a future possibility. Even in the older and advanced 
states, as will be shown, adoption machinery is accepted for those rules where the 
executive cannot really act as a legislator. Besides which, international law being 
primarily a law between states, it is not obvious that the adoption theory would be of 
much benefit to individuals and corporations whose interests might be affected by the 
international legal rules but whose rights would not be. 
c. The methods in practice 
In any constitutional system for dealing with international obligations of the 
state, there are two questions which must be considered: 
1. Which organ of government makes international obligations, especially 
treaties? 
2. Which organ of government implements these obligations in domestic 
law? 
Where there is no necessity for the implementation of properly made 
international obligations, then the constitutional system is said to be monist. Where 
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there is need for implementation (and that implementation may be made by a 
different organ of goverimient than the one which has bound the state internationally), 
then the system is duahst. However, because of the variety of constitutional systems, 
it must be understood that those formal terms cover a variety of circumstances where 
it may be possible to say only that a system is "more monist" or "more dualist" rather 
than purely one or another. Indeed, a single domestic legal system may exhibit both 
tendencies. The practice of the United Kingdom and the United States should 
ilUustrate those doctrines, and provide a basis for ascertaining those points in the legal 
systems of GCC Member States. 
UK Practice 
As concerns treaties, their negotiation signing and ratification is the 
prerogative of the Crown. However, because their subject matter varies and may 
involve alteration of domestic law, most require approval by Parliament for them to 
take internal legal effect; this is summarised in the following passage: 
a. Treaties which: (1) affect the private rights of British subjects, or (2) 
involve any modification of the common or statute law by virtue of 
their provisions or otherwise, or (3) require the vesting of additional 
powers in the Crown, or (4) impose additional financial obligations, 
direct or contingent, upon the government of Great Britain, must 
receive parhamentary assent through an enabling Act of Parhament, 
and, if necessary, any legislation to effect the requisite changes in the 
law must be passed. 
b. Treaties made expressly subject to the approval of ParHament 
require its approval, which is usually given in the form of a statute, 
though sometimes by Resolution. 
c. Treaties involving the cession of British territory require the 
approval of Parliament given by a statute. 
d. No legislation is required for certain specific classes of treaties, 
namely, treaties modifying the belligerent rights of the Crown when 
engaged in maritime warfare (presumably because such treaties 
involve no major intrusion on the legislative domain of Parhament), 
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and administrative agreements of an informal character needing only 
signature, but not ratification, provided they do not involve any 
alteration of municipal law.(l2) 
Obviously, large parts of those treaties whose nature is international 
co-operation rather than co-existence or state-like business are not automatically 
applicable by British courts. In particular, treaties which bear on rights under domestic 
law are part of the law of the UK only insofar as their rules have been transformed by 
an enabling Act of Parliament. Recently Lord Oliver confirmed this position, stating: 
...as a matter of the constitutional law of the United Kingdom, the Royal 
prerogative, whilst it embraces the making of treaties, does not extend to altering 
the law or conferring rights upon individuals or depriving individuals of rights 
which they enjoy in domestic law without the intervention of Parliament. 
Treaties as it is sometimes expressed, are not self-executing. Quite simply, a 
treaty is not part of EngUsh law unless and until it has been incorporated into 
the law by legislation. (^ 3) 
Thus, those unimplemented treaties will not give rise to domestic legal rights, 
although if such a state of affairs results in a situation incompatible with the treaty, it 
will constitute a breach by the UK of its international obligations. 
Treaties domesticated by enabling acts of parliament take precedence over 
prior inconsistent statutes.^ "^ "^ ^ But such a treaty will yield precedence to subsequent 
statutes; there is, however, a presumption that Parliament did not intend to act 
inconsistently with the treaty, hence courts interpret the subsequent statute in 
conformity with it.^^^-' One means of reaching that is by giving the language of the 
implementing statute the meaning of the treaty so far as possible. ^ ^^ -^  And in finding 
the meaning of a treaty, courts look at its language and interpret it so far as possible 
in accordance with the international rules for treaty interpretation, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, articles 31-3.^ ^^ ^ In cases where provisions of a 
subsequent statute are unambiguously in conflict with a prior treaty, courts apply the 
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statute.^^^^ The UK practice with regard to the treaties effectiveness in a domestic 
sphere is typical for states of the transformation camp. If the treaty has not been 
implemented by legislation, it cannot give rise to legal rights and duties in English law, 
However, the Courts may have regard to such a treaty in interpreting statutes (though 
not delegated legislation or the exercise of ministerial powers), although the force of 
the treaty will be less than where there is no implementing legislation. 
With regard to customary international law, the classic doctrine, as stated by 
Blackstone, ^^ ^^  that international law is part of English Common law has been 
generally the position within the English legal system. ^ ^^ ^ Currently, a customary rule 
constitutes part of UK law, provided that it is not inconsistent with statutes or judicial 
authority.^ ^^^ If a customary rule conflicts with a statute, the statute according to 
Mortensen v Peters ^^ "^^ prevails; however, courts interpret statutes so as to conform 
with customary law, based on the assumption that Parliament did not intend to violate 
international law, ^^ ^^  unless the statute is unambiguous; generally speaking, the 
automatic applicability of customary international law by British courts shows that the 
UK is an adherent to the doctrine of adoption with regards to customary rules. 
When compared to universal international law, EC law bears a closer, 
perhaps special, relationship with the domestic law of the UK. Such a relationship was 
established by the European Communities Act 1972, of which section 2(1) that gives 
legal effect to EC law within the UK reads: 
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time 
created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures 
from time to time provided for, by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with 
the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the 
United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, 
allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression 'enforceable Community 
right' and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this 
subsection applies. 
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The legal effect accorded to EC law by this provision, as envisaged by EC 
Law, includes the doctrine of primacy of EC law over inconsistent domestic 
legislation. However, it is known that in the UK the supremacy of Parliament is a 
traditionally fundemental doctrine. So, how are the two doctrines being reconciled? 
Section 2(4) of the Act is relevant to this question; it reads: 
The provision that may be made under subsection 2(2) above includes, subject 
to Schedule 2 to this act, any such provision (of any such extent) as might be 
made by Act of Parliament, and any enactment passed or to be passed, other 
than one contained in this Part of this Act, shall be construed and have effect 
subject to the foregoing provisions of this section, but, except as may be provided 
by any Act passed after this Act, Schedule 2 shall have effect in connection with 
the powers conformed by this and the following sections of this Act to make 
Orders in Council and regulations. 
Apparently, the sort of supremacy of EC law as formulated by the ECJ ^ ^^ ^ 
is not really provided by the terms of this subsection, i.e. 2(4), but rather a rule of 
construing inconsistent domestic statutes so as to conform with EC law. 
Of course, cases involving conflict between statutes enacted prior to the Act 
are not included in that generalisation. These, like the treatment of other international 
agreements, would be decided on the principle that the later in time prevails, hence 
pre-Act conflicting statutes are subjected to the Act. 
As regards subsequent inconsistent statutes, British courts are, generally 
speaking, more likely to subject them to directly effective EC law either by way of 
reconciling the conflict or acknowledging the primacy of EC law as viewed by the EC 
itself, unless the Parliament deliberately deviates, in express terms, from EC 
obligations. This general assumption is illustrated by the rulings in cases such as 
Garland, mentioned earlier and SmithP^^ Recently, the House of Lords suggested 
that British Court should take an even more receptive attitude to Community law.^ ^^ ^ 
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In conclusion, the practice of the UK generally reflects employment of both 
methods of incorporation, i.e. 'adoption' for customary international rules and 
'transformation' for Treaty rules, though both are with qualification. Furthermore, 
the UK legal system exhibits an obviously more receptive attitude towards EC law. 
United States Practice 
At the outset mention must be made of the fact that in the United States its 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, i.e. Constitutional provisions supersede 
any other law, domestic or international, customary or otherwise. Accordingly, US 
officials and courts as bound by the Constitution carmot enact or apply a law contrary 
to the Constitution.Those external rules, customary and treaty, in conformity with 
the Constitution are applied domestically as such, though with some qualifications. 
As far as treaties are concerned, the US Constitution describes where the 
treaty-making power lies as well as their status in domestic law. Courts too have 
recognised certain bases for their internal effect. Broadly speaking, international 
agreements which the US enters into fall into two categories: treaties and executive 
agreements. Treaties are those made by the President with the consent of two-thirds 
of the Senate as provided in Article 11(2) of the Constitution. Executive agreements 
are those made by the President alone under his constitutional power ^^ ^^  or pursuant 
to congressional authorisation.^ ^^^ On their domestic effect, Article VI(2) of the 
Constitution provides that treaties confirmed by the Senate are 'the supreme law of 
the land'. This sort of internal status should also apply to executive agreements made 
under congressional authorisation. While executive agreements based solely on the 
power of the President, like treaties, prevail over any state law ^^^\ it is not clear 
whether they have the same status with regard to federal law. 
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Anyway, domestic application of treaties is subject to court-imposed 
doctrines of self-executing treaties. That is, American courts distinguish between what 
they categorise as self-executing and non- self-executing treaties. The term 
'self-executing' treaties refers to those agreements which, upon entry into force 
internationally, aim immediately at the creation of domestically enforceable rights 
and duties of private individuals by domestic courts. Conversely, 'non-self- executing' 
agreements are those which require legislation to make them effective in the domestic 
sphere. Determining whether or not a treaty is self-executing is, as mentioned earlier, 
the function of the courts; they reach their conclusions by examining the intent of the 
parties, language of the treaty and the surrounding circumstances.^^^ For domestic 
considerations, however, some treaties might be treated as non-self-executing, 
regardless of whether or not they satisfy the aforementioned criteria; treaties on 
matters relating to the appropriation of money or the imposition of penalties for 
criminal offences are counted as examples.^ ^^ ^ In US v Postal for instance, the 
court decided that the High Seas Convention, especially Article 6, was 
non-self-executing, so that an individual could not complain about the United States 
asserting jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas. A critic of this decision 
suggested that the underlining policy was reaching out to criminals on the high 
seas.^ ^^ ^ He noted that had the court held Article 6 to be self-executing, it would have 
prevailed over the conflicting prior domestic statutes thus limiting its jurisdiction over 
defendants. ^ "^ ^ Apparently, therefore categorising a treaty as self- executing or not is 
a decision influenced by domestic policies. 
A treaty considered as self-executing, or non-self-executing but implemented 
by legislation, is subordinate, as mentioned earlier, to the Constitution.^ ^^^ In relation to 
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Statutes, such a treaty supersedes any prior inconsistent ones.^ '^ ^ But it yields 
precedence to a subsequent statute if it can not be interpreted so as to avoid conflict.^ '*^^ 
That said of treaty law in the US, it is apposite to make a mention of the status 
of customary international law therein. In 1900, the Paquete Habana case established 
that customary rules constitute part of the US law.^ '*^ ^ However, this adoption 
approach is not without qualification. The status of customary rules in the hierarchy 
of US law is not an obvious one. Besides provisions of the Constitution, domestic 
statutes regardless of their date of issuance take precedence over inconsistent 
customary rules.^ "^^ ^ However, in such cases, a statute is interpreted as far as possible 
so as not to conflict with customary rules of international law, "unless it unmistakeably 
appears that a congressional act was intended to be in disregard of a principle of 
international comity".^ '^ -^^  Such a state of relationship has been subject to castigation 
in favour of applying the principle of the latter as time prevails, accorded to treaty law 
as noted above. ^ '^ ^^  
Generally, US practice reflects a more monistic approach towards 
international law subject to national courts determination of whether or not an 
international obligation gives rise to rights and duties in the domestic sphere.^ "*^ ^ 
7.B: Interaction between G C C law and municipal law 
7.B.I: The character of GCC law 
a. Regionality 
In chapter four, it was established that the GCC in its present structure is 
neither a federation nor a supranational organisation. It follows, therefore, that its 
rules are neither federal nor supranational law. The character of the rules of the GCC 
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can best be identified through study of its constitutional and structural features. 
For the purposes of this study the term 'GCC law' means that body of law 
encompassing rights, duties, powers and remedies created by the Charter of the GCC, 
subsequent agreements and decisions of the Supreme Council. Broadly speaking, the 
subjects are the Member States and the addressees are the inhabitants of the 
Members' territories, though the latter are involved only after the rules are 
domesticated.^ '*^^ 
Examination of the organisational structure of the GCC '^^ '^  reveals that it is 
of no more than a traditional international organisation. Examination of its 
constitution and the way it was handled by the Members calls for a number of 
observations. The constitutive instruments were international political acts resulting 
in the creation of treaty law amongst the six sovereign States. Those acts are 
international treaties ratified by the parties in accordance with their constitutional 
requirements. They can be amended only with the consent of all signatory Member 
States They are subject to unilateral renunciation ^^^\ All these constitutional 
and institutional observations point towards the existence of relations, though special, 
governed by international law, rather than a national or supranational law. 
Nonetheless, the Hmitation on its subjects and addressees hints to a need for 
qualification of the internationality suggested to be the classification of the GCC rules 
of law. This discussion, therefore, holds the view that the said law constitutes a regional 
international law, and hence shall be identified accordingly, i.e. GCC international 
law, or, for the purpose of simplification as employed in this work in general, GCC law. 
By way of illustration, the term "regional international law" means here those 
rules of international law the field of validity of which is restricted to a number of 
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States associating themselves by means of international treaty. Thus, GCC law means 
those rules of international law the sphere of validity of which is confined to the six 
States of the GCC. Such definition should also apply to law pertinent to other non-
universal associations which are not federations and yet still to reach the stage of 
supranationalism, e.g. the Arab League. Further, the term 'GCC law' denotes those 
rules of international law created to further the interests of the sk Members without 
contradicting universal international law. As such, whilst the admissibility of regional 
international law, such as that of the GCC, corresponds to reality and meets the need 
for non-universal international law, it is offered insofar as there is no inconsistency 
between the regional and the universal international law. 
The need and admissibility of regional international law has been recognised 
by learned authors such as Professor W. Friedman. In the preface to his much read 
book The Changing Structure of International Law (1964), he promoted the distinctive 
character of the international law of co-operation as increasingly reflected in 
international organisations and acknowledged the need for non- universal spheres of 
international law to further the interests of specific people. In his words: 
This part [two] outlines the principal thesis of the book: that in international law 
it is today of both theoretical and practical importance to distinguish between 
the international law of "coexistence", governing essentially diplomatic 
inter-state relations, and the international law of co-operation, expressed in the 
growing structure of international organisation and the pursuit of common 
human interests. From this follows the acknowledgment of the necessity of both 
universal and non-universal spheres of international law.(51) 
The concept of regionalism advocated by the learned jurist, though not 
elaborated, is assumed to include the rules created by regional organisations which 
do not violate the rights of non-members in the concerned organisation. 
Having stated that, this discussion would be incomplete without clarifying the 
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interrelation between regional, in particular that of the GCC, and universal 
international law, though briefly. In accordance with what has been expressed above, 
their relationship is not one of hierarchy, rather of complementary, i.e. the regional 
being part of the universal. GCC law is regional because it concerns only six States of 
the international community, and international because, as said earlier, it contains 
international elements rather than supranational or federal ones. There are, however, 
two exceptions to the non- hierarchical inter-relation between regional and universal 
international law. 
One is that obligations arising under the UN Charter supersede obligations 
incurred under other treaties, including those constituting the constitutional basis for 
regional laws. Thus, a regional law such as that of the GCC gives way to a duty 
enshrined in the UN Charter in case of conflict. According to Article 103 of the UN 
Charter: 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail. 
Obviously, questions with regard to the specification of the obligafions of the 
Members under the UN Charter may arise. In this respect, it has been maintained 
that: 
the definifion of "obligafions under the Charter" within the meaning of article 
103 must be confined to those obligations that have been laid down in provisions 
of the Charter and binding decisions of the Security Council.(52) 
This supremacy of the UN law under Article 103 has been expressly provided 
for in some constitutive instruments of international organisations, e.g. GATT in its 
article 21(c) states: 
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent any contracting party 
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from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.(53) 
was The Charter of the GCC contains no such provision. However, since it 
set up by a treaty, it is bound to yield to the obUgations which the Charter of the UN 
and binding decisions impose upon its Members. 
The second exception to the above menfioned thesis that the relafionship 
between universal and regional international law is not one of hierarchical character 
is the rules of jus cogens, e.g. prohibition of the use of force and trade in slaves and 
piracy, which override the provisions of treaties of international organisations. For 
example, an agreement by the GCC States to use force against another sovereign state 
would be void because the treaty is inconsistent with a rule of jus cogens, i.e. the 
prohibifion of the use of force. Generally, however, those rules are the subject of 
controversy. ^ '^^ ^ 
In cases other than those covered by the above mentioned exceptions, 
conflicts between regional and universal rules of international law should be governed 
by the conflict rules applied to cases of inconsistency between norms of international law. 
b. Sources 
Having suggested above that GCC rules are basically international law, 
though their sphere of validity is restricted to the six Member States, it should follow 
that the GCC rules derive from the same sources as the universal international law, 
i.e. treaties, customs, and general rules of international organisations. 
Indeed, it has been expressly provided that the GCC Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes is to base its recommendations or opinions inter alia on the 
rules of international law.^ ^^ ^ 
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The regional sources, however, are mainly treaties, e.g. the Charter of the 
GCC, the Economic Agreement and the Agreement on the GCC Privileges and 
Immunities. In other words, GCC law is mainly treaty law. 
Decisions of the Supreme Council are yet another source of law, but it might 
be argued that those decisions are merely programming of the rules already in the 
treaties. In any case, those decisions have contributed to the body of GCC law ^^^\ 
Besides universal customary international law, GCC customary law could be 
developed, and hence constitute a basis for rights and duties amongst its Members, in 
accordance with the jurisprudence of ICJ. In the Right of Passage over Indian Territory 
case, it accepted such assumption when it stated: 
It is difficult to see why the number of States between which a local custom may 
be established on the basis of long pracfice must necessarily be larger than two. 
The court sees no reason why long continued practice between two States 
accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of 
mutual rights and obligations between the two States.C^^ ) 
Regional customary rules, according to the jurisprudence of the ICJ, bind 
only those states which adhered to it; in the Colombian- Peruvian asylum case, it stated: 
But even if it could be supposed that such a custom existed between certain 
Latin-American States only, it could not be invoked against Peru which, far from 
having by its attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it....(58) 
Another source of GCC law would be the general principles of law common 
to the law of the Member States. In this respect, the general principles of Islamic law 
could play a significant role. It has been already sanctioned that disputes between the 
Member States are to be tackled inter alia in accordance with the principles of Islamic 
law(59)_ 
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7.B.II: Its relations to national legal systems 
a. Autonomy? 
It was argued above that GCC rules are international law with regional 
peculiarities. Such character prompts one to ask whether GCC law is an autonomous 
legal system. This question and others like it are likely to be put forward by those who 
conclude that the GCC is modelled in long-term objectives on the organisation whose 
legal order is autonomous, i.e. the EEC. Therefore, it seems appropriate to examine 
how and why the EEC admitted such autonomy, for the purpose of contrasting the 
position of the GCC legal order. 
Notably, like GCC law, that of the EEC is originally the product of 
international treaties. However, unlike the earlier suggested characteristic of the 
GCC law, i.e. that it is essentially international, the body of the EEC law has been 
described as an autonomous legal order, different from both national and 
international law, by the ECJ and various national courts. In the Van Gend en Loos 
case, the ECJ declared: 
...the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit 
of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals. (60) 
Furthermore, in the Costa v ENEL case, it stated: 
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its 
own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral 
part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound 
to apply.(6i) 
Similarly, the German Federal Constitutional Court in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhrund Vorratsstellefur Getriede viewed the Community law 
as an autonomous legal order ^^^l Also, in Minister of Economic Affairs v SA 
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Fromagerie Franco-Suisse 'Le Sid' the Belgian Cour de Cassation maintained that 
treaties of the Community have created a new legal order.^ '^^ ^ 
This new legal order has individuals as its subject alongside the Community 
institutions and the Member States. In the Community the creation of direct rights 
for individuals which must be safeguarded by national courts constitutes a new 
phenomenon. This nature of the EEC law, i.e. supranationality, made constitutional 
adjustment in some of its member states inevitable By contrast, by reason of the 
internationality, rather than supranationality, of GCC law such adjustment has not 
been needed by the GCC Member States. 
It can be argued that the GCC legal order constitutes a special type of 
international law; but it would be hard to prove that it is an autonomous system of 
law, i.e. distinct from national and international law. It is difficult, therefore, to see it 
other than as currently forming regional legal system. 
b. Supremacy? 
In this Section, the basis for the supremacy of EEC law will be identified. 
This will enable comparison and contrast with GCC law, and reasons for its primacy 
or otherwise, addressed below in Section 7.C.II, in which the treatment of the GCC 
treafies by Member States will be examined. Again, the justification for such 
undertaking is the obvious fact that, operationally and organisationally, the GCC 
growing; therefore, constitutional and structural features pointing towards the 
existence of supreme law should be known to the advocates of Gulf integration. Space 
here will allow only a brief examination of ECJ jurisprudence which illustrates the 
constitutional and political basis of EEC law primacy. The viewpoint of EEC 
Members on the issue of supremacy will be mentioned, and should measure the 
an 
is 
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responses to the treaties which brought into being the new legal order. 
The ECJ in Costa v ENEL entertained the issue of whether Community law 
prevailed over national law. In making its judgment, the ECJ examined the 
Community features and made the following observations: 
a. By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has 
created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the 
Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member 
States and which their courts are bound to apply. 
b. By creating a community of unlimited duration...the Member States 
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within Hmited fields, and 
have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and 
themselves. 
c. The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions 
which derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and 
the spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the States...to accord 
precedence to unilateral and subsequent measures over a legal 
system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. 
d. The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one state to 
another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without 
jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.... 
e. The obligations undertaken under the Treaty establishing the 
Community would not be unconditional...if they could be called in 
question by subsequent legislative acts of the signatories.(65) 
Then, based on these observations, it concluded that the Community law 
prevails, stating: 
it follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an 
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, 
be over-ridden by domestic legal provisions, without being deprived of its 
character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself 
being called into question.(^) 
In the Simmenthal case, the question was whether an ordinary Italian court 
is prevented from discarding national provisions which are inconsistent with 
Community law. In the preliminary ruling, the ECJ noted that: 
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...any recognition that national legislative measures which encroach upon the 
field within which the Community exercises its legislative power or which are 
otherwise incompatible with the provisions of Community law had any legal 
effect would amount to a corresponding denial of the effectiveness of obligations 
undertaken unconditionally and irrevocably by Member States pursuant to the 
Treaty and would thus imperil the very foundation of the Community. (6 )^ 
It then concluded that the question: 
should therefore be answered to the effect that a national court which is called 
upon within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law 
is under a duty to give full effect those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own 
motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted 
subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior 
setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means.(^) 
Moreover, the ECJ declared that even national constitutional law must give 
way for EEC law. In the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case, it held that: 
the validity of a Community instrument or its effect within a member state 
cannot be affected by allegations that it strikes at either the fundamental rights 
as formulated in a state's constitution or the principles of a national 
constitutional structure.(69) 
The aforementioned cases should illustrate that the supremacy of the 
Community law as confirmed by the ECJ is based on treaty and policy considerations. 
The treaty considerafions include the fact that they created a new legal system 
and this involved the partial transference of sovereignty, thus exposing the subjects of 
the Member States to the force of EC law directly. 
The policy considerations include the attainment of the functional effectiveness 
of the EEC, necessary for the realisation of the objectives of the EEC treaty. 
Applied to the GCC case, the political considerations can constitute grounds 
for arguing for the primacy of GCC law. Yet, alone and without a judicial body, their 
role counts for nothing. It is the treaty considerations which make the difference. Had 
the GCC Charter been modelled on the EEC Treaty, the latter's primacy with its 
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Otherwise. So given the fact that courts effectuate EC rules so long as Parliament 
decides not to distance itself from the EC, the UK, regardless of the method by which 
it maintains EC law supremacy, can probably be said to be recognising the primacy of 
EC rules like other members. 
The point of view of the GCC Member States towards the status of GCC law 
is explained below in Section 7.C.I, in which the notion of GCC law primacy is 
examined. 
7.C: Reception of G C C law by national legal systems 
7.C.I: Implementation of GCC law 
External law includes rules of customary, general and conventional 
international or regional law as well as decisions of international or regional 
organisations. However, the aim of this section is mainly to explore the relationship 
between GCC law and the national law of the Member States; the latter's relation to 
international law will be referred to where necessary. It is submitted that in the field 
of international law and organisations, there has been neither uniform legal theory 
nor a single state practice on the relationship between international law and municipal 
law. Compounding the problem for GCC Member States, as will be shown, is the 
secrecy of the very necessary sources for venturing into such an issue; notably, 
moreover, no written work on this complex problem has ever been published with 
regard to the six Members of the GCC. Nonetheless, this section will attempt to draw 
marks on the road of full exploration. The constitutions of the Member States are 
thought to be of primary importance in this regard; therefore, pertinent provisions 
annexed to this chapter and will be referred to throughout. 
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a. Treaty law 
The constitutions of all the Member States contain provisions on treaties. 
Although not straightforward, they guide a discussion on how treaty law is 
implemented in addition to their original purpose of determining the treaty-maker 
and the necessary steps for concluding treaties. GCC treaty law in particular will be 
examined in terms of its relationship to the legal system of its Members. For simplicity, 
each Member state will be studied individually. 
U.A.E. 
The constitution of this federation embodies a number of articles on the 
conclusion and incorporation of treaties '^^ '^ \ These include Articles 120/1, 124, 91, 
110/1 and 2,113, 111, 125,144/a, c and d and 60. 
According to Article 60, the Council of Ministers, controlled by the President 
of the Union and the Supreme Council, is the executive organ of the Union. The 
above-mentioned constitutional provisions make it clear that this branch of the 
government has not only the power to negotiate and sign but also to ratify international 
treaties. This prerogative is guaranteed by the constitution by the assignment of the 
conduct of foreign affairs to the said branch. 
However, as provided in Article 124, this power is not absolute; the executive 
authority must consult the seven Emirates before concluding a treaty which may affect 
the special position of any one of the Emirates. The term 'special position' is not 
defined; yet, one would expect that it means those treaties of peace, alliances and 
territorial settlements as well as those which ensue financial obligations or amend 
greatly the existing local laws. For example, therefore, the Charter of the GCC and 
the subsequent related agreements should have been submitted to the individual 
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Emirates for consultation because, obviously, they affect the position of each Emirate. 
Nonetheless, this requirement seems to be of academic nature since 
ratification of such treaties must, in the first place, aquire the consent of the rulers of 
the seven Emirates, hence in their capacity as members of the Supreme Council they 
can decide whether or not to give effect to the treaties. The soundness of this view 
becomes apparent when borne in mind that each Emirate is ruled absolutley by its 
ruler. So a question such as whether such treaties, including the GCC ones, referred 
to the individual Emirates can be answered in the affirmative on the assumption that 
the requirements under the circumstances is~ met by the rulers not objecting to its 
ratification by the Supreme Council. In other words, once it is learned that a treaty 
has been ratified, the assumption is that each emirate had been consulted as 
represented by its ruler. 
The Union National Council too has a role in the conclusion of treaties. 
However, because its legislative function is narrowed to being of preparatory 
character, it seems that the say it has on treaties by which it is informed is of an advisory 
nature and acceptance, rather than amendment or rejection as is its power with regard 
to internal Union legislation.^ ^^^ 
Having established where the power to make treaties lies, it is apposite to 
determine how such treaties are implemented internally. Such ratified treaties are not 
adopted as such by the Emirates' national legal structure; formally the 
"transformation" not the "adoption" method is applied for application of treaty law in 
U.A.E. municipal law. GCC treaty law has undergone a process of transformation, 
though minor indeed, for its internal effectiveness. The Charter of the GCC, the 
Economic Agreement, the treaty setting up the Gulf Investment Corporation and the 
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Agreement on the GCC Privileges and Immunities were given effect by decrees 
having the force of law, in accordance with Articles 124 and 113, by the President 
based on the assent of the Council of Ministers and the Supreme CoxxncilP^^ They 
could, alternatively, have been made internally applicable by federal law, in 
accordance with the requirements of Article 110 cited above, i.e. by the President 
based upon the approval of the Council of Ministers and the Union National Council 
and the ratification of the Supreme Council, which consists of the Rulers of the seven 
Emirates. Either one must be published in the Federal Official Gazette, their internal 
effectiveness starting one month after the date of publication, unless otherwise stated 
in the law or decree itself. In the case of GCC treaty law, the one month period has 
been applied. 
For ensuring the execution of international treaties, Article 125 of the 
constitution requires the member Emirates to take the necessary measures to 
implement the treaties concluded by the Federation. 
Finally, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 151, federal 
legislation prevails over local legislation; hence, GCC treaty law, as being 
implemented by federal decrees, overrides inconsistent local law. The question which 
remains, however, is whether a conflicting federal law or decree would give way to 
GCC treaty rules. This is examined below in Section 7.C.II. 
Bahrain 
In this Member State, the conclusion and implementation of treaties are 
described by the following constitutional provisions: 35/a, 37, 38, 42, 59, 104/a and 
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The constitution provides that the system of govenunent is based on the 
division of authority as follows: 
1. legislative power rests with the Amir and the National Assembly; 
2. executive power is vested in the Amir and the Council of Ministers; 
and 
3. judicial power is retained by the courts in the name of the Amir.(78) 
Of greater importance, however, is the fact that the constitution describes 
the requirements for the conclusion of two types of treaties: one for the purpose of 
this study will be characterised as 'general', and the other as 'special'. The former 
probably encompasses those treaties which are concerned with states as such, but a 
more precise definition could be: those treaties the subject of which is not covered by 
Article 37 paragraph 2. On the other hand, the 'special' treaties are those involving 
one or more of the enumerated subjects in the said paragraph. 
It is the prerogative of the Amir to negotiate, sign and ratify what are termed 
'general' treaties. They are made internally applicable by decrees by the Amir and 
come into effect one month after publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise 
stated in the decree itself. Notably, even this type of treaty is to be submitted to the 
National Assembly; yet, reading into the entire context of Article 37 supports the view 
that the Assembly's role in this kind of treaty is of an advisory nature. This role is 
better understood by comparison with the Assembly's role with regard to the other 
type of treaty, i.e. what has earlier been characterised as the 'special'. 
The 'special' type of treaty is also negotiated, signed and ratified by the Amir. 
However, the Amir's ratification power is dependent upon the assent of the National 
Assembly. The joining of the Assembly in effectuating such treaties is provided for in 
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Article 37 paragraph 2, which stipulates that they come into effect only when made 
by a law. Laws, according to Article 42, are promulgated after being passed by the 
Assembly. In practice, their internal effectiveness takes place one month after their 
publication in the Official Gazette. GCC treaty law falls under the 'special' type of 
treaty because it shows at least one of the characteristics of the 'special' type, e.g. it 
involves expenses not included in the Bahrain budget. 
Most of these constitutional procedures for concluding and implementing 
treaties, however, lost their practical value when in 1976 the National Assembly was 
disbanded From that date and until now the Assembly's chair has been occupied 
by the executive. Therefore, the GCC treaties concluded between 1981-90 were 
ratified and made applicable in Bahrain by means of decrees referring to the 
constitution in general and to the approval of the Council of Ministers as their legal 
basis, e.g. decree No. 24 of 1981 implementing the Charter of the GCC 
Such decrees, while internally valid with the absence of the National 
Assembly, will have their validity exposed to the mercy of the Assembly once it is 
reinstated, i.e. in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 38, decrees implementing 
GCC treaties must be referred to, and for their continued effectiveness must receive 
the assent of, the next Assembly at its first meeting; otherwise, the Article provides, 
they are either rejected by the Assembly or not referred to it, and in both cases they 
retroactively cease to have the force of law. However, if rejected, the Assembly may 
approve "their validity for the preceding period or settle in some other ways the effects 
arising therefrom." 
Of related importance is measuring the relationship between internal law 
and GCC treaty law. Bahrain is no different in this issue from other Member States. 
The Relationship Between GCC Rules and Municipal Laws of the Member States 304 
It is appropriate, therefore, to examine the position of Member States towards treaty 
rules of international law all together in Section 7.C.II. 
Saudi Arabia 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has no formal written constitution. However, 
the Statute of the Council of Ministers illustrates who the treaty-maker is, how a treaty 
is made and what the municipal status of a treaty is. Therefore, this Statute will be 
consulted. Of some importance at the outset is to note that the said Statute removed 
many of the doubts that the Council of Ministers enjoys both executive and legislative 
powers. More significant for this discussion, however, are those articles which bear 
relevance to the making and implementing of treaties. These include Articles 18,19, 
20 and 24.^ ^^ ^ 
Pursuant to Articles 18 and 19, the treaty-making power is a prerogative of 
the executive branch of the goverimient, i.e. the King and the Council of Ministers. 
So, too, is the implementing authority of concluded treaties, i.e. the implementing 
measure is in the form of a Royal decree to be passed after being approved by the 
Council of Ministers. Such a decree, which is the highest legal instrument in the 
Kingdom, makes the concerned treaty applicable internally. Thus, the relationship 
between Saudi law and treaty international law, including GCC treaty law, is 
cormected by an implementing legislative act, e.g. Royal decree No. M/13 of 1982 
implementing the Economic Agreement. As such, treaties may be looked at by a 
national tribunal or commission for internal purposes only if they are given effect in 
the way described by the Articles mentioned above and published in the Official 
Gazette, as provided in Article 24. 
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Qatar 
In the State of Qatar the Amended Provisional Constitution of 1972 
determines the treaty-maker as well as the requirements for making treaties 
effective internally. These matters are enshrined in Articles 23/1 and 2, 24/1, 34/2 
and51/First/3.^^^^ 
According to Articles 23 and 24/1, it is the Amir who is authorised not only 
to negotiate and sign but also to ratify treaties by decrees having the force of law. 
Although Article 24/1 speaks of informing the Consultative Council of treaties, it 
seems that its power is restricted to the making of recommendations; this is based on 
general reading of the constitution which mentions nothing about assent or rejection 
by the said Council, especially Article 5 l/first/3. 
Thus, treaty rules of international law, including those of the GCC, are made 
domestically effective by Amiri decrees, e.g. decree No. 51 of 1982 ratifying the GCC 
Economic Agreement and reaffirming its force of law ^^^\ Other GCC treaty law has 
been transformed in the same way. The internal status of GCC treaty law in the Qatari 
legal hierarchy is examined in section 7.C.II of this chapter. 
Like other national laws, decrees nationalising external treaty rules must, 
Article 24/1 says, be published in the Official Gazette to be internally effective. 
Oman 
The Sultanate of Oman has no written constitution. However, the Law on 
the Organisation of the Administrative System of the Sultanate of Oman contains 
what is usually embodied in the constitutions, including the provisions on 
concluding treaties and their internal effect, therefore, this Law will be the primary 
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source for this discussion. In its Article 3, it provides: 
International treaties, agreements and pacts shall be signed by His Majesty the 
Sultan or who he has authorised to do so, in this later case, they shall be 
submitted to His Majesty for ratification. And, the international treaties, 
agreements and pacts signed by His Majesty the Sultan or ratified by His Majesty 
shall be deemed part of the domestic law as of the date of their publication in 
the Official Gazette, unless His Majesty decides otherwise, [author's translation] 
(84) 
Accordingly, it is clearly apparent that the treaty-making power as well as the 
implementing legislative authority rest solely with the Sultan. Participation, let alone 
combining acts, of different national bodies, was not even accorded advisory power. 
The above-cited Article reveals that treaties which have been signed by the 
Sultan are, as such, ratified and so they become part of the national law from the date 
of their publication in the Omani Official Gazette; an example of this kind of treaty 
is the GCC Economic Agreement, which was signed by the Sultan personally. On the 
other hand, pursuant to the same Article, those treaties signed by a person authorised 
by the Sultan must undergo a process of ratification by the Sultan himself. Such 
ratification process takes the form of Sultanic decrees, as appear in the various 
ratifying legislation of international agreements. An example of the treaties signed on 
behalf of the Sultan, hence needing ratification by the Sultan himself, is decree No. 2 
of 1983 ratifying the agreement establishing the Gulf Investment Corporation 
Likewise, this type of treaty comes into effect as of the date of its publication in the 
Official Gazette. In both cases, however, the Sultan may decide other dates for the 
treaties' entry into force, as stated in the cited Article 3. 
Seemingly, like most Members, Oman takes a monistic attitude towards the 
international rules created by treaties to which it is a party. The requirement for 
publication for their internal effectiveness should not hinder this argument, inasmuch 
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as such requirement is minor and necessary, especially for treaties which create rights 
for individuals or impose obligations upon them. The domestic status of ratified 
treaties is no different from that in other Member States, therefore it is examined in 
section 7.C.II of this chapter. 
Kuwait 
The constitutional procedures for concluding and implementing treaties in 
Kuwait are similar, and in some parts identical, to those embodied in the constitution 
of Bahrain. Out of the 183 articles, those having relevance to this discussion and 
supporting the expressed view of similarity are Articles 6,65,70,71,79,97 and 174.^ ^^ 
Like the State of Bahrain, the above provisions contemplated two types of 
treaty which, as in Bahrain, may be characterised as either 'general' or 'special'. The 
executive has the prerogative to negotiate, sign and ratify both; but, unlike the 
'general', the 'special', which is described by Article 70/2, must be approved by the 
National Assembly in order that it comes into force internally upon its publication in 
the Official Gazette. The role of the National Assembly with regard to the 'general' 
treaties, i.e. those which are not covered by Article 70/2, is of an advisory nature, which 
means that its disapproval counts for nothing in terms of internal effectiveness 
Although the National Assembly has been dissolved twice since 1962 when the 
Constitution was promulgated, i.e. 1976 and 1986, the GCC treaties coincided with its 
existence and, because they fall under the 'special' category of the contemplated types of 
treaties, they were implemented by laws approved by the Assembly and ratified and 
promulgated by the Amir, e.g. Law No. 44 of 1981, ratifying the Charter of the GCC As 
in the case of Bahrain, the creation of the GCC involved Kuwait with expenses not included 
in the budget, to state one reason for treating the GCC Charter imder Article 70/2. 
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It is worth mentioning that the said Assembly was reinstated in 1990, though 
not in the form intended by the constitution of 1962. 
In summary, in formal terms, treaty rules of international law in the State of 
Kuwait become part of its internal law only once they are transformed by decree or 
law in accordance with the constitutional requirements. GCC treaty law has 
undergone the same process of nationalisation, hence has been internally effective. 
The status of GCC treaty law within Kuwait is treated in section 7.C.II of this chapter. 
b. Customs 
As mentioned above in the case of treaties, the internal status of customary 
rules of international law can best be determined by resort either to states' 
constitutions or the work of their courts. In the case of the GCC Member States, the 
jurisprudence of some national courts is not accessible, a matter which makes the 
constitutions the last useful resort. Unfortunately, provisions concerning the internal 
application of customary law are non-existent in the Member States' constitutions. It 
is understandable that customary international law no longer constitutes the major 
part of international law in this era when efforts are intensified to codify existing rules 
of international law in treaties; but the question is whether it is this trend which lies 
behind the silence of the constitutions of GCC Member States on the stand of 
customary law internally. This is probably one reason. Another reason may be their 
response to the fact that those rules were established at a time when they were unable 
to participate in their creation. The point is that they were hesitant, perhaps reluctant, 
to recognise the direct applicability of customary rules of international law; therefore, 
they drew up their constitutions containing no provisions on their internal application. 
In terms of relationship between customary rules of international law and 
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national law, one would be of the opinion that currently customary rules have no 
internal effect as appears to be the attitude of developing countries. Logically, 
customary rules should be applied internally as a part of internal law so far as it is not 
inconsistent with constitutional and national law. In general, only an additional 
constitutional provision would clarify the internal status of rules of customary 
international law. Alternatively, they should release judicial decisions on this matter, 
should there be any. 
c. Decisions 
Member States of the GCC have not yet transferred even part of their 
respective sovereignties to the GCC, a matter unsurprising and to be expected of 
newly structured States. In fact, relinquishment of part or all sovereignty would 
require the amendment of the constitutions of those States having written ones as they 
expressly prohibit such transformation, i.e. U.A.E. Article 4; Bahrain Article 1; Qatar 
Article 2; and Kuwait Article 1. However, in light of the importance of the GCC 
decisions as a source of law, one is bound to conclude that from the viewpoint of the 
GCC, the decisions are expected to be made valid internally by means of national 
legislation. The said expectation can be detected from the comprehensive objectives 
the Members have designed for the GCC. Of more significance is that its functional 
ability to work is highly dependent upon the implementation of its decisions. The 
conclusive membership in the GCC also suggests that, in spite of its traditional 
structure, it includes chosen Members who should be willing to make the GCC more 
than a diplomatic conference. 
That expectation has so far been honoured. In realisation of the important 
role of effectuating their willingness, the Member States have taken specific legislative 
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measures for each and every decision, hence making them internally effective. The 
question thus far is how? 
To begin with, constitutions of Member States contain no provisions determining 
the internal status of decisions of international organisations, including those of the GCC. 
However, the practice of the States with regard to decisions of the GCC reveal that the 
internal vahdity of GCC decisions is guaranteed when given effect by municipal legislation 
or Ministerial decrees. In the U.AE. GCC decisions are transformed by different 
instruments, e.g. federal laws, decrees by the Council of Ministers and decrees by the 
various Ministers. In Bahrain, they have been made applicable by Amiri decrees and 
Ministerial decrees. In Saudi Arabia they are made internally vahd by Royal decrees, 
decrees by the Ministerial Council and Ministerial decrees. In Qatar, laws and decrees by 
the Council of Ministers are the means employed to implement the decisions of the GCC. 
In Oman, they have been given effect by means of Ministerial deaees. Kuwait implements 
them by means of Ministerial decrees. Notably the internal enactments are made by 
varieties of municipal organs, depending on the nature and specialty of the decision 
concerned. For example, a decision of a commercial nature is mostly implemented by 
Ministerial decree of the respective Ministers of Commerce. No decision of the GCC has 
been adopted as such, i.e. without implementing legislation. 
Internal instruments vary not only from one State to another, but also within 
States. Elucidation of the relationship between municipal law and GCC decisions ought 
to arise out of the States' constitutions or work of the courts, but neither is of help because 
of the silence of the former and lack of the latter. In such circumstances, different views 
may be stated by different people. Hereunder is one. 
The Charter of the GCC and other GCC treaty law, notably the Economic 
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Agreement, are the basis of GCC decisions. In practice those decisions are only 
detailed programmes of the principles already made applicable nationally by laws or 
decrees having the force of law. For example, Member States, by signing the Economic 
Agreement, have obliged themselves to realise the principle of free movement of 
persons. This principle became internally effective when the respective States passed 
their implementing legislation of the said Agreement. Officials and courts should thus 
apply the principles of the Economic Agreement, regardless of their external origin, 
seeking guidance for the personal and material scope as well as the timetable from 
the GCC decisions which are in essence the programmes for effectuating the 
Economic Agreement. The argument to be made here is that GCC decisions, 
regardless of the ranking of the instrument by which they were transformed, would be 
accorded the ranking given to the treaty which constitutes their constitutional basis. 
In other words, they should be treated as integrated with the treaty law, explaining its 
general principles and interpreting its terms. 
Hence, one would expect that in the case of a conflict between a GCC 
decision and a national law, it would be solved on the basis of conflict between the 
origin, (i.e. treaty) and the national law, on the assumption that the decision, as stated 
above, is a supplement to the treaty ^^^\ Thus, the question becomes whether the 
Economic Agreement, for example, rather than the mere content of the decision, 
takes priority over national law. 
Those decisions of non-economic character should be treated in the same 
way as the Charter of the GCC itself, since it is generally the constitutional basis for 
all GCC decisions. 
Generally speaking, the fact that Member States take the necessary 
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legislative steps as soon as the decision is made suggests that there is a genuine 
willingness to give domestic effect to the international obligations; therefore, one is 
of the opinion that national courts, too, are most likely to draw on GCC decisions, 
which are inspired from the treaty law, with disregard to inconsistent municipal law 
which may be overridden by treaty law. 
Before concluding this section, it should be mentioned that in the Member 
States, including Bahrain and Kuwait as long as their legislative organs are put out of 
action, the organs which make treaties are themselves the ones which implement 
treaty obligations in domestic law. Therefore, they can well be classified as 'monist' 
States in relation to treaty rules of external law. However, bearing in mind that the 
'monist' schools are of various form, categorising them as such does not necessarily 
mean that external law is without qualification part of domestic legal systems. 
Qualifications or/and exceptions may be imposed for policy considerations of a 
domestic nature. At any rate, ascertaining how is/would GCC rules be treated 
domestically in terms of priority seems in order. This is the concern of the following 
section. 
7.C.II Enforcement of GCC law 
In a preceding section, it was seen that the GCC treaties were not adopted by the 
legal systems of the Member States, except Oman, as such. Although there are further 
formalities beyond the creation of the international obligations required for domestic 
effect, these formaUties are not extensive and are completed by the same organ which 
effected the international obligation. Formally, it might be correct to say that the systems 
are dualist but the steps between making the international obligations and giving it 
domestic effect are so small as to make the system in practice almost monist. 
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More importantly, in practice, however, conflicts may arise between the 
provisions of a GCC treaty law and provisions of a national law of any internal 
hierarchy. Thus, the question to be asked here, and to be discussed and referred to 
throughout this section, is which prevails over the other? 
Generally, the internal status of treaty law varies from one state to another. 
Further, constitutional law principles or court-imposed doctrines may come into play 
in this context. Thus to answer the posed question with precision, one must find either 
constitutional provisions or national jurisprudence on the point. If both means, or one 
of them, are usable, an answer to the question should not be difficult. Otherwise, any 
answer would be speculative. 
Generally, for the purpose of determining the municipal status of 
international treaty law, some states' constitutions provide explicitly for the primacy 
of international law in the municipal sphere, e.g. the Netherlands' constitution in its 
Article 66 as amended in 1963, which reads: 
Legal regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not apply if this application 
should be incompatible with provisions - binding on anyone - of agreements 
entered into either before or after the enactment of the regulations.C^i) 
In all six Member States of the GCC, by contrast, there is no constitutional 
or administrative provision speaking of the hierarchy between national and 
international treaty law, let alone the supremacy of the latter. As such, one major tool 
for answering that question has become of no value with regard to this discussion. 
The other major tool by which that question may be tackled is the 
jurisprudence of the national courts and tribunals. In the UK, for example, writers 
such as Brownlie were able to state what is the internal status of the international 
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treaty law in the UK based on the cases decided on this very issue Unfortunately, 
in the GCC Member States relevant cases decided by courts and other judicial or 
quasi-judicial bodies are not easily accessible. Vigorous attempts to obtain some were 
unsuccessful. It appeared eventually that this problem facing legal researchers is a 
common one, except to those closely linked with the national legal institutions. 
Disappointing as it must be, the consequence is that this tool, which could have been 
very useful indeed, has been rendered useless for answering the question raised at the 
outset of this discussion. With the inability to employ those two means, or either one 
of them, this discussion in most parts takes a course of prediction of what the status 
of treaty law would be, rather than what it is. 
In an attempt to obtain the best prediction, the discussion will be based first, 
on thorough readings of the provisions of the treaties concluded by the Members of 
the GCC in order to ascertain their attitude to the idea of the supremacy of 
international law and, second, on examining the internal ranking of the instruments 
transforming the GCC treaties and making them internally applicable. 
Reading of the provisions of treaties concluded by the Member States before 
and after the GCC was set up reveals that they seem to differentiate between two 
categories: one category includes those treaties the subject of which is the regulation of 
the inter- governmental relations and the States as such; with regard to the GCC, these, 
so far, include the Charter of the GCC and the Agreement on the GCC Privileges and 
Inraiunities Conflicts and disputes arising under those treaties, and the hke, are 
stipulated to be of an inter-State nature, hence both treaties provided for their submission 
to the GCC Commission for Settiement of Disputes International law, as opposed to 
any national law, is a principal source of that Commission's law. 
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The second category includes those treaties which create rights and impose 
obligations upon the citizens of the Member States, whether namral or legal. The 
forum for execution of such treaties is the national courts and other quasi-judicial 
bodies and tribunals. It is in this category that it was found that most treaties, especially 
those to which the GCC Members are all or most parties, contained express terms for 
the supremacy of the words of the concerned treaty over inconsistent municipal law. 
Examples are not only the very typical GCC ones, i.e. the EA in its Article 27, but also 
those of the pre-GCC period when the States' co-operation was non-institutionalised; 
that era witnessed a number of treaties containing provisions providing for the 
primacy of their rules over conflicting national law, including: the Treaties 
establishing the Arabian Company for Maritime Transportation Article 3, the 
Arabian Corporation for Petroleum Services Article 5, and the Arabian Corporation 
for Shipbuilding and Repair Article 3 ^^^\ The question, as yet, is what would one 
make out of those abundant examples providing expressly for the superiority of the 
treaty law? What would be the internal status of GCC treaty law in particular? 
Seemingly, it removed much of the believed individualistic notion of the 
Member States' interests. Moreover, it shed light on the fact that the States have 
established an attitude which gives treaties duly ratified the status they ought to be 
given by express terms. However, those examples are probably not decisive and 
enough evidence to make one unequivocally confirm that the Member States of the 
GCC give priority to treaty law over national law in case of conflict. The primacy 
provided for in those treaties is probably a qualified one; this limitation on the 
provided superiority has to do with the instrument by which a treaty is made applicable 
internally as well as its date of issuance. 
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Restricting the discussion to the internal status of the GCC treaty law, the 
prediction takes the following course: the constitutions, basic laws or organisational 
laws are amended by two-thirds majority of the empowered national organs ^'^\ in 
most Member States, while the national instruments, i.e. law or decree, are passed by 
absolute majority, therefore, it can be strongly argued that the GCC treaty law, even 
with the above-mentioned provision on its primacy, is likely to stop short of 
over-riding a constitutional provision, whether such provision is embodied prior or 
subsequent to a GCC treaty law. Indeed, Article 113 of the U.A.E. Constitution, 
Article 38 of the Bahrain Constitution and Article 71 of the Kuwait Constitution, 
reproduced in Appendices 7.1, 7.2 and 7.5 respectively, all provide expressly that the 
internal effectiveness of decrees effectuating treaties is conditioned by their 
consistency with the constitutions. In Qatar, Article 27 of its constitution provides that 
such decrees have the force of law provided that they are not contrary to the "essential 
guiding principles of State Policy". The State Policy, according to Articles 3-8 of the 
Qatar Constitution, includes the principles of the preservation of State sovereignty 
and allegiance to the Arab Nation, Islamic Nation and United Nations, the principle 
of free market economy, the principle of improvement based on Islam, and the 
principle of improving the educational and cultural prosperity of the citizens. 
Apparently, decrees implementing an international treaty in this State are open 
broadly for interpretation, unlike those in the States of Bahrain, U. A.E. and Kuwait. 
In Oman and Saudi Arabia, as mentioned above, there is no written constitution, 
therefore, it is unforeseeable that a treaty rule would be contested as in contradiction 
with a constitutional principle; and, there is no parliamentary supremacy or the like. 
Moreover, the constitutions of Bahrain and Kuwait, in Article 38 and 71 
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respectively, provide that in cases where treaties are accorded effect by decrees, rather 
than by laws made with the participation of the legislative branches, such decrees have 
the force of law only insofar as they are not: 
contrary to the constitution or the appropriations included in the budget law. 
Thus, treaty law of the GCC implemented by decree in those States gives way 
to budget law unless the decrees are upgraded to laws which, of course, involves the 
participation of the legislative organs and the majority required for passing budget 
law. 
At another stage, although GCC treaty law has been made effective in all 
Member States by the highest ranking instrument, and whilst it prevails over existing 
national law, it could be subjected to inconsistent subsequent municipal law by a 
municipal court, leaving the moral as well as the international obligation to be faced 
by the executive. But, courts can adopt a rule of construction such as that employed 
by British courts whereby bringing as far as possible conflicting subsequent law into 
conformity with their countries' GCC obligations. Assuming that their executives in 
the first place would not deliberately negotiate and adopt rules contrary to their 
constitutions, the room for manoeuvring of the suggested rule of construction is wide 
provided that the courts take positive and special attitude towards GCC rules which 
they should do if the existence of the GCC is to have any meaning for the citizens to 
whom its founders said it was established. At any rate, GCC treaty law should take 
priority over national law of inferior ranking, irrespective of its date of issuance. 
This discussion, however, will not be balanced without mentioning that 
contrary arguments on this point, particularly with regard to those treaties provided 
expressly for their provisions' supremacy, may not be unfounded. At this early stage 
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of the GCC's existence the role of researchers is really to point roughly towards the 
direction his or her point of discussion may take, particularly in view of the scarcity of 
information. That having been stated, it should be remembered that if a state passes 
inconsistent legislation and it appeared that the provided primacy was by-passed, the 
state remains responsible to its counterparts under international law for breach of its 
international obligations. 
In the eyes of the international community, international law is supreme in 
the international sphere. Thus, inconsistent internal law and other constitutional 
considerations have no effect in the international scene, nor can they relieve a state 
from its responsibility to shoulder the consequences of the breach of its international 
obligations. This is a principle enshrined in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on 
the law of treaties, which reads: 
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46. 
Article 64 provides: 
1. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty 
has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law 
regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent 
unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal 
law of fundamental importance. 
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any state 
conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice 
and in good faith. 
Consequently, whilst a national judge may internally apply a subsequent 
conflicting law, be it for internal legal reasons, the state as such is obliged to bring its 
national law into conformity with its international obligations resulting from treaties, 
though international law does not really invalidate the municipal law 
The Relationship Between GCC Rules and Municipal Laws of the Member States 319 
Summary 
From a theoretical point of view, the relationship between external and 
internal law has been dominated by the 'dualist - monist' doctrine. The dualist theory 
broadly speaking allows the enforcement of international law in the national sphere 
only when transformed into the latter, whereas the monist theory allows the direct 
adoption and enforcement of international law without transformation. As such, 
incorporation of international rules into the municipal sphere takes one of two 
methods: 'Transformation' or 'adoption', or both, but each for a set of rules of 
international law, e.g. transformation for treaties and adoption for customs. There are 
varieties of each system. In practical terms, the mechanisms may not be quite so far 
apart as at first appears. In the United States, which may be said to be a monistic state, 
for treaties to operate as domestic law, nonetheless, the national courts must decide 
whether they are 'self-executing'. In the United Kingdom, which shows a dualistic 
approach towards treaties, although legislation is necessary before the courts can give 
effect to an international obligation, it is often the case that the exact language of the 
treaty is incorporated into the implementing statute; further, English courts have 
increasingly recognised that in interpreting implementing statutes, it is their 
obligation to examine the meaning of the treaty language according to the canons of 
interpretation of international law and not to impose upon it the interpretive 
techniques applicable to domestic statutes. 
As regards GCC law, it was confirmed that it is international rather than 
supranational law, though it is in fact a regional international law. It appeared too that 
Member States of the GCC are more monist countries with regard to external treaty 
rules including those of the GCC, as the organ which concludes treaties also 
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implements them in domestic law. 
Generally, however, in the legal systems of Member States, the constitutional 
matters of the relationship between law and domestic law are not always clearly 
established and the courts have had few opportunities to develop their own positions. 
Given the objectives of the GCC, especially given the necessary impact of its 
programmes in the conduct and interests of individuals and corporations, it is 
desirable that such constitutional ambiguities as exist, and such powers as the courts 
have, be resolved and exercised in giving the maximum effect to the GCC treaty and 
its associated obligations. 
Meanwhile, courts in particular should step in and make it crystal clear to 
investors and economic activists that the courts will find a way for effectuating GCC 
rules and maintaining their priority over domestic legislations. Such a way may be in 
the form of adopting a rule of interpreting GCC obligations so that Member States 
keep up to their obligations similar to that employed by British courts with regard to 
EC obligations. So doing will generate peoples' attraction and trust of GCC economic 
opportunities, hence the development of the GCC as an organisation, hence making 
its existence meaningful. 
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7.1; UAE 
Article 120/1 
The Union shall have exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction in the 
following matters: 
1. Foreign Affairs... 
Article 124 
Before the conclusion of any treaty or international agreement which may affect 
the special position of any one of the Emirates, the competent Union authorities shall 
consult that Emirate in advance. In the event of disputes they shall submit the matter 
to the Supreme Court of the Union for ruling. 
Article 91 
The Government shall be responsible for informing the Union National Council 
of international treaties and agreements concluded with other states and the various 
international organisations, together with appropriate explanations. 
Article 110/1 and 2 
1. Union laws shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article and other appropriate provisions of the Constitution. 
2. A draft law shall become law after the adoption of the following procedure: 
a. The Council of Ministers shall prepare a draft law and submit it to 
the Union National Council. 
b. The Council of Ministers shall submit the draft law to the President 
of the Union for his agreement and presentation to the Supreme Council 
for their ratification. 
c. The President of the Union shall sign the law after ratification by the 
Supreme Council and shall promulgate it. 
Article 113 
If between meetings of the Supreme Council, the speedy promulgation of Union 
laws, which caimot be delayed, is required, the President of the Union and the Council 
of Ministers may together promulgate the necessary laws in the form of decrees which 
shall have the force of law, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. 
Such decree laws must be submitted to the Supreme Council within a week at the 
maximum for assent or rejection. In the case of assent the force of law shall be 
confirmed and the Union National Council shall be informed accordingly at its next 
meeting. 
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Article 111 
Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Union within a maximum 
of two weeks from the date of their signature and promulgation by the President of 
the Union after the Supreme Council has ratified them. Such laws shall become 
effective one month after the date of their publication in the said Gazette, unless the 
law stipulates another date. 
Article 125 
The Governments of the Emirates shall undertake to take the appropriate steps 
to implement the laws promulgated by the Union and the treaties and international 
agreements concluded by the Union, including the promulgation of the local laws, 
regulations, decisions and decrees necessary for such implementation. 
Article 144/a, c and d 
a. If the Supreme Council considers that the supreme interests of the Union 
require the amendment of this Constitution it shall submit a draft constitutional 
amendment to the Union National Council. 
c. The approval of the Union National Council for a draft constitutional amend-
ment shall require the agreement of two-thirds of the votes of members present. 
d. The President of the Union shall sign the constitutional amendment in the name 
of the Supreme Council and as its representative and shall promulgate the amend-
ment. 
Article 60 
The Council of Ministers, in its capacity as the executive organ of the Union, 
and under the Supreme control of the President of the Union and the Supreme 
Council, shall be responsible for dealing with all internal and external matters within 
the competence of the Union according to this Constitution and Union laws. 
7.2: Bahrain 
Article 35/a 
The Amir shall have the right to initiate laws, and he alone shall ratify and 
promulgate the laws. 
Article 37 
The Amir shall conclude treaties by decree and shall transmit them immediately 
to the National Assembly with the appropriate statement, A treaty shall have the force 
of a law after it has been signed, ratified and published in the Official Gazette. 
However, treaties of peace and alliance, and treaties concerning the territory of 
the State, its natural resources or sovereign rights, or public or private rights of 
citizens, and treaties of commerce, navigation and residence, and treaties which entail 
additional expenditure not provided for in the budget of the State, or which involve 
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amendment to the laws of Bahrain, shall come into effect only when made by a law. 
In no case may treaties include secret provisions contradicting those declared. 
Article 38 
Should necessity arise for urgent measures to be taken while the National 
Assembly is not in session or is dissolved, the Amir may issue decrees in respect 
thereof which shall have the force of a law, provided that they shall not be contrary to 
the Constitution or the appropriations included in the budget law. 
Such decrees shall be referred to the National Assembly within the fifteen days 
following their issue if the Assembly is in being. If it is dissolved or its legislative term 
has expired such decrees shall be referred to the next Assembly at its first sitting. If 
they are not thus referred they shall retroactively cease to have the force of a law 
without the necessity of any decision to that effect. I f they are referred and the 
Assembly does not confirm them, they shall also retroactively cease to have the force 
of a law, unless the Assembly approves their validity for the preceding period or settles 
in some other way the effects arising therefrom. 
Article 42 
No law may be promulgated unless it has been passed by the National Assembly 
and ratified by the Amir. 
Article 59 
For a meeting of the National Assembly to be vahd, more than half of its 
members must be present. Resolutions shall be passed by an absolute majority vote 
of the members present, except in cases where a special majority is required. 
Article 104/a 
Notwithstanding the provision of Article 35 of this Constitution, for an amend-
ment to be made to any provision of this Constitution, it is stipulated that it shall be 
passed by a majority vote of two-thirds of the members constituting the Assembly and 
ratified by the Amir. 
Article 106 
Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette within two weeks of their 
promulgation and shall come into effect one month after their pubhcation. The latter 
period may be extended or reduced for any law by a special provision included in it. 
73: Saudi Arabia 
Article 18 states, under the title Jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers: 
The Council of Ministers shall draw up the policy of the State in the areas 
of internal and foreign affairs, finance, economy, education, defence and 
all public matters and shall oversee its execution; it shall possess legislative 
Appendices: Pertinent Constitutional Provisions 329 
authority, executive authority and administrative authority. It is the ulti-
mate authority for financial affairs and for all affairs committed to all 
Ministries of the State and other departments, and it shall decide what 
measures it may be necessary to take therein. Treaties and international 
agreements shall not come into effect until they are approved by the Council 
of Ministers. And decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be final, except 
for those which require the issuance of Royal order or decree in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Statute. 
Articles 19,20 and 24, under the heading Legislative Functions, read: 
19. Laws, treaties, international agreements and concessions shall not be issued, 
except in form of Royal decrees drafted after the approval of the Council of Ministers. 
20. Laws, treaties, international agreements or concessions may not be amended, 
except by law to be promulgated in conformity with Article 19 of this Statute. 
24. All decrees must be published in the Official Gazette, and they shall enter into 
force as of the date of their publication, unless a period is stipulated therein. [Author's 
translation] 
7.4; Qatar 
Article 23/1 and 3 provides: 
The Amir shall exercise the following powers: 
1. He shall represent the State internally and towards other States in all interna-
tional relations. 
3. He shall ratify and promulgate laws and decrees.Such laws and decrees shall not 
enter into force until they are pubUshed in the Official Gazette, and they must be 
published in this Gazette, after their ratification and issuance, within two weeks from 
the date of issuance. They shall come into force after one month from the date of their 
publication, unless the law itself stipulates another date. 
Article 24/1 reads: 
The Amir shall conclude treaties by decree and shall inform the Consult-
ative Council of them together with the appropriate statement. A treaty 
shall have the force of law after its conclusion, ratification and publication 
in the Official Gazette. 
Article 34/2 states: 
In its capacity as the highest executive organ, the Council of Ministers shall 
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be responsible for the administration of all the internal and external affairs 
which fall within its competence in accordance with their Constitution and 
laws. The Council of Ministers in particular shall have the following 
powers:... 
2. Propose draft laws and decrees and submit them to the Consultative Council for 
discussion and forming an opinion thereto prior to their submission to the Amir for 
ratification and promulgation in accordance with the principles of this Constitution... 
Article 51/First/3 reads: 
The Consultative Council shall have the power to: 
First, discuss the following:... 
3. The draft laws proposed by the Council of Ministers and submitted to it, prior 
to their submission to the Amir for ratification and promulgation. [Author's transla-
tion] 
7.5: Kuwait 
Article 6 
The system of Government in Kuwait shall be democratic under which sover-
eignty resides in the people, the source of all powers. Sovereignty shall be exercised 
in the maimer specified in this Constitution. 
Article 65, in part 
The Amir shall have the right to initiate, sanction and promulgate laws... 
Article 70 
The Amir shall conclude treaties by decree and shall transmit them immediately 
to the National Assembly with the appropriate statement. A treaty shall have the force 
of law after it is signed, ratified and published in the Official Gazette. 
However, treaties of peace and aUiance; treaties concerning the territory of the 
State, its natural resources or sovereign rights, or public or private rights of citizens; 
treaties of commerce, navigation and residence; and treaties which entail additional 
expenditure not provided for in the budget, or which involve amendment of the laws 
of Kuwait; shall come into force only when made by a law. 
In no case may treaties include secret provisions contradicting those declared. 
Article 71 
Should necessity arise for urgent measures to be taken while the National 
Assembly is not in session or is dissolved, the Amir may issue decrees in respect 
thereof which shall have the force of law, provided that they shall not be contrary to 
the Constitution or to the appropriations included in the budget law. 
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Such decrees shall be referred to the National Assembly within the fifteen days 
following their issue if the Assembly is in being. If it is dissolved or its legislative term 
has expired, such decrees shall be referred to the next Assembly at its first sitting. If 
they are not thus referred, they shall retrospectively cease to have the force of law, 
without the necessity of any decision to that effect. If they are referred and the 
Assembly does not confirm them, they shall retrospectively cease to have the force of 
law, unless the Assembly approves their validity for the preceding period or settles in 
some other way the effects arising therefrom. 
Article 79 
No law may be promulgated unless it has been passed by the National Assembly 
and sanctioned by the Amir. 
Article 97 
Article 174, in parts 
Either the Amir or one-third of the members of the National Assembly shall 
have the right to propose the revision of this Constitution by amending or deleting 
one or more of its provisions or by adding new provisions...Approval by a two-thirds 
majority vote of the Members constituting the Assembly shall be required for the bill 
to be passed.... 
Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
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8.A: The Findings Digested 
Member States of the GCC are the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
Qatar and Kuwait. They have been brought to their present position of independent 
and sovereign States over the course of the past few decades. Saudi Arabia and Oman 
joined the international community earlier in this century. Kuwait gained its 
independence in 1961; Bahrain, Qatar and UAE ten years later. Since the early 1970s 
the States have realised that, by themselves, political independence does not 
guarantee the achievement of stability and prosperity for their people. They further 
recognised the imperative need for common actions in lieu of exclusive rights of each 
State. As a result, efforts towards co-operation in the various fields were set in motion. 
The 1970s witnessed numerous bilateral, as well as multilateral, agreements amongst 
the six States, for co-ordination in spheres including the economy, education, culture, 
information, health, labour and social affairs, communications, etc.. By the end of the 
1970s the States stood on the threshold of a decisive phase in their political evolution. 
Under the impulse of these co-operation agreements and new initiatives, the States 
grasped the need to move towards some form of closer unity under the umbrella of 
an institutionalised arrangement. That desire for conmion action reached its peak in 
1981 when, on 25 May, the six States formally signed the GCC Charter and other 
related documents. Integration in the economic sphere was considered the backbone 
of the journey necessary for integrating other fields. The EA, therefore, was signed 
by the states only six months after the establishment of the GCC. 
The purpose of this study has been to analyse the GCC experience from a 
legal point of view. In particular, it has attempted to illuminate how the GCC is made 
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up, what type of association it is, and what implications the formation of the GCC has 
had for the Member States, especially in the economic area. 
Having described how the idea of the GCC was bom and later materialised, 
the study began with an examination of the Charter and other related constituent 
instruments in constitutional and institutional terms. It established that they are 
multilateral treaties signed and ratified by the six sovereign States in accordance with 
their respective domestic law procedures. In addition to being acts of an international 
political nature creating international legal obligations, the said treaties are the GCC 
constitution, establishing an institutional framework to undertake and carry out the 
aims of the GCC in accordance with the principles laid down therein. One of the main 
principles is equality between Member States. Despite the inequalities of the 
Members in terms of size, population, economic development and standing in the 
international community, the Charter laid the foundation of their co-operation on a 
footing of absolute equality, reflected in the composition of the Supreme Council as 
well as the Ministerial Council and their voting rules, i.e. one State one vote. Another 
GCC principle is the resort to amicable resolution of disputes. As far as the objectives 
of the GCC are concerned, the Charter designates it as "unity of the Member States". 
Of course, unity as an end-product can and does mean very different things to different 
people. However, apart from the policy-makers' statements, the conclusion of the EA 
and the adoption of various strategies in different spheres suggest that unity within 
the GCC means integration in particular fields: that is to say achieving uniform 
standards within these fields without destroying the independence of the Member 
States. The means employed to reach that end have been co-ordination in all fields 
with much emphasis on economic co-operation, for which purpose the EA was 
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concluded a few months after the establishment of the GCC. Besides enlisting these 
aims and principles, the Charter in its own terms resolves some common 
constitutional issues: for instance, it prohibits making reservations to its provisions. It 
is clear, too, in limiting membership to the six States which created the GCC in May 
1981. What it does not answer is the question of withdrawal; however, a respectable 
body of opinion would allow unilateral withdrawal when a constitution, like that of 
the GCC, is silent. 
From the institutional point of view, the Charter has established a structure 
marked with simpUcity, when bearing in mind the breadth of its subject matter and 
the tasks entailed. It created three principal organs: the highest is the Supreme 
Council composed of the heads of State and meeting once a year. It draws up policies 
of the GCC, both internal and external. Attached to it is a conciliatory ad hoc tribunal 
called the Commission for Settlement of Disputes. The Ministerial Council is the 
second main organ within the GCC framework. It comprises Foreign Ministers or 
other delegated ministers of the Member States. In practice the States' 
representatives at the Ministerial Council are usually Foreign Ministers, although on 
some occasions other ministers have joined the Foreign Ministers in the Ministerial 
Council sessions when the discussion has focused on areas of their expertise. As the 
junior and intermediate organ meets four times annually, it is the chaimel through 
which all detailed and preparatory work pass to the Supreme Council. The third GCC 
principal organ is the Secretariat General. It comprises the Secretary General, his two 
assistants and several hundred civil servants. Functions of the Secretariat are mainly 
of an administrative, financial and clerical nature. It is charged with the day to day 
work of the GCC through its various departments, e.g. legal, economic, political. 
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environmental, information, etc.. Pursuant to the Charter, any of the 
above-mentioned organs may establish sub-organs. The Supreme Council is 
empowered to form permanent committees. To date, the institutional development 
of the GCC includes the establishment of three ancillary institutions: the Gulf 
Investment Corporation, the Technical Office for Communications and the Board for 
Specifications and Standards. Furthermore, 17 specialised ministerial committees 
have been formed in an attempt to hasten the planning and execution of GCC 
programmes. 
These specialised committees are the prime source from which GCC 
decisions are taken annually by the Supreme Council, or by the Ministerial Council 
when authority to do so is delegated to it by the former. Decisions on substantive 
matters are made by unanimous vote of the Members present and voting, providing 
that the participants are no fewer than four. Procedural matters, on the other hand, 
are decided by majority vote. In practice, decisions are reached through consensus. 
GCC decision-making is influenced by the fact that the states' co-operation within the 
GCC is characterised by a consensus-building process in which an extensive 
co-operative network is maintained and promoted to facilitate interactions amongst 
Member States. This tendency could be grounded in the fact that the process 
estabhshes a sense of confidence because no vital interests are overlooked or ignored, 
hence generating far-reaching commitments along the road of integration. At any rate, 
once a decision is made, it is binding upon the Member States on the international 
plane; its internal effectiveness is dependent on being given effect by an enabling act 
as described by the respective national legal system. Although the character of the 
GCC has some indirect bearing on the effect of GCC law, the character of the GCC 
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has no bearing on whether or not the GCC is a separate legal person, both 
internationally and under the domestic law of Member States. 
The study reached the conclusion that the GCC is an international legal 
person in accordance with the requirements drawn by international jurists for gaining 
such attributes by organisations whose constituent instruments do not specifically 
stipulate that they are invested with an international legal personality, e.g. the UN. 
The GCC has a permanent organ undertaking its day-to-day work, i.e. the Secretariat 
General. As an organisation with a permanent organ, it must have a distinct will of its 
own, similar to that confirmed by the I d in the Reparations case to the UN. 
Additionally, the GCC has been established by an international treaty which specifies 
its purposes. Above all, the international juridical personality is found by necessary 
implication from powers and objectives vested in it. This international personality, 
however, has no existence in relation to non-members who have not accepted it as 
such explicitly or implicitly. 
As an international person, the GCC has some rights and duties by 
implication as a necessary means to discharge its functions effectively. In particular, 
it should be able to conclude agreements in the fields entrusted to it. 
The international personality of the GCC, in its meaningful sense, has 
introduced the GCC to the international community as a subject of international law; 
it is, therefore, responsible for all acts injurious to other subjects of law. The Hability 
for damage done will be borne by the GCC itself. The respectable body of 
jurisprudence on the issue shows that there may be exceptional circumstances when 
the acts of the organisation are the responsibility of its Members. The nature of the 
GCC as well as the intention of its Members in this regard are crucial. They may be 
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deduced from GCC constituent instruments. Explicit as well as implicit terms of its 
founding treaties neither suggest liability of the Members nor limit or exclude it. They 
appear neutral on the subject. Nonetheless when bearing in mind that the UN has 
itself born hability and, for instance, that the International Tin Council itself has been 
held liable, one would expect that the GCC as such will be liable. 
Apart from the necessary privileges and immunities which have been granted 
to the GCC, its subsidiaries and officials by the Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities, the GCC, in Article 1 of this Convention, was expressly endowed with 
independent juridical personality under municipal law of Member States. It may, in 
particular, acquire or dispose of movable or immovable property, conclude contracts 
and be a party to legal proceedings. Such private law capacity may be accepted by 
non-members even those which do not recognise it for the purposes of public 
international law. One way is in accordance with the rule of conflict of laws that the 
legal personality granted by one state to an entity in its domestic law may be accepted 
by another state for the purposes of its domestic law. 
As regards the character of that legal person, the GCC, the Charter does not 
state what precisely it is. This study is of the view that the GCC is a confederal 
institution. It seems abundantly clear that it is not a mere alliance for it has been 
provided with a permanent common organ possessing some measure of separate will. 
On the other hand, the Charter's employment of terms like "unity" and "intergration" 
triggers thoughts on its supranational or even federal character. The federal possibility 
is precluded by the fact that it does not show the elements of federal arrangements. 
There is no division of powers between the GCC and its Members, no independent 
common judiciary, no merger of sovereignties, and no direct contact between the 
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GCC and citizens of its Member States. It is of great significance to note that neither 
the founders of the GCC nor its treaties to date have contemplated merging the six 
States in a federal institution. It follows that Member States of the GCC are presently 
fixed at six. The existence of six governments, however, does not by itself rule out the 
supranationality of the GCC. Like federalism, supranationality has elements which 
must be exhibited by the GCC in order for it to be characterised a supranational 
institution. The number of its element vary from one study to another. The common 
ones are highly similar to those of federal arrangements in terms of kind, as opposed 
to degree. Amongst those mostly identified are the independence of the organisation 
vis-a-vis the governments of Member States, the direct effect of its rules within the 
legal systems of the members, the financial independence, the ability to take decisions 
by majority or weighted majority voting systems, and the partial transfer of sovereign 
powers to the common institution. The significance of each indicia is dependent on 
the nature of the organisation. What is required for a defensive organisation to be 
supranational is not necessarily the same for an economic one, etc. Broadly speaking, 
because it is an effective and less demanding model than the federal one, it appears 
that some existing international organisations including the GCC show some 
supranational features. Yet such organisations should not be classified supranational. 
The GCC, therefore, is not a supranational arrangement because it exhibits very few 
supranational elements, e.g. the institutionalisation. However, the GCC clearly has 
supranational aspirations reflected in the statements of its policy-makers and the 
provisions of its Charter and the EA. Hence, although it is difficult to classify it as 
supranational, the GCC is proceeding on supranational lines. 
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Evidently the GCC of today shows the following characteristics: it is 
composed of six States retaining their sovereignty, relations between its Members are 
determined under international law, whether the universal or the GCC one, decisions 
of substantive GCC matters are taken by unanimous vote, GCC law has no direct 
effect within the domestic legal sphere, its Members are at liberty to withdraw, and 
its policy-making organs are composed of instructed diplomats. Al l these elements 
are cited by jurists as indicia of confederalism. The GCC, thus, fits the category of 
confederalism far more comfortably than other models for integration. 
Confederalism then, is the keynote of GCC experience. To sum up, through its 
confederal structure, the GCC is pursuing supranational aspirations, reflected in its 
economic rules. 
GCC substantiative economic rules are embodied in the EA which was 
signed by the States only a few months after the creation of the GCC and ratified in 
accordance with the constitutional procedures in each Member State. Although it 
does not state it, the end pursued by the EA is economic integration through 
progressive steps. The detailed means whereby that end is to be achieved reveal an 
amount of flexibility in order to enable the GCC to adapt itself to changing 
circumstances and ideas as to how it should move towards realising its designated 
objectives. Despite the fact that the EA leaves ample room for the evolution of the 
GCC economic legal regime, such evolution is dependent upon the enactment of 
implementing rules by the Supreme Council or, when authorised, the Ministerial 
Council. 
The EA explicitly embodies the principle of free movement of goods of 
national origin, i.e. goods which have been entirely produced within the GCC as well 
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as those of foreign or undetermined origin, provided that the value added ensuing 
from their production in Member States is not less than 40% of their final value as at 
the termination of the production phase, and that Member States citizens' share in 
the ownership of the producing plant is not less than 51%. As a first step the EA 
envisages the establishment of a GCC Free Trade Area: that is, eliminating customs 
duties and other charges of assimilated effect and quantative restrictions on goods of 
national origin. On 1 March 1983, execution of the EA provisions began with the 
formation of the GCC FTE. Its detailed rules, sanctioned by the Supreme Council, 
were received and made part of the national legal systems. Attention then turned to 
creating a GCC Customs Union and materialising elements of a common market. In 
this direction, goods originating from within the GCC were accorded measures of 
equality; apart from equal taxation, products of national origin were granted priority 
in goveriunental purchasing. In addition, the GCC declared equality between means 
of transportation belonging to GCC nationals in terms of licensing recognition and 
equal opportunity for making use of the ports and services provided therein in any 
Member State. Most significant is the GCC success in creating a minimum external 
tariff of 4% before the lapse of the five years stipulated in the EA. Consultation is 
underway for agreement on a GCC Common External Tariff. Working out a Common 
Commercial Policy is an important current item on the GCC agenda. Steps towards 
a comprehensive CCP include the conclusion of a co-operation treaty between GCC 
States and the EEC, negotiating collectively similar agreements with the US and 
Japan, and the adoption of the unified system for the Protection of Industrial Products 
of National Origin, 
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As in the case of free mobility of goods, the EA provides explicitly for the 
free movement of individuals. It contemplates the confirmation upon citizens of 
Member States the rights of entry, residence, work, ownership, engagement in 
economic activities and practice of liberal professions through progressive steps. It 
also stresses equal treatment of nationals of the GCC in any Member State. 
Throughout the decade of the GCC's existence, a great deal has been accomplished 
in these directions. As regards the right of entry, the GCC abolished the entry visas 
required by some States prior to the creation of the GCC. Efforts are under way to 
introduce a GCC passport with a uniform format as a means of facilitating free 
mobility of individuals within the GCC. In the area of equal treatment, numerous 
measures have been taken in fields including housing ownership, acquisition of 
company shares and loans for investment, in accordance with agreed rules for each 
field. Fuller equality between GCC citizens is accorded in higher education, public 
education, health and taxation. Liberal professionals who are citizens of Member 
States are allowed by GCC rules to provide services in any Member State in the areas 
of law, medicine, accountancy, engineering, consultancy, pharmacy, translation, land 
surveying, soil inspection and programming, analysing and operating computers. In 
the establishment sphere, several GCC rules have been adopted to facilitate the 
effective exercise of the following economic activities: industrial, agricultural, animal 
and fish resources, contracting, operating hotels and restaurants and working therein, 
retail and wholesale trade, inspection, operation and maintenance, supply services, 
weights and measures, and cleaning services. Engagement of such economic activities 
is governed by the relevant GCC rules on the matter. Another set of GCC rules 
governs the practice of liberal professions. 
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It is important to consider questions raised by the above, as to how these, as 
well as other, GCC rules are contracted and treated by the domestic legal systems of 
the Member States. To begin with, the study established that GCC law is international 
rather than supranational, though it is in fact a regional international law. 
Consequently the relationship between GCC law and municipal law of Member States 
falls under the theories of the interrelation between international law and domestic 
law which has been dominated by the 'dualist' and 'monist' doctrines. In practice, a 
single domestic legal system may exhibit both tendencies. Generally, because of the 
variety constitutional systems, those formal terms cover a variety of circumstances 
where it may be possible to say only that a system is "more dualist" or "more monist" 
rather than purely one or another. The relationship between GCC law and municipal 
law of each Member State is not always clearly defined and the courts have had few 
opportunities to develop their own positions. In broad terms, GCC treaties and 
decisions are given internal effect by laws or decrees having the force of law. It was 
noted that national organs which conclude treaties and participate in making GCC 
decisions, i.e. the executives, also implement them for domestic law purposes. 
Therefore, the conclusion reached was that the six States are effectively more monist 
countries for the implementation process, apart from being conducted by the same 
organ, is relatively minor. 
As far as supremacy of GCC law is concerned, three points are worth 
mentioning: the first is that out of the several constituent GCC treaties only the EA 
in Article 27 provides for the priority of its provisions over inconsistent domestic law. 
There is no GCC court to clarify the scope of such an article. The second point is that 
Member States have developed an attitude which gives international obligations 
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priority over conflicting municipal law. Hence, GCC rules are more likely to be 
preserved. The third is that GCC law could be subjected to constitutional provision 
as well as the terms of national laws of higher ranking than the instrument whereby a 
GCC rule was given domestic effect. It is clearly the case that some device whereby 
individuals may rely on the content of GCC rules in domestic proceedings will 
contribute to ensuring that a State observes its GCC obligations in this sphere. How 
this is to be done is primarily a matter for the constitutional laws and the courts of the 
Member States themselves. The more effective constitutional laws are, the better 
implemented will be the objectives of the GCC. The courts and tribunals can and 
should adopt a rule of interpreting GCC obligations in a way similar to that employed, 
for instance, by British Courts with regard to EC obligations. Courts and tribunals of 
the GCC States should, as far as possible, construct in a manner which conforms with 
GCC rules those domestic laws which would otherwise purport to conflict. 
The shortcomings of the six States' overall organisational structure and in 
particular the gaps in their own legal systems were transmitted to the GCC. As stated 
in the beginning of this study, when GCC matters are disputed, its current mechanism 
for settlement of disputes which has not even been established, would be inadequate. 
Even were it able to dispose of some problems, it remains unsuitable for an institution 
embarking upon an integrative journey in which individuals are involved besides the 
States. The following section embodies an elaborated proposal on this structural 
deficiency as well as other recommendations. 
8.B: Recommendations 
As has been stated previously, in terms of institutional setting and 
constitutional structure, the GCC is a co-operative confederal institution. However, 
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in terms of objectives, it resembles integrative institutions such as the EEC. This latter 
integrative characteristic attempts to overwhelm an analyst of the GCC experience, 
particularly when studying GCC concepts in comparison with their counterparts in 
EC law. An analyst could reach a point where he questions achieving integration by 
ways other than those adopted in Western Europe. In such a case skill is needed to 
pay due regard to realities surrounding the GCC, rather than being carried away by 
the EC approach to integration. 
Special attention must be paid to statements made by GCC policy-makers 
who, while frequently referring to integration as the end never mention 
supranationalism, let alone federalism, as the means employed or to be employed in 
the near future. Such a prevailing attitude towards the GCC's foreseeable future 
logically draws boundaries to what one should recommend. Proposals, therefore, 
should be made with a view to being possible to implement within the current legal 
framework, or with slight modifications thereof. 
For such reasons, this section will be confined to the following two 
suggestions which should contribute to speedy implementation of the EA provisions 
and a steady march towards integration. 
8.B.I: The Need for a GCC Judicial Body 
a. Significance of Judicial Bodies to Integration 
It is submitted that the usefulness of a settlement method depends on the 
nature of the dispute under consideration. Some kinds of disagreements are 
appropriate for judicial solutions; others are better disposed of by resorting to 
non-judicial means. Examples of the latter are political differences, or even legal 
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questions when the parties are unwilling to refer them for adjudication for whatever 
reason. Disputes more appropriate for judicial means are, it is thought, in addition to 
those involving legal matters, any differences arising under a treaty or treaties 
establishing a regional organisation aiming at integrating its community. 
As such, the thesis of this section is that the possession by a regional 
organisation and the GCC in particular of a permanent judicial organ with jurisdiction 
over all disputes arising under its treaties, is the necessary means for achieving the 
ultimate goal of integration for the reasons highlighted below. 
In general terms, the important role judicial bodies can play, and their 
contribution to the promotion of the international community, have been identified 
by several learned authors. Brierly has noted that they are "not only a means of settling 
disputes, but to some extent a means of preventing them from arising" Jenks was 
more comprehensive when he stated that: 
"It is not a true service to world peace and world order to exaggerate or 
oversimplify the contribution which the rule of law can make to their promotion; 
wider and more genuine political freedom, fuller respect for civil rights, more 
vigorous policies of world-wide economic development, the enlistment of 
scientific and technological progress for the common good, a deeper sense of 
social purpose, a keener sense of collective responsibility, greater moral 
integrity and moral courage, all these have equally indispensable parts to play. 
They can play them effectively only within a comprehensive scheme of world 
organisation, but no such scheme can fulfil its purpose satisfactorily, or secure 
justice, unless the rule of law finding expression in the last resort in the judicial 
process plays its full part" (2). 
Application of the rule of law, consequently, plays a three-fold role: 
prevention, cure and advancement in all fields. Besides these advantages the 
availability of permanent judiciary relieves states from the task of creating a tribunal 
with the necessary negotiation for its composition, procedure, etc., whenever a dispute 
arises. 
Conclusion 
347 
Moreover, an independent judicial organ is able to consolidate the 
integration process of a community by the development and restatement of the 
regional and international law as well, ensuring the uniform application of the 
respective community law, identifying the objectives of the community and adapting 
them as policies in the production of its judgments and judicially legislating for the 
community through the interpretation of treaties and other sources of the concerned 
regional law. 
By reason of its permanent nature, a judicial institution, as time passes by, 
establishes a consistent jurisprudence hence contributing to the overall development 
and restatement of the law in which it is engaged. The jurisprudence established by 
the ICJ, for instance, has been of great importance to the legal order of the 
international community. That of the ECJ is imposing a body of European 
jurisprudence the positive effect of which has been felt not only in Europe where it 
originated but also in other parts of the world where a number of countries are 
embarking upon an integrative venture. 
Judicial bodies, more so in regional organisations, can assume an activist 
approach so as to allow a policy, i.e. the objectives which the body wishes to promote, 
to play a dominant role in arriving at its judgments. Policies of a court, if kept in 
perspective, are necessary in integrative organisations by reason of their lack of proper 
legislation. On this practice by courts in general and the ECJ in particular, it has been 
suggested that: 
All courts are influenced by policy, but in the European Court policy plays a 
particularly important role: occasionally the Court will ignore the clear words 
of the treaty in order to attain a policy objective. (3) 
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An examination of some of the E C J jurisprudence, for instance, reveals that 
policy motivations behind its decisions have existed; amongst the policies of the E C J 
are: 
"1. Strengthening the community 
2. Increasing the scope and effectiveness of Community law; 
3. Enlarging the powers of Community institutions;" W. 
In other words, "the promotion of European integration" (5). 
To take one case as an example, in the Van Gend case, the E C J ruled that the 
doctrine of primacy of Community law over national law is necessary in order to attain 
the objectives of the E C As such, the functional ability of the E C was the essential 
element in establishing the primacy of Community law over national law Other 
courts, including a G C C future one, could, likewise, identify the concept of their 
respective communities and their underlying objectives and seek to promote them 
through the production of reasonable jurisprudence which should close the gaps in 
the constituent treaties. 
As for any constitutional tribunal, courts which decide matters for 
international institutions have a wide law-making function because of the need to 
interpret the wide and general provisions of the basic treaties. In these circumstances, 
such courts can make a substantial contribution to strengthening the integration of 
the organisation, of which the performance of the E C J is the most remarkable 
example. It may be argued that the value of a court case law is dependent on whether 
or not the concerned community regards it as a binding precedent; however, even in 
cases where it is not, its persuasive force is most likely to be borne in mind in 
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subsequent rulings; as such, jurisprudence built up by a court will at least reflect the 
way the law is applied in practice. 
Yet another significant advantage of attaching a judicial organ to an 
organisation is its apparent role in ensuring that the terms of treaties and other sources 
of law are applied uniformly within the states who are party to them. Advisory opinions 
of the ICJ and preliminary rulings by the E C J are functioning towards that effect. 
Having stated that, the role that international tribunals, particularly on the universal 
level as seen in the ICJ, can play has been curtailed by several factors. One is the 
inclination of some states to mix political differences with legal questions for reasons 
including the existence of different ideological concepts and/or the distrust between 
the old and new states, a matter which renders such mixed cases suitable for 
non-judicial means. However, in regional organisations where the membership is 
selective, there is a presumption that disputes of a legal nature be stripped from any 
political implication and submitted for definitive judicial settlement for the overall 
interest of the functioning of the organisation; the growing number of regional judicial 
institutions is supportive of their usability as they now exist in Europe, America, Africa 
and Asia, and it is a promising prospect for judicial settlement within the framework 
of regional organisations which should encourage the G C C to form a judicial body of 
its own. 
Generally speaking, the fact that the role of the judicial method in the 
amicable settlement of disputes has remained quite modest has not resulted so much 
from deficiencies of the courts themselves but rather from the unwillingness of states 
to make use of them. 
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As regards the G C C , 10 years of existence without judicial authority 
necessary for proper supervision and enforcement of regional integration schemes 
may be justified by allowing Member States to adapt themselves to the concept of 
co-operation and the prospects for integration. This unlimited flexibility of 
implementation which may not have been offered had there been a judicial machinery 
enforcing G C C agreements should now be narrowed by establishing the necessary 
organ, ie a court of justice. 
The time has come to emphasise the rule of law in the G C C cooperation 
process, because the journey it is embarking upon involves so many individuals besides 
the six Member States. Hence, rights and obligations that have been supervised 
diplomatically ought hereafter to be watched by an appropriate judiciary accessible 
by natural and legal persons participating in the process of integration alongside the 
States themselves. It is probable that at the time the G C C was set up, attention was 
mainly concentrated on the economic and political aspects of the venture, and how 
the survival of the G C C could be maintained, fears which were, at that time well 
grounded. However, not only the survival of the G C C is now securely guaranteed, but 
also the integration programmes of the G C C are becoming tangible; as noted in 
previous chapters, national legal documents eg official gazettes, are now acquainted 
with the constant inclusion of G C C rules. It is, therefore, necessary that a G C C judicial 
mechanism of a permanent nature be established to ensure that what the politicians 
and economists have decided upon is administered and supervised in accordance with 
the rule of law. Another reason for the need for such a body is the fact that in the 
current G C C system, its rules are implemented by each state by means of national 
laws or decrees having the force of law aiming at achieving the same result. Yet 
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there is no authority to decide, should it be necessary, whether or not implementing 
national instruments are in harmony. Currently such authority is vested in poUtical 
bodies, ie the Supreme Council and the Ministerial Council, by means of diplomatic 
methods. This obvious gap in the G C C legal structure can be filled by setting up a 
judicial body. So far the question arises - what characteristics such a body should have? 
An attempt to identify some institutional and jurisdictional aspects that a G C C court 
should possess is made in the following point. 
b. A tentative suggest ion of a GCC Judicial Body 
The Charter of the G C C , particularly Article 6 which enumerates the 
institutions of the G C C , does not provide for a fully fledged judicial organ, hereinafter 
called a court, nor does it stipulate the creation of one in the future, unlike, for 
example. Article 19 of the Arab League Pact which contemplates the establishment 
of an Arab court of justice. The last paragraph of Article 6 in the G C C Charter which 
enumerates G C C organs provides that, "each of these organisations may estabhsh 
sub-agencies as may be necessary". It is self-evident therefore that the Article is not 
able to authorise the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council nor the Secretariat 
General to set up a permanent independent court. If, arguably, they were able to do 
so, then the court must be attached to the body establishing it, a matter which 
contradicts the principle of autonomy of courts and judicial institutions. 
What the G C C needs is an independent court to be established as one of the 
principal organs of the G C C ; in other words, a fourth body - as its Court of Justice. 
This will probably require Article 6 to be amended as mentioned above so as to allow 
such institutional enlargement. Be it so, the modification process should not be 
exaggerated for it can be made concurrently with the ratification of the statute which, 
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like the Charter of the G C C , should be inclusive to the six Member States so that the 
bulk of the jurisdiction and function be devoted to the GCC-related matters. 
Organisation: 
Seat: 
For a start, the seat of a G C C Court ought to be selected carefully. One 
possible site is at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where the headquarters of the Secretariat 
General are located. However, if one expects that a G C C Court, besides serving to 
consolidate the G C C , also to raise the profile of the G C C in the region, he/she might 
consider locating it in Bahrain where the University of the Gulf is situated, provided 
that other arrangements are made for establishing legal-educational bridges between 
the two; these arrangements should encompass the setting up, under the auspices of 
the University of the Gulf, of a G C C Centre for Legal Studies concentrating on G C C 
legal issues and taking into account international laws of co-operation and European 
law and integration. This suggested Centre will succeed if it is generously financed so 
that it can accommodate sufficient/enough students, researchers, lecturers, etc. This 
arm of the University of the Gulf and the future Court, both located in one city and 
easily accessible for every Member State, will have mutual academic legal relations 
and other contacts, each contributing to the promotion of G C C integration. The Court 
would hand down judgments and opinions on GCC-related legal questions, and the 
Centre would be a forum for G C C legal studies, laws and projects for the unification 
of legal systems, assessment of current programmes and mapping out of future 
prospects, providing judges and personnel concerned in the Court with legal materials, 
whether national, regional or international. 
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In brief, provided that the above, as well as other legally oriented 
arrangements are made, Bahrain would be an appropriate site for a G C C Court. Its 
geographic proximity to most Member States is the basic factor for its selection. Other 
sites still can be proposed. 
Composition 
A GCC Court should be composed of a relatively large number of judges, 
even if it is expected that it might not be inundated with cases in the near future so 
that as many judges as possible can gain experience. The detailed mechanism for the 
appointment of judges can remain to be worked out, to take into account the concerns 
of the States and the need to achieve independent and well qualified judges, in which 
all the States may have confidence. It will probably be necessary that each State has 
a national judge in the Court - six is not a good number for a court and so, perhaps, it 
will be necessary to appoint a president. 
Jurisdiction 
At this stage of the G C C operational development, it is necessary that a court 
be empowered to interpret its treaties and resolutions; to ensure Member States' 
compliance with its rules and to oversee the activities of its institutions. A first thought 
of the appropriate jurisdictional power would suggest the ECJ's jurisdictional model 
for a G C C Court. However, the economic and development levels of the G C C States 
are profoundly different from those of the E C countries, hence the effectiveness of a 
facsimile of the E C J in the G C C may well be questionable. Copying the ECJ's broad, 
complicated and strict jurisdiction could lead to the breakdown of the whole 
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organisation, or the disregard of the Court rulings, thus, though structurally sound, 
nuUifying its existence. 
Therefore a jurisdictional scope that is less than that granted to the E C J and 
more than that endowed, for instance, to the ICJ, should be worked out. For future 
development there ought to be a provision in its statute giving power to one body of 
the G C C based on a proposal by the Court to extend the Court's jurisdictional 
authority in line with the needs of the time and the evolution of the G C C . 
At this juncture one may depart from the promise that since five Member 
States within O A P E C have already submitted to compulsory jurisdiction, albeit of a 
limited nature, and allowed themselves - upon their assent - for actions to be brought 
against them by legal persons, they, as Members, are more likely to make further 
advancement towards a supranational judiciary under the banner of the G C C . After 
all, they have established the G C C and described integration of their States as its 
ultimate goal. 
Hereunder is a tentative suggestion on the contemporary types of jurisdiction 
required. First it should be pointed out that there must be an undertaking by Member 
States to submit all disputes relating to the functioning of the G C C to the future Court 
so that advantages of such a regional judicial body can be materialised by the Court. 
1. Disputes relating to the funct ion of the GCC 
Interpretation of the GCC Charter and subsequent agreements. 
Endowing a Court with a power to interpret provisions of treaties 
undoubtedly ensures their uniform application within the parties Member States. In 
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particular, uniformity in the interpretation and application in integrative communities 
is a necessary requirement for the existence and functioning of a common market. 
Such power, however, can be extended or otherwise, according to the nature 
of the organisation concerned, ie whether supranational like the E C or international, 
like the UN. Although the G C C is basically a co-operative institution, its integrative 
objectives have presented it as an integration-orientated community. 
Consequently in the case of the G C C a compulsory interpretative jurisdiction 
should be granted to its future judicial body in terms of allowing for the achievement 
of uniform application of G C C treaties. In principle, such compulsory jurisdiction has 
been accepted by Member States with other organisations, eg OAPEC, hence the 
principle has been acknowledged already by Member States.^ ^^ 
Actions of non-compliance 
Although poUtical controls may be sufficient in organisations of one or a 
limited field of operations, judicial supervision is necessary in those of comprehensive 
objectives embarking upon integrative ventures. The width of the aims as well as the 
participation of persons other than states in the venture render political bodies, 
however keen they are to ensure compliance, unable to discharge their supervisory 
function effectively since they are, at the same time, already loaded with their proper 
preparatory and legislative tasks. 
Therefore several communities, including the E C and Andean Pact, attribute 
to their respective courts compulsory jurisdiction enabling them to entertain actions 
of non-compliance ^^ \^ Both communities share similarities with the G C C in terms 
of long term goals. 
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Consequently, a G C C Court ought to be empowered to hear actions of 
non-compliance by Member States. And, as in both communities mentioned above, 
there should be a requirement that an intermediary administrative phase proceeds 
instituting proceedings in the Court, ie to designate a G C C organ, say the Secretariat 
General, to question the accused state, investigate the matter and participate in the 
action against the Member. 
Staff Disputes 
The number of staff in the G C C is probably in its hundreds. Thus it may be 
strongly argued that this size, when compared for instance with that of the E C , does 
not warrant assigning a G C C Court specific jurisdiction for their disputes within the 
G C C ; instead, an administrative tribunal would fulfil the task. However, for the sake 
of the unity of the judiciary and adjudicating administrative matters by judicial 
mechanisms, the size factor as well as the possible substitutions should be disregarded, 
hence granting a future G C C Court jurisdiction over its civil servants' disputes. In 
practice, the E C J is provided with such jurisdiction by Article 179 of E E C Treaty. 
Actions for Nullification 
Several permanent judicial bodies have been assigned jurisdiction to decide 
cases for nullification of acts by institutions of their respective organisations 
Proceedings may be brought by a member state, another institution or by natural or 
legal persons. 
This type of jurisdiction is pertinent for a future G C C court. It could, though, 
be argued that in the case of the G C C where decisions are taken unanimously, such 
jurisdiction may not be necessary. Instead, should a State consider a potential act is 
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in violation of the norms which comprise the judicial structure of the G C C , it can easily 
block the decision by casting a negative vote and thereby keeping the problem at bay. 
However sound this argument might be, it does not take into account that questioning 
an act may arise after the decisions are made. Therefore, a Member State or a G C C 
institution should be able to bring proceedings for annulment of a G C C measure 
within a specified period of time. 
2. Disputes not directly related to the functioning of the G C C 
There are some disputes the rise of which could affect the very existence of 
the G C C . These disputes do not arise under the G C C arrangement although they are 
indirectly related to the functioning and development of the G C C . The most serious 
type of disputes, it is believed, are frontier disagreements. Despite the fact that most 
of the boundary disputes have been settled, several are still awaiting amicable 
settlement ^^ l^ Silence of Member States on these disputes causes considerable 
disturbance to those concerned about the future of the G C C and its journey; yet it 
could mean that Member States have decided either to accept the status quo as the 
final and definite solution or that they consider their existence in hidden forms without 
danger. In neither case is the potential danger removed from the way of their 
co-operation within the G C C . They are still potential time-bombs which can explode 
at any time, as one did.^ '^^ ^ 
Should they have decided, for whatever reason, that those territorial disputes 
are not worth bringing up, discussion and resolution and that the status quo pleases 
every State, i.e. each State keeps what it currently has, they should openly announce 
this and document it in, for instance, a summit meeting so that this potential threat of 
instability is definitely avoided. 
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If, on the other hand, their disregard of the unsettled frontier disputes is 
based on the belief that 'unity' or 'integration', or even constant 'co-operation' can 
evolve regardless, it is thought they must have misjudged the destructive force such 
differences could produce. For, even if people of the area choose to ignore existing 
unsettled disputes in order to promote friendly co-operation, outsiders within and 
outside of the Gulf will always find these disputes useful tools for undermining the 
venture of the states within the framework of the G C C whenever such outsiders 
decide that ignition of such disputes is to their advantage. 
General Jurisdiction 
It is submitted that most states prefer diplomatic means and arbitration over 
judicial methods for reasons including cost, time, propriety and the uncertainty about 
the outcome of the judicial process. However, the narrower the membership is in an 
organisation, the less convincing are most of these grounds for argument. In fact once 
considerations are given to long-term benefits, states who are members in a regional 
organisation armed with a judicial organ may sacrifice some of the immediate gains 
for the sake of building up an intra-state relationship based on the rules of law which 
resolve problems, and saves face from public criticism which is likely to be the case 
had disputes been disposed of by diplomatic means. 
Therefore, a G C C Court should be armed with non-compulsory judicial 
jurisdiction to handle cases which lie beyond the functioning of the G C C . 
In the case of the G C C , the need for such jurisdiction is acute for the reasons 
outlined above, ie the frontier disputes. A provision providing for a general 
jurisdiction over disputes referred by G C C Member States by special agreement will 
likely be made a future Court, a forum for settling the said disputes. 
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Arbitrat ion jurisdiction 
At the international adjudication level, arbitral jurisdiction has been 
attributed to some international courts, eg the E C J and the Projected Islamic Court 
of Justice ^^ '^ \ Usually such jurisdiction comes into play when a bilateral or 
multilateral treaty or contract stipulates that disputes arising under it be settled 
through arbitration by a designated court. 
There is no doubt that designation of a court as a forum for arbitration and/or 
arbitrator is a testimony of its competence. Accordingly, assigning a G C C Court an 
arbitration jurisdiction will clothe it with that prestige. But apart from that, and the 
fact that endowing it with such jurisdiction by the Member States is clear expression 
of their trust in the Court, when it actually arbitrates successfully, inter-state hidden 
disputes are likely to be unveiled and submitted to the Court for definitive solutions, 
especially if the states involved prefer arbitration methods over purely judicial ones. 
8.B.II: The Need for a G C C Supervisory Arm 
Within the current G C C framework, there is no supervisory body as such. 
Enforcement of G C C rules has been inspired by good relations between Member 
States, their desire to realise G C C objectives and their interested citizens' desire to 
see that goverimients of G C C states, including their own, implement the agreed rules. 
The General Secretariat undertakes a form of indirect supervision by means of 
collecting information on the implementation of G C C rules. Taking into account that 
the Secretariat General is overloaded by secretarial and preparatory tasks, assigning 
the supervision function to a sub-organ would contribute a great deal to the G C C 
experience as a whole. 
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This can be done within the existing legal framework of the GCC. Article 6 
of the Charter provides that each of the three principal organs may create sub-organs 
as necessary. Hence, the Supreme Council preferably can establish a supervision 
organ and attach it to itself so that this organ contacts national entities in the name of 
the highest G C C body, i.e. the Supreme Council. 
The significance of such an organ lies in the fact that the mere existence of it 
should be an incentive for the concerned national entities to implement G C C rules 
because otherwise it may draw attention to some non-compliance which currently 
went unnoticed. As explained below, since Member States noticeably implement 
G C C rules as they are handed down, the main task of this proposed organ will be to 
see to it that the exact terms or at least the substance of G C C rules are given internal 
effect. 
G C C decisions are characterised for being poorly worded and presented to 
the public, in particular the economic ones in which private citizens are most 
interested. More importantly, they are of no direct effect which means that during the 
process of their internal effectuation, they could be stripped of their substance to a 
variety of degrees. 
For such reasons, this suggested body in the name of the Supreme Council 
should be entrusted with supervisory tasks including the following: 
1) formulating G C C decisions in a detailed manner before they are decided 
by the Supreme Council or the Ministerial Council should it be 
empowered to take decisions; 
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2) ensuring that G C C decisions are made effective by the required national 
instrument, through examination of the official gazette and contacts with 
concerned entities. As noted in chapters five and sbc, some States 
sometimes communicate with the Secretariat General by letter that, for 
instance, "the concerned establishment has been instructed to execute the 
decision of the Supreme Council", even though domestic law requires law 
or decree rather than a letter. Therefore this proposed body can be 
empowered to insist on implementing G C C rules by the constitutionally 
prescribed instrument. It may well be the case that officials realising that 
a letter may be held to be inadequate, start observing their own 
constitutional requirements. The point to be stressed here is establishing 
direct contacts between the Supreme Council represented by this 
supervisory organ and the national entities concerned rather than the 
foreign ministries, taking into consideration that such supervision is made 
only after a rule is established so that should a State dislike it, it can block 
the decision, by preventing it from being made in the first place; and 
3) During its supervisory function, the body is likely to be more 
knowledgeable of the practical problems and obstacles involved in 
implementing certain rules. Therefore, it should also be assigned a 
responsibility to gather together such problems, propose solutions with the 
aid of the concerned G C C specialised committees, and submit them to the 
Supreme Council for modification. 
In summary, despite the constant implementation of G C C rules by Member 
States, there have been cases where the substance of the rules was not implemented. 
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In Other cases, moreover, the implementing instruments required by domestic law 
were not observed. Therefore a G C C supervisory body attached to the Supreme 
Council is in order. Deriving its power from that of the Supreme Council, which is 
composed of the six rulers, it will encourage Member States to implement and comply 
with G C C rules. This body can be created within the existing terms of the G C C 
Charter, Article 6. Hence, future improvements of the G C C should include the issue 
of supervision in line with what was stated above. 
8. C: Future Prospects: 
The States which make up the G C C possess one of the most important 
commodities of our time - oil. This has made the Gulf areas of vital interest to most 
industrialised nations, particularly the United States. Involvement, therefore, of such 
states in the policymaking has been and probably will be persisting whether directly 
or indirectly. Regionally the States of the G C C have always been affected by the events 
in neighbouring countries. In particular, security and stability of the six States could 
not be easily divorced from security and stability in other Gulf states. For instance, 
the States suffered from the Iran-Iraq war to a variety of degrees. Internally the fall 
of the price of oil has affected the economy and development plans in every State. In 
addition, as the development projects and industrialisation plans begin to snowball in 
some States, the need for co-ordination to avoid duplication and competition was, and 
still is, imperative. 
Needless to say, as the above suggests, the GCC's future is influenced by 
international, regional and internal factors. Seemingly, therefore, in assessing its 
future one should first enquire into whether the very existence of the G C C is secure 
enough. In order to establish a reasonable answer, it appears necessary, inter alia, to 
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examine the motives which prompted its six Members to embark upon this journey of 
integration and to see if these motives are still present. 
The founders have stated one motive for the setting up of the G C C : 
integration amongst the Member States and, realising the prosperity of their peoples 
for security and respectable standards of living This aim is yet to materialise, 
hence it will continue to be a motive for some time to come. Other non-stated reasons 
for establishment of the G C C have been suggested ^^ \^ These include the belief that 
collective actions in the field of security, internal as well as external, through an 
institutionalised procedure - the G C C - is by far more rewarding than individual 
measures. Another is the recognition that the individual nation States are not able to 
withstand the poHtical and economic pressures which they now face on the scale that 
they exist in the Gulf. Furthermore, they have realised that they may not be 
agricultural States, and that they need to diversify their sources of national revenue 
by, inter alia, entering the industrial field for which they have the raw materials. This 
movement towards industrialisation requires a high degree of co-ordination with a 
view to avoiding duplication and future competition. In addition, the six States 
capitalised on the fact that politically as well as from the point of view of security, 
co-operation would be facilitated through economic integration. Therefore, the E A 
was signed in the first year of the GCC's existence. 
Apparently all the above motives as well as other possible ones are still valid 
and constitute compelling reasons for maintaining the G C C , which the States will do. 
This continued needed is strengthened by their stance when Kuwait was invaded by 
Iraq on 2nd August 1990 and later aimexed to Iraq That event was one means, 
and probably the most destructive, which could have arisen to destroy the G C C as one 
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of its Members - Kuwait - was occupied overnight. Political co-operation was not a 
stated objective, and even implicitly was less well articulated and developed than the 
economic one. The invasion and the subsequent military, political and media 
campaign employed by Iraq and other Arab countries against the GCC and its 
Members could have put an end to the GCC experience as a vehicle for integration, 
or at least created differences amongst the Members hence making the future of the 
GCC recede. Nothing of this kind happened. On the contrary, the economic 
integrative journey was protected when security principles formulation throughout 
the decade of the GCC's existence were transformed into deeds. In 1982 the States 
reached an agreement that aggression against one Member is aggression against all 
During the Kuwait crisis these words were honoured by deeds. This is best 
explained by passages from the final Communique of the GCC eleventh summit held 
in December 1990; in that final Communique the States held this view: 
"... the GCC government and peoples stand beside the state of Kuwait in its 
ordeal and extend their full support for and solidarity with the struggle of the 
Kuwaiti government and people until full liberation is achieved." (i^ ) 
"... The GCC at the same time, underlines its Member States' right and 
determination to resort to all means necessary to secure the restoration of 
sovereignty and legitimacy to Kuwait." (20) 
'The Council reiterates the GCC countries' firm stand in the face of the Iraqi 
aggression and their determination to resist it and nullify its negative 
consequences, proceeding from the premise that aggression against any member 
state is aggression against all GCC Member States and that the security of the 
GCC Member States is indivisible." (21) 
This sort of action under the circumstances should make answering questions 
regarding the attaiimient of the GCC less difficult. One is, therefore, inclined to view 
the GCC as an irreversible process, as the Secretary General once said ^^ ^^  
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Now that the continued existence of the GCC seems secure, the question 
becomes whether or not the GCC will generate pressures for closer economic 
integration at which it is aimed, along with the necessary preconditions of political 
co-ordination and measures for stability. This depends on the political goodwill of the 
governments which, even during the Kuwait crisis, showed an enthusiastic attitude 
towards economic integration with the necessary political co-ordination. The eleventh 
summit communique reads (in parts): 
'The GCC emphasises its concern to expedite steps and to make a quahtative 
leap in collective action among the Member States in the forthcoming stage in 
order to achieve further co-ordination, integration and cohesion out of its 
absolute conviction that its members share the same fate and goals." (^3) 
'The GCC Higher Council also reviewed the march of economic action and 
expressed satisfaction with the achievements of joint action in this field. It 
stressed its determination to continue the work to fulfil the ambitions and 
aspirations of the GCC peoples in completing the steps towards economic 
integration. To achieve this goal, the GCC Higher Council assigned the financial 
and economic co-operation committee the task of adopting the necessary 
measures to develop new concepts for joint economic action in order to expedite 
the achievement of economic integration and to draw up a programme to 
complete the establishment of a common Gulf market, agree on a unified trade 
policy, evaluate economic co-operation and examine the texts of the Unified 
Economic Agreement and methods of implementing it with the aim of securing 
new privileges that will enable the citizens of the GCC countries to enjoy new 
benefits in the march towards prosperity and development." (^4) 
The Manamah Declaration issued at the end of the eleventh summit 
embodied the following plans: 
Completing the establishment of security and defensive arrangements for the 
GCC Member States to ensure that the individual national security of each 
member state and the collective regional security of all Member States is 
safeguarded. 
Increasing political co-ordination among the GCC Member States on domestic, 
regional, Arab and international levels. 
Promoting economic co-operation among the GCC Member States, particularly 
in: 
(a) Developing new concepts of common economic action to accelerate 
economic integration. 
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(b) Laying down a programme for completing the establishment of a 
common market among the GCC Member States and of an 
agreement for a unified trade policy. 
(c) Reassessing the Unified Economic Agreement with a view to 
achieving benefits that can bring about a balance of interests among 
the Member States and overcome obstacles. 
Supporting the GCC General Secretariat in forming committees of experts to 
study and develop proposals for integrated projects so that they can be submitted 
to the competent ministerial coinmittees.(25) 
Thus, after a decade of GCC existence, during which several internal as well 
as neighbouring destructive events took place, Member States affirmed that not only 
will the GCC as an international entity be maintained, but also they are resolved to 
promote common actions, and in particular, economic integration will be the subject 
of special attention amounting to assessment and improvement. The EA, as noted in 
the passage cited above, will be evaluated in the light of the experience gained during 
the implementation of its provisions throughout the past decade. As such the GCC 
and its achievements so far are generating more and more measures for closer 
integration. There is no apparent convincing reason to doubt what the GCC 
poHcy-makers have planned for its future. After all, it is in line with the prevailing 
trend in international relations for collective rather than individual actions. 
Another point however remains: that is how future improvement will be best 
controlled. Obviously it is for politicians, economists and time to answer this question. 
However, the chosen way will, of necessity, have legal implications. From a legal point 
of view, should what the States have expressed mean progress within the existing 
treaties, the current legal order of the GCC would increasingly be an inadequate 
contributor to the integration sought. Thus, as the integration process expands further, 
embracing as it grows more and more spheres of economic sovereign powers of 
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Member States, the whole structure and the legal framework of the GCC will have to 
be revised in order to respond to the new circumstances. Whether the required 
development is structural or substantive in nature, the E C then should be the model 
to satisfy the requirements of the coming stage of integration. 
Mention should be made of the role of public opinion within Member States 
in shaping a brighter future for the GCC. Disputing the fact that popular views 
formally have no say in the policymaking within the States, let alone the GCC, they 
have indirect influence and at least can make what has been taken along the road for 
integration irreversible. Amongst the public, especially after the Kuwait crisis, it 
appears that discussion tends to be concentrated on what sort of unity is to be sought 
rather than whether or not it is desirable. For the purpose of generating public support 
for more integrative actions, and public attention for what is taking place, the 
Secretariat General can play a major role. It is necessary to devise forms of GCC 
education that will bring to ordinary citizens of Member States the advantages of 
integration. Notably, the Kuwait crisis, which caught the attention of every GCC 
citizen regardless of age and gender, has contributed considerably to the introduction 
of the GCC to all sections of the six societies. The concrete unified stance of GCC 
Members against the occupation of Kuwait, and the eventual liberation of Kuwait 
from Iraq, must have gained popular blessings for the concept of integration within 
the GCC. 
Briefly, for the foreseeable future, the ultimate and decisive power in the 
GCC will remain, as it does at present, with the governments of the Member States. 
It is they who will determine how rapidly and effectively the treaties are carried out, 
and the speed of future developments. Progress in the direction of supranationality 
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will be dependent on their readiness to make decisions, and to advance beyond the 
present confines of co-operation laid down in the existing treaties. Over the past 
decade. Member States have shown a willingness to commit themselves to modest 
programmes of economic integration, in a pragmatic approach. This is likely to 
continue into the immediate future, which could also witness improvement in the 
judicial machinery and re-organisation of the supervision technique. 
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